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ABSTRACT 
In 1981, during the height of apartheid, the South African national rugby team, the 
Springboks, toured to New Zealand and the United States of America. In South Africa, the 
tour was expected to reopen the doors to international competition for the Springboks after an 
anti-apartheid sporting boycott had forced the sport into relative isolation during the 1970s. In 
the face of much international condemnation, the Springboks toured to New Zealand and the 
USA in 1981 where they encountered large and often violent demonstrations as those who 
opposed the tour attempted to scuttle it. For the duration of the tour, New Zealand was 
plunged into a divisive state of chaos as police and protestors clashed outside heavily fortified 
rugby stadiums. In South Africa, those bleary-eyed rugby fans who braved the early morning 
hours to watch the historic live broadcasts of the matches were greeted with extraordinary 
scenes: rugby fields being combed for glass shards, fishhooks, and nails scattered by anti-tour 
protestors; a pitch invasion at Hamilton forcing the cancellation of the Springboks’ match 
against Waikato; and the infamous Auckland test, dubbed the ‘flour-bomb’ test. While the 
tour matter polarised New Zealanders, there were only minor disruptions during the USA leg 
of the tour as rugby was still a relatively unknown sport to most Americans. Although the 
tour events were a rude awakening to many white South Africans on the hostilities abroad 
towards the apartheid regime, the country’s racist policies remained unyielding. However, the 
tour had repercussions for South African rugby and reflected how desperate establishment 
rugby had become to stave off total isolation. While the tour is frequently mentioned in work 
on the sporting boycott era, it is rarely assigned the significance it deserves. Using hitherto 
untapped archival material this thesis concerns an in depth discussion on the 1981 tour, what 
it revealed about South African rugby at the time, and in particular how the tour had a large 
hand in bringing about South African rugby’s total isolation in the 1980s.  




In 1981, tydens die hoogtepunt van apartheid, het die Suid-Afrikaanse nasionale rugby span, 
die Springbokke, getoer na Nieu-Seeland en die Verenigde State van Amerika toe. In Suid-
Afrika was dit verwag dat die toer die deur vir Springbok-rugby sou oopmaak nadat ŉ anti-
apartheid sport boikot die spel in relatiewe isolasie in gedwing het tydens die 1970’s. In die 
gesig van baie internasionale veroordeling het die Springbokke in 1981 getoer na Nieu-
Seeland en die VSA en is gevolglike deur groot en dikwels gewelddadige optogte teen die 
toer gesteur. Nieu-Seeland is vir die duur van die toer in chaos in gedompel terwyl polisie en 
betogers buite versterkte rugbystadions gebots het. Suid-Afrikaners wat die vroeë oggendure 
getrotseer het om die historiese lewendige uitsendings van wedstryde te kyk is deur 
buitengewone beelde gegroete: rugbyvelde wat ondersoek word vir glas skerwe, vishoeke, en 
spykers gestrooi deur anti-toer betogers; die afstel van die Springbokke se wedstryd teen 
Waikato in Hamilton as gevolg van betogers wat die veld beset het; en die Auckland toets, 
ook bekend as die ‘meel-bom toets’. Terwyl Nieu-Seelanders diep verdeel was oor die toer 
was daar aansienlik minder ontwrigtinge tydens die VSA deel van die toer aangesien rugby 
nog relatief onbekend was vir Amerikaners. Al was die toer ‘n skok vir baie wit Suid-
Afrikaners oor die vyandelikhede in die buiteland teenoor die apartheidsregering, het die land 
se rasistiese beleide onwrikbaar gebly. Die toer het, alhoewel, gevolge gehad vir Suid-
Afrikaanse rugby en het weerspieël hoe desperaat die land se rugby geword het om totale 
isolasie te voorkóm. Die toer word dikwels na verwys in werke oor die sportboikot era maar 
word selde met die beduidende belang toegeken wat dit verdien. Deur gebruik te maak van 
argiefmateriaal sal hierdie tesis ‘n indiepte bespreeking voer oor die 1981 toer, wat dit 
geopenbaar het oor Suid-Afrikaanse rugby op daardie stadium, en in besonder hoe die toer 
bygedra het tot die rugby isolasie van Suid-Afrika tydens die 1980’s.  
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In July 1981, the South African national rugby team, the Springboks, departed on a three-
month long rugby tour of New Zealand and the United States of America. The tour took place 
during the height of the anti-apartheid sporting boycott, which had attempted to isolate South 
African sports teams since the 1960s. Those who supported the boycott believed that if the 
generally sport-mad white South Africans could be isolated, it would place sufficient pressure 
on the Nationalist South African government to abandon its racial supremacy policies. The 
tour would see the Springboks return to New Zealand soil for the first time in 16 years, while 
the USA leg of the tour featured the first test match between the Springboks and USA Eagles.  
However, from the start the tour was plunged into disarray as violent anti-apartheid, anti-tour 
demonstrators attempted to stop the tour in its tracks. In order to prevent the Springboks and 
their opponents from being attacked by angry mobs the tour was forced to operate under strict 
security. However, despite the exhaustive security measures there were still incidents, some 
of which have been etched into public memory of the tour. In Hamilton, the Springboks’ 
match against Waikato was called off after 400 demonstrators occupied the field and a small 
aircraft threatened to crash into the main grandstand. In Auckland, the third and decisive test 
match between the Springboks and All Blacks was plagued by a light aircraft dropping bags 
of flour onto the field and players. In the USA, the historic test match between the 
Springboks and Eagles was played in secrecy and a day ahead of schedule in order to deter 
any protests from interrupting the final match of the tour. 
The tour was heralded as South African rugby’s first merit selected Springbok team to tour to 
New Zealand. South Africa’s white rugby fraternity had hoped that the inclusion of Errol 
Tobias, South Africa’s first black Springbok would calm tensions surrounding the tour. 
However, anti-apartheid supporters of the 1980s were less concerned with the integration of 
South African sport than they were about the removal of apartheid in its entirety. 
Accordingly, Tobias’ presence was dismissed as political window dressing and certainly did 
not aid in softening attitudes toward the touring South Africans.  
In South Africa the tour was coined a ‘pioneer’s tour’. It was believed that the supposed 
multiracial makeup of the team would prove to world rugby that the game in South Africa 
had made definitive steps toward achieving fully integrated sport. In doing so, the South 
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African Rugby Board was responding to the criticism levelled against South African sport in 
the 1970s. Those who advocated a sporting boycott against apartheid South Africa during the 
1970s had stipulated that sport needed to be non-racial before the country’s return to 
international sport would be considered. However, the SARB were slow to come to terms 
with this and were hampered by a government that was slow to initiate change. Thus, by the 
time South African rugby adhered to these non-racial demands, the boycott had changed its 
focus.  
The sporting boycott had revealed sport to be a successful place to apply pressure to the 
apartheid government. The boycott was particularly effective when it came to placing 
pressure on South African rugby. As the game held near religious status amongst Afrikaners, 
the white regime was willing to make certain concession to ensure that international rugby 
continued.  However, granting concessions to rugby only legitimised beliefs that sport could 
pressure the apartheid government into making changes. In essence, sport, and particularly 
rugby, was confirmed as an effective avenue of approach to pressurise the apartheid regime.  
Therefore, when the ‘multiracial’ Springboks arrived in New Zealand and the USA in 1981, 
they discovered that non-racial sport no longer held the weight it had in the 1970s. For the 
South African Rugby Board, 1981 looked like the year that would see off the fears of rugby’s 
total isolation. A bumper year awaited the Springboks as they took on Ireland, New Zealand, 
and the USA, with further prospects of a Welsh tour and an Australian tour in 1982. 
However, following the events that transpired in New Zealand and the USA and the ripples 
they caused, South African rugby found itself truly isolated for the duration of the 1980s. 
Between 1981 and 1992 (by which time the formal dismantling of apartheid was underway) 
the Springboks only played against one of their traditional rivals. The SARB was forced to 
invest in costly ‘rebel tours’ by the New Zealand Cavaliers and South Sea Barbarian in order 
to feed the country’s rugby lust. 
The events during the 1981 tour had made governments and rugby bodies around the world 
weary of competing against the Springboks. By the 1980s, the international spotlight had 
turned onto South Africa and anyone seen to be competing with the ‘racists’ would face 
repercussions. After the mayhem attracted by the Springboks in New Zealand in 1981, it was 
unlikely that their competition would be sought out, particularly as it came with the added 
risk of civil unrest. The Springboks had become a liability to any potential host, and for as 
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long as the South African government perpetuated apartheid, this would be unlikely to 
change.   
For most of the 1980s, the South African Rugby Board was forced to dictate its own future. 
The South African government was facing its own challenges amidst increasing international 
and domestic pressure to remove apartheid. What’s more, the government did not intend to 
remove apartheid merely so that the Springboks could return to international competition.  In 
order to try to stay afloat in international rugby, the SARB was forced to find its way around 
the challenges posed by apartheid. Following the cancelation of tours by Wales, Australia, 
France, New Zealand, and the British and Irish Lions, the SARB made alternate 
arrangements. The afore mentioned rebel tours by the New Zealand Cavaliers (1986) and 
South Sea Barbarians (1987) were among the strategies the SARB implemented to stave off 
the impending isolation. However, amidst the speculation of player payments and the 
bypassing of the International Rugby Board in the arranging of these tours, the SARB wound 
up tarnishing its own reputation and losing numerous of its rugby allies. The rebel tours left 
South African rugby more isolated than it had been prior to them. 
For most of the 1980s, South African rugby was stuck in a rut. The lack of regular 
international competition had a detrimental effect on the game in South Africa. Both player 
and spectator numbers were diminishing as the domestic Currie Cup tournament could not fill 
the void left by international tours. SARB President, Danie Craven, needed to reassess the 
path the Board was on if the game was to survive in South Africa. In 1988, perhaps in a 
moment of desperation (or realisation), Craven entered into negotiations with the exiled 
African National Congress. Recognising that South Africa was unlikely to re-enter 
international rugby without the blessing of the ANC, Craven approached the Congress 
executive. Upon the ANC’s recommendation, the SARB began an amalgamation process 
with the South African Rugby Union. The SARU, whose executive had been present as the 
negotiations, was an ANC affiliate and claimed to be South Africa’s only true non-racial 
rugby body. Unsurprisingly, the negotiations were met with fierce resistance from the South 
African government, who labelled Craven a traitor. It took until 1991 for the two rugby 
bodies to amalgamate, forming the South African Rugby Football Union. By 1992, amidst the 
start of the dismantling of apartheid, South African rugby was readmitted to international 
competition.  South Africa hosted New Zealand and Australia, effectively marking the end of 
the sporting boycott against rugby. 
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For this thesis, an intensive study of the 1981 Springbok tour is undertaken. In doing so, this 
work will attempt to bridge the knowledge gap which exists on the tour. It will be illustrated 
that the 1981 tour was the tipping point of tensions in New Zealand over sporting ties with 
South Africa.  Dating back to the 1960s, New Zealanders grew increasingly uneasy with the 
continuation of rugby ties between the Springboks and the All Blacks amidst apartheid. By 
the late 1960s, unease had turned to protest and, consequentially, forced the cancelation of 
two All Black tours to South Africa. By the time the Springboks arrived in New Zealand in 
1981, attitudes toward South Africa had become openly hostile and led to the violent 
demonstrations during the tour.  
Furthermore, the 1981 Ireland tour of South Africa is discussed as a prelude to the New 
Zealand and USA tour later that year. The Ireland toured revealed how desperate the SARB 
had become to secure the New Zealand tour. The SARB designed the tour as a public 
relations exercise in hope that the Irish team would spread an optimistic image of South 
Africa on their return. This, it was believed, would help to secure the New Zealand tour and 
stave of the brewing storm.   
The tour itself is also discussed in detail. Despite the anti-apartheid nature of the tour 
demonstrations in New Zealand, other factors affected the severity of protests.  For many 
New Zealanders the tour became a proxy through which to deal with matters pertaining to 
their own society. The heavy-handed policing of the tour and the government’s reluctance to 
intervene in the tour all added to further inflaming the situation. The USA leg of the tour is 
also discussed, despite being of less importance to South Africans. The magnitude of the 
events in New Zealand overshadowed the American leg, despite it also being plagued by anti-
apartheid demonstrations. Furthermore, the question is raised of whether the American tour 
was perhaps of political significance to the South African government. South Africa was in 
need of rekindling its relationship with the USA. During the Cold War era, South Africa felt 
itself to be under threat from expanding communist forces in southern Africa, making the 
need for a powerful western ally invaluable. This section, however, only raises the 
plausibility of the tour as a political foray based on the evidence at hand. A further self-
standing study is required to shed light on the matter.  
The final chapter of the thesis concerns an extensive discussion of the ramifications the tour 
caused for South African rugby in the 1980s. Ultimately, the tour had a large hand in 
isolating South African rugby. In order to try to offset this isolation, the SARB were forced to 
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implement numerous initiatives to keep the country’s rugby afloat internationally. However, 
most of these initiatives failed and, as was the case with the rebel tours, generally left the 
SARB worse off. As is mentioned earlier, it was under these circumstances that Danie Craven 
entered into negotiations with the ANC on how South African rugby could be rectified. 
Ultimately, the ripples caused by the 1981 tour can be traced to this point, after which new 
forces began to dictate the path South African rugby followed.   
The 1981 tour was a watershed moment for South African rugby. This is rarely 
acknowledged by other work in this area of history. This thesis is one of the first pieces of 
extensive academic work to be conducted solely on the 1981 tour. While the tour is often 
referred to in work on the sporting boycott era, it is rarely assigned the significance it 
deserves.   
A Literary Overview of the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand and the USA  
Rugby in South Africa has drawn significant attention in academia. During the rise of 
Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s, the game was used to inculcate burgeoning 
societal values to the Afrikaner people. Consequently, the game came to be regarded as the 
hallowed sport of the Afrikaner nation. This history is well documented and continues to 
draw interest in academia. Furthermore, the sporting boycott era has been equally well 
documented. The boycott era, spanning the period of some thirsty years between 1960 and 
1990, remains one of the largest areas of historical interest on South African sport and 
continues to churn out research on a regular basis. As the national sport of the Afrikaner 
nation, rugby has drawn ample studies, particularly on how the sport operated during the 
boycott era. Isolating South African rugby was regarded as key to the boycott’s success, as 
the game was imbued with social and cultural significance to Afrikaners. While much has 
been written on South African rugby during the boycott era, very few works have 
endeavoured to explore the significance of the 1981 tour and its ramifications. As shall be 
illustrated, the 1981 tours is frequently mentioned as a dark moment in South Africa’s rugby 
history, but is rarely accorded further importance.  
Paul Dobson, former official historian of the South African Rugby Board, has written 
prolifically on South African rugby history. Dobson’s Rugby’s Greatest Rivalry: South Africa 
vs. New Zealand (1996), Rugby in South Africa (1989), and Doc: The Life of Danie Craven 
(1994) covers the boycott era and refers to the 1981 tour. In Rugby’s Greatest Rivalry, 
Dobson records the history of Springbok-All Black encounters. The book starts with the first 
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official test between the two teams in 1921, and concludes with the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 
where the Springboks defeated the All Blacks in the tournament’s final. When writing about 
the 1981 tour, Dobson reminiscences on some of the more unusual features of the tour. The 
pitch invasion at Hamilton and the ‘flour-bomb test’ in Auckland are discussed, as well as the 
generally torrid time the Springboks had at the hands of the New Zealand protestors. 
Ultimately, though, Dobson provides a recollection of the tour but does not provide any 
discussion on the ripples caused by the tour. While Dobson’s only discusses the tour, this 
thesis will highlight how the tour ramifications had a large hand in isolating South Africa 
rugby in the 1980s. Furthermore, Dobson discusses the 1985 All Black tour cancelation and 
1986 Cavaliers rebel tour. However, Dobson does not acknowledge the role the 1981 tour 
played in both of these events.  This thesis will illustrate that, in fact, the 1981 tour was 
integral to the cancelation of the 1985 All Black tour of South Africa and ensuing Cavaliers 
rebel tour.  
The second of Dobson’s listed books, Rugby in South Africa, ranges beyond the South 
Africa-New Zealand rivalry. Instead, Rugby in South Africa concerns a general history of the 
game in South Africa between 1861 and 1988. Once again, Dobson’s book covers the 
sporting boycott era and refers to the 1981 tour. However, the book refers chiefly to the on-
field actives of South African rugby during the allotted period. Perhaps, then, the greatest 
difference between this thesis and Dobson’s work is where the focus lies. This thesis will 
focus primarily on the events that took place off the field. While mention is made of certain 
matches, this work focuses predominantly on how facilitating rugby tours during the boycott 
era were detrimental to Springbok rugby. 
However, Dobson’s books were not meant to be profound analytical works into the rugby 
isolation period. Instead, these books ascribe more to the ‘coffee-table book’ type of history, 
something that is easily accessible to people interested in the history of South African rugby. 
Although Dobson’s books do provide good accounts of the difficulties South African rugby 
faced during the boycott era, they do not elaborate extensively on the 1981 tour. 
Fundamentally, they do not discuss the 1981 in depth, the circumstances that led to the events 
on tour, or link the 1981 tour to South Africa’s rugby isolation in the 1980s. In essence, 
Dobson’s books provide the reader with a good chronological recollection of events with 
enough information to understand the context wherein the documented rugby matches took 
place.  
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The New Zealander, Grant Harding, and South African, David Williams, have also 
contributed to the literature on the South Africa – New Zealand rivalry. Their book, Toughest 
of Them All (2000), is a similar book to Dobson’s Rugby’s Greatest Rivalry as it provides the 
reader with a history of the rivalry. Naturally then, the 1981 tour does feature in Toughest of 
Them All. As Harding was a student in New Zealand during the 1981 Springbok tour, he 
provides a useful first-hand perspective of how many New Zealanders experienced the tour. 
However, Harding does not elaborate on the long term effects the tour had on either New 
Zealand or South Africa. Furthermore, the book does not discuss the tour from a South 
African perspective. In Harding’s chapter, “1981: When Sport and Politics Mix”, he outlines 
that apartheid was the catalyst for the demonstrations during the tour. However, Harding does 
not delve deeper on how the tour became a proxy through which many New Zealanders aired 
their frustrations with their own society. This was a major feature of the tour and certainly 
had the effect of inflaming the demonstrations.  
However, the general approach of Toughest of Them All towards the 1981 tour seems to 
suggest that political problems had made rugby difficult, but ultimately could not stop it. The 
following extract from Harding’s chapter provides an insight on his approach to the tour: 
“Despite the 5000 protestors outside the ground, the 2000 police and the barbed 
wire, it had been a match of quality. Most of the typical features of a New 
Zealand – South Africa Test…”1 
It must be noted, however, that Harding and Williams’ book also ascribes to the ‘coffee-table 
book’ type of history. The book mentions key moments in the history of competition between 
South Africa and New Zealand but does not identify the sort of causal links that are important 
to this thesis. For instance, Harding does not elaborate on whether the 1981 tour 
demonstrations had any long-term effects on either South Africa or New Zealand. 
Furthermore, in both Toughest of Them All and Rugby’s Greatest Rivalry, the 1981 tour and 
subsequent event are discussed as products of the restrictions the sporting boycott placed on 
South Africa sport.  
Ultimately, this thesis highlights several points on the 1981 tour that are not acknowledged 
by Harding and Williams. For instance, Harding and Williams do not demonstrate that the 
events that unfolded in New Zealand during the 1981 tour can be traced to the growing 
                                                            
1 G. Harding, D. Williams: Toughest of Them All, p. 116. 
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unease many New Zealanders felt toward their country’s sporting ties with South Africa. 
Impatience with apartheid had been growing in New Zealand since 1965, when H.F 
Verwoerd banned Maoris from playing in South Africa. Furthermore, this thesis argues that 
some notable features on the South African rugby landscape in the 1980s – the 1985 All 
Black tour cancelation; the rebel tours; and the country’s exclusion from the first Rugby 
World Cup (RWC) – should be considered as part of the 1981 tour ramifications. 
Another author who has written prolifically on boycott era rugby in South Africa is John 
Nauright. In Sport, Cultures, and Identities in South Africa (1997), Nauright discusses the 
origin of the sporting boycott, as well as why rugby was of such importance to the boycotters. 
As the book’s title suggests, Nauright addresses sport in general and does not only focus on 
rugby. However, Nauright devotes a brief section to the 1981 Springbok tour of New 
Zealand. Nauright provides a good discussion on the significance of the tour events, and 
particularly on how it influenced white South Africans. While Nauright discusses the 1985 
All Black tour, 1986 Cavaliers tour, and 1987 RWC, he too does not link these events to the 
ripples of the 1981 tour. Nauright’s take on the 1981 tour, however, creates the impression 
that this tour was of greater importance to South African rugby than any tour preceding it.  
However, as a study of sport in South Africa, ranging from its imperial origins until after the 
collapse of apartheid, Nauright’s book does tend to condense information. For this thesis, 
rugby in the 1980s is of importance in order to trace the extent of the 1981 tour ripples. 
Nauright, however, is relatively brief in his discussion on this period and does not elaborate 
on certain key features this thesis intends to expand on. However, the book provides a good 
historical recollection of mainstream South African sport and the complexities of the sporting 
boycott. 
Furthermore, Nauright has co-written a book with David Black, titled Rugby and the South 
African Nation. In their chapter, “Springbok-All Black Rugby, Sanctions and Politics, 1959-
92”, Nauright and Black provide an excellent discussion on the boycott era history between 
the Springboks and All Blacks. The chapter discusses the difficulty of sustaining a rugby 
relationship, particularly after H.F. Verwoerd in 1965 banned Maori’s from touring South 
Africa with the All Blacks. Furthermore, the chapter refers to how the All Black-Springbok 
relationship (particularly after 1981) threatened to, and in several cases succeeded in, 
plunging the Olympic and Commonwealth Games into jeopardy. In particular, numerous 
African countries boycotted the 1976 Summer Olympic Games due to New Zealand’s 
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presence at the games. New Zealand had provoked the ire of many African nations when the 
All Blacks toured South Africa shortly after the 1976 Soweto uprising. The 1978 
Commonwealth Games was also boycotted due to New Zealand’s presence. The 1981 tour 
also very nearly led to boycotts at the 1982 Commonwealth Games and 1984 Summer 
Olympic Games. While Nauright and Black do provide a great deal of insight on the sporting 
boycott era and the difficulties faced by Springbok-All Black rugby, they do not provide a 
great deal of analysis on the 1981 tour. Importantly though, they do contend that the events 
during the tour came as a rude awakening to white South Africans on the hostilities abroad 
toward the apartheid regime. This will elaborated on at a later stage.  
The sport boycott era has also yielded a significant number of journal articles. In his article, 
Hitting Apartheid for Six: The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott, Douglas Booth 
discusses the effectiveness of the sports boycott’s ability to apply pressure on the Nationalist 
government to implement reform. Although Booth’s article discusses sport in general, he 
does pay special attention to rugby during the boycott. The article argues that the increasing 
liability of Springbok tours abroad and the eventual abandonment of international rugby ties 
with South Africa added to doubts about the viability of apartheid. Booth’s article also 
discusses how the objectives of the sports boycott continually shifted. This is significant to 
this work, as it will be demonstrated that the SARB were late to come to terms with these 
changing objectives. Consequently, the Board would implement initiatives that could no 
longer relieve the pressure of the boycott. Although Booth comments on numerous aspects of 
the boycott that are relevant to this thesis, he also does not discuss the 1981 tour in any 
significant depth or establish causal links between the 1981 tour and South African rugby’s 
isolation in the 1980s.   
Others who have written articles on the sporting boycott include Bruce Kidd (The Campaign 
against Sport in South Africa), Rob Nixon (Apartheid on the Run: The South African Sports 
Boycott), and Paul Martin (South African Sport: Apartheid’s Achilles Heel?). These 
academics have contributed substantial discussions to the sporting boycott debate, usually in 
order to assess how effective the boycott was in dismantling apartheid. While the sporting 
boycott on its own could lead to the dismantling of apartheid, the boycott did contribute to 
growing white insecurities about the sustainability of the regime. While these academics 
provide useful insights and information regarding the boycott, they tend to provide a general 
overview of the period. While most of these articles mention the 1981 tour, they do not 
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regard it as an event with particular significance and therefore do not provide any sort of 
discussion on it.   
Several of the Springboks who toured to New Zealand and the USA in 1981 have also penned 
their memoirs of the tour. Theuns Stofberg’s Stories from the Touchline (2016), Rob Louw’s 
For the Love of Rugby (1987), Wynand Claassen’s More than Just Rugby (1985), and Errol 
Tobias’ Pure Gold (2016) all deal with the issues of the 1981 tour. These recollections are 
first-hand accounts of the players’ perspective of the tour and often provide information that 
could not be found elsewhere. However, as Claassen and Louw’s books were authored in 
1985 and 1987 respectively, they do not cover the full extent of the period this thesis 
proposes to focus on, which ends in 1992. On the other hand, Tobias and Stofberg’s books 
are written in 2015 and 2016 respectively, meaning there is a 35-year gap between the events 
and their recollections thereof. Thus, it is always a possibility that information has gone 
astray in their recollections or that their interpretations of events have been altered as time 
has moved on. Furthermore, as these books are meant as memoirs, they do not provide a great 
deal of interpretation of events or place them into historical significance. 
While in South Africa there have been limited publications on the tour, there have been 
numerous works published in New Zealand on the tour. Geoff Chapple’s 1981: The Tour 
(1984) provides an account from the perspectives of those who protested against the 
Springbok in New Zealand during the tour. The majority of the information used to compile 
Chapple’s work was collected from an anti-tour organisation and therefore has a very specific 
agenda in its approach to the tour. The book, however, elaborates predominantly on the New 
Zealand perspective of the tour and therefore does not provide much use to this thesis. This 
work centres on how the tour events were received in South Africa, as well as the 
ramifications the tour had for South African rugby in the 1980s.  
Another work on the tour from a New Zealand perspective is Thomas Newnham’s By Batons 
and Barbed Wire (2003). Newnham discusses the anti-tour protests that took place in New 
Zealand, but specifically those that took place in Auckland. As Newnham himself was an 
anti-tour protestor greatly involved in the demonstrations, the book has a very specific agenda 
with regard to the way in which the tour is remembered. However, as was the case with 
Chapple’s book, Newnham’s work does not pose much relevance to this thesis as it focuses 
predominantly on the effects the tour had on New Zealand. The book does not provide a 
discussion on how the tour contributed to South African rugby’s isolation in the 1980s. 
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Ross Meurant has also published on the tour. His book, The Red Squad Story (1982), traces 
his own experiences as a police officer during the tour. Meurant was a member of the Red 
Squad, who protected the Springboks in New Zealand. Meurant’s book provides a good 
recollection of the tour events, as well as how New Zealand police officers regarded the 
significance of the tour to New Zealand society. However, as Meurant’s book was published 
in 1982 his narrative does not include a long-term discussion of the repercussions of the tour. 
Ultimately, these authors do not assign the 1981 Springbok tour the significance it deserves. 
Although each of the authors discusses the tour in their own way, they do not regard the tour 
was as the watershed moment it was for South African rugby. These authors tend to discuss 
the tour events as being indicative of the pressure that apartheid and the sporting boycott was 
placing on South African rugby. However, they do not identify the long-term impact the tour 
had on South African rugby. 
Thus, there exists a knowledge gap in the existing literature on the tour. Although the tour is 
frequently mentioned in work on the sporting boycott, it is rarely assigned the significance it 
deserves as a watershed moment for South African rugby. None of the above-mentioned 
work provides an in-depth discussion on the tour events, elaborate on what brought about 
these events, or whether there were any ramifications for South African rugby following the 
tour. Due to the bizarre events that took place during the tour, it has become commonplace to 
use the tour to sensationalize the boycott era and the difficulties faced by South African sport. 
It is here where this thesis will set itself apart from other work. This thesis will illustrate that 
the 1981 tour events were the final stage in a process that started in the 1960s as New 
Zealanders grew increasing uncomfortable about their sporting ties with South Africa. While 
the tour events had an immediate and very visible impact on New Zealand, the effects the 
tour had on South Africa were prolonged over the 1980s. Ultimately, the ripples caused by 
the 1981 tour finally isolated South African rugby. With the onset of isolation, something that 
the SARB had been able to avoid for almost two decades, the rugby establishment was forced 
into new strategies to save the game in South Africa. These strategies were usually short-
lived and counterproductive to the SARB and ultimately only further isolated the Board from 
world rugby. Furthermore, this thesis will argue that events such as the 1983 International 
Rugby Media Congress, the 1985 All Black tour cancelation, the 1986 Cavaliers tour, and 
eventual 1988 meetings between the SARB and ANC were all ways through which the SARB 
attempted to combat the ramifications of the 1981 tour.  
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Problem Statement and Methodology  
The significance of the 1981 Springbok tour is generally understated. The tour is often 
referred to in order to illustrate the suffocating conditions the sporting boycott placed on 
South African sport. However, the tour itself is rarely studied. It remains unacknowledged 
that the tour events had their own unique causes and that the tour itself influenced the future 
of South African rugby. Therefore, this thesis argues that the 1981 Springbok tour of New 
Zealand and the USA was a watershed moment in South African rugby. The 1981 tour is 
closely studied for how it influenced on South African rugby, and not merely as a by-product 
of the greater sporting boycott. Previous research has tended to lump the 1981 tour into 
general discussions on the sporting boycott era.  
This thesis elaborates on why rugby was targeted by the sporting boycott, and specifically 
why the Springbok-All Black contest became significant to the boycott. Furthermore, while 
the Springbok tour was the catalyst for the demonstrations in New Zealand, it will be shown 
that these demonstrations took on a different significance during the tour. New Zealand’s 
own domestic issues came to the surfaces during these demonstrations and certainly added to 
the ferocity of the protests against the Springboks.  
Furthermore, the 1981 tour contributed significantly to South African rugby’s isolation in the 
1980s and early 1990s, something which is rarely acknowledged. Following the tour, the 
Springboks were labelled as a liability. The New Zealand and USA tours had proved that a 
touring Springbok side could attract significant social unrest and, consequently, deterred 
rugby nations around the world from extending an invitation to the South Africans. The 
isolation that gripped South African rugby in the 1980s forced the SARB to implement some 
decisive changes. These changes ultimately resulted in Danie Craven meeting with the ANC 
to try to relieve the pressure on South African rugby.  
With regard to methodology, this thesis utilises qualitative data, the majority of which are 
primary sources. Newspaper articles form a large component of the research collected for this 
thesis. While newspaper articles can provide in depth information on events taking place at 
the time, they can also offer insight into the prevailing attitudes of the time. The Cape based 
Newspaper, Die Burger, which was widely regarded as the mouthpiece of the Cape National 
Party, provides a good source of ‘establishment thinking’. The more liberal Cape Times is 
also used as way to juxtapose the views of the more conservative Die Burger. Furthermore, 
several articles from the Rand Daily Mail are used in order to provide a perspective that was 
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openly hostile towards apartheid and the NP. The Times (England) is also used in order to 
provide a useful international perspective on the 1981 tour.  
However, the majority of the research used in this thesis is archival material. The South 
African Rugby Board Archive, housed at Stellenbosch University, has yielded the majority of 
the research used to substantiate this work. This thesis is the first piece of work to utilise this 
archive to substantiate an argument on the 1981 tour. The material in this archive ranges from 
personal letters, to official correspondences between international rugby boards, to SARB 
meeting minutes, to newspaper articles and provides an excellent insight into the internal 
workings of the SARB. This archival research permits one to delve deep into the background 
machineries of the Board and presents information that was generally not available to the 
public. Thus, archival material provides an accurate insight into what was going on in the 
South African Rugby Board between 1981 and 1992. 
This thesis has also made use of interviews with some of the Springboks who took part in the 
1981 tour. Interviews with former Springbok Captain, Theuns Stofberg, and former 
Springbok loose-forward, DeVilliers Visser, were conducted in order to gain a players’ 
perspective on the tour. However, as there is a 35-year gap between the tour events and the 
players’ recollection thereof, there is always a possibility that information has gone astray or 
that subsequent events have led to a reinterpretation of their recollections.  
Furthermore, there have been several Springboks who have published on their experiences 
during the 1981 tour. As some of these works were published soon after the tour, they 
provide reliable and original information as there was a short time-lapse between the tour and 
the publication of their recollections. While former Springboks, Wynand Claassen and Rob 
Louw, published their recollections in 1985 and 1986 respectively, others such as Theuns 
Stofberg and Errol Tobias have only recently come forth with their recollections of the tour. 
However, while not discounting the value of Stofberg and Tobias’ contributions, a lengthy 
period has elapsed between the event and their recollections thereof. However, these works 
do still provide valuable insight into the tour, particularly with regard to the players’ 
perceptions on why the demonstrations were taking place. 
This thesis has also made use of numerous secondary sources, particularly journal articles and 
books. These sources have predominantly been used in the first part of the thesis during 
which an overall discussion on rugby during the sporting boycott is presented. This secondary 
literature has formed the basis of providing the reader with an informed overview of the 
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general conditions leading up to the 1981 tour, as well as South African politics in the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, virtually no secondary sources correlate with the central argument this 
thesis presents. Thus, the majority of the evidence used to substantial the claims made in this 
thesis is derived from primary sources, with any secondary sources merely playing an 
ancillary role in this work. 
Structure   
This thesis consists of six chapters, including this introductory chapter. In the second chapter, 
the reader is introduced to the significance of rugby to Afrikaner Nationalism, as this is 
valuable in understanding why the sporting boycott became obsessed with isolating rugby. 
This chapter also sheds light on why the ruling National Party were willing to grant certain 
concessions to rugby in the 1960s and 1970s in order for to maintain international rugby ties. 
Furthermore, this chapter provides the reader with a general overview of the conditions faced 
by South African sport under the sporting boycott and, specifically, how the boycott affected 
South Africa-New Zealand rugby relations. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on 
the state of rugby and the boycott in the years immediately leading up to 1981.  
Chapter’s three, four, and five all deal with South African rugby in 1981. Chapter three starts 
with a discussion on the 1981 Ireland tour of South Africa, the first time the Irish team had 
been on South African soil in 22 years. For the SARB, however, the Ireland tour presented a 
way to secure the upcoming New Zealand tour. The Board used the tour as a public relations 
exercise to ensure that the Irish team would report favourably on South African rugby with 
the conclusion of the tour.  
Chapter four discusses the New Zealand leg of the 1981 tour and the chaos that ensued at the 
hands of demonstrators. The chapter illustrates the extent to which New Zealand society was 
divided over the tour. Furthermore, this chapter discusses how the tour became a vehicle 
through which many New Zealand’s voiced opposition to their own domestic troubles. As a 
result, the ferocity of the protests increased to the extent that the New Zealand government 
deemed the tour a matter of maintaining law on order.  
Chapter five discusses the largely unknown Springbok tour of the USA. The America leg of 
the tour was of less importance to South African rugby enthusiasts and was somewhat an 
anti-climax after the riveting New Zealand tour. However, despite rugby being somewhat 
unknown to Americans, the Springboks were still targeted by potentially dangerous anti-
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apartheid demonstration. The team faced threats, such as the use of bombs, which resulted in 
drastic steps to protect the team but ensuring the tour proceeded. In order to prevent any 
disruptions to Springboks’ match against the USA Eagles, the game was played ahead of 
schedule and in absolute secrecy. However, this chapter also raises the question that the USA 
tour may well have taken place for reasons other than rugby. The South African government 
was facing what it believed to be a communist inspire onslaught from southern Africa and 
was in dire need of western allies. Based on the evidence at hand, tour may well have been a 
way of extending a hand of friendship to the USA newly elected President, Ronald Reagan, 
of the Republican Party. Historically, the Republican Party had taken a softer line towards 
apartheid South Africa, making it likely that Reagan too would be more sympathetic to South 
Africa than his Democrat predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had.  
The final chapter of the thesis concerns the large hand the 1981 tour played in isolating South 
African rugby in the 1980s. The chapter illustrates that South African rugby came to be 
regarded as a security risk internationally as a touring Springbok side was likely to draw mass 
demonstrations on tour. Furthermore, following New Zealand Prime Minister, Robert 
Muldoon, violating the Gleneagles Agreement by allowing the Springboks to tour in 1981, 
the agreement was tightened up. To ensure that no Commonwealth nation engaged in sport 
with South Africa, transgression of the Gleneagles Agreement would now be punished, which 
include the possibility of expulsion from the Commonwealth Games. As the majority of 
South Africa’s traditional rugby rivals were from Commonwealth nations, the SARB found 
itself with relatively few rugby allies.  
Staring isolation in the face, the SARB was forced to come up with new ways to keep itself in 
the international rugby realm. The SARB became involved with three organisations, Freedom 
in Sport, Stop Politics in Rugby, and Free Nation New Zealand, who abhorred political 
involvement in sport. These organisations regarded the Springboks as being a victim of 
political interference in sport and attempted to aid the SARB in returning to the international 
rugby scene. In order to achieve this, these organisations attempted to promote a multiracial 
image of the SARB as evidence that apartheid had been removed in rugby.  
Furthermore, the cancelation of the 1985 All Black tour and subsequent rebel tours are also 
discussed as ripples caused by the 1981 tour. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how 
the SARB were forced into marketing South African rugby, which was rapidly waning in 
popularity and quality. As South African rugby received little assistance from the South 
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African government in offsetting isolation, Danie Craven was forced to take the matter into 
his own hands. In what the SARB called its ‘African initiative, Danie Craven turned to the 
ANC for help on how South African rugby could return to international competition, 























Sport in Society and a General Overview of the Conditions 
Leading up to the 1981 Tour 
“Analysis of a nation at play reveals the stuff of its social fabric and value 
system, and tells us much about other facets of political and economic life”.2 
The 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand and the United States of America must be regarded 
as one of the most important tours undertaken by a Springbok team, as it was a watershed 
moment for South African rugby, the ripples of which could be felt deep into the 1980s. The 
tour must not, however, be seen as an isolated incident but instead as the final stage in a 
series of developments created by the increasing emphasis the anti-apartheid sporting boycott 
placed on putting a stop to South Africa-New Zealand rugby relations. It can be argued that 
the events that unfolded in New Zealand during the 1981 tour were already set in motion by 
the late 1950s, as New Zealanders became increasingly uncomfortable with the exclusion of 
Maoris from All Black teams when touring South Africa, as per the South African 
government’s request. Every contest between the South Africa and New Zealand since has 
involved a measure of controversy surrounding the sustained relationship with a racist 
regime.  
Therefore, in order to comprehend the ferocity of the 1981 tour events in New Zealand and to 
understand that these events were a long time in the making, it is necessary to have a 
sufficient understanding of the years leading up to the tour. Furthermore, as this thesis will 
discuss the effects the 1981 tour had on South Africa over the course of the 1980s, it is 
necessary to recognize the symbolic significance of rugby to Afrikaner nationalism. 
Understanding this relationship goes a long way toward explaining white South Africa’s 
astonishment at the 1981 tour events and subsequent isolation. Therefore, a brief section is 
devoted to understanding how the game came to symbolise national pride and power for the 
Afrikaner nation. The penultimate section of this chapter concerns a discussion on the 
international anti-apartheid sporting boycott. The boycott was implemented against South 
Africa in an attempt to pressurize the South African government into scrapping its racist 
laws. Although the sporting boycott impacted heavily on a number of South Africa’s amateur 
                                                            
2 J. W. Loy, G.S. Kenyon: Sport, Culture and Society: A Reader on the Sociology of Sport, p. 14. 
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sporting codes, this section will focus specifically on South African rugby under the boycott 
and how they boycott faced difficulties in isolating the game.  
Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion on the rugby relationship between New 
Zealand and South Africa in the years immediately preceding the 1981 tour, as well as how it 
became increasingly difficult to maintain this relationship. From the early 1960s, New 
Zealanders started to question the morality of sustaining rugby ties with South Africa. 
Consequently, New Zealand protests against this contest started to gather momentum. In the 
1960s, New Zealanders demanded that Maori’s no longer be excluded on All Black tours to 
South Africa. By the 1970s, protests had shifted their focus and demanded non-racial sport in 
South Africa before the All Black-Springbok rivalry continued. Finally, by the 1980s protests 
condemned apartheid and called for it to be scrapped. However, rugby contests between 
South Africa and New Zealand continued despite these protest. Consequently, New Zealand 
became a kingpin in the sports boycott due to the value South African rugby placed on 
sustaining contact with the All Blacks. As Danie Craven noted in the late 1980s, “without the 
All Blacks it is just not rugby”.3   
A Second Religion: Rugby and Afrikaner Nationalism  
There has been no shortage of written material on the relationship between rugby and 
Afrikaner nationalism. For white South Africans, particularly Afrikaners, rugby transcended 
the traditional significance of a sport and became part of the identity of their society. 
Although the saying that rugby is the Afrikaners’ second religion is perhaps exaggerated, it 
does capture the prominence of the game in Afrikaner society. Thus, when rugby became the 
target of the international sporting boycott, it was more significant that just preventing the 
Springboks from touring overseas. International rugby was a way through which Afrikaner 
nationalism could demonstrate its symbolic power to the world, and with the boycott, chances 
to do this grew scarce. Furthermore, the way in which Afrikaner nationalism permeated 
rugby is significant in understanding why the game came under fire from the boycott 
movement. As the sacred game of Afrikaners, rugby was targeted on a greater scale than any 
other sport, and particularly the country’s rugby ties with traditional rivals like England and 
New Zealand. Despite the best efforts of the boycotters, the game took much longer to isolate 
than any other South African sport. This was largely due to the Nationalist government’s 
                                                            
3 SARB Archive, Collection C2: Craven, D.H., Box Rugby/Politiek. Danie Craven’s responds to questions from 
Haruhisa Kodaira, Chief Editor of Rugby Magazine Japan, no date available. 
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willingness to make certain concessions to rugby in order to secure Springbok rugby’s place 
on the international circuit.   
When assessing the symbolic significance that developed between rugby and Afrikaner 
society in the twentieth century, the notion that ‘it is just a game’ does not hold substance. 
Like the Afrikaners, numerous other societies have found a cultural and nationalistic outlet in 
sport (often in one specific sport). The way in which a society plays sport – and the sport they 
choose to play - reflects the social and cultural values that society regards highly.4 For 
Afrikaners, a society that by the start of the twentieth century had little shared history or 
commonality, rugby served as a cultural initiative that brought people together. The sport 
helped to create and reinforce Afrikaner societal values and sketched them as something 
desirable, as exhibited by those playing the game. In his analysis of nationalism through 
sport, Matti Goksøyr writes: “sport seems to be the carrier of claimed implicit virtues highly 
regarded in the home country”.5 For Afrikaners the virtues of rugby extended far beyond the 
field. The game was believed to foster good moral values amongst its participants. One does 
not have to look far to identify the sort virtues that Afrikaners took from the game – 
discipline, strength, determination, teamwork, endurance. The fact that Afrikaners excelled at 
the game to the point where they were regarded as among the best in the world at rugby 
certainly aided the sport being adopted as the society’s national sport.6  
Those who excelled at the sport came to be national heroes, fine specimen who embodied the 
best virtues of the Afrikaner people. The prestige embodied in the game is evident when 
considering the political campaigns of rugby idols Dawid de Villiers and Kobus Louw. Both 
De Villiers and Louw had donned the Springbok jersey in their time as players and used their 
social status associated with their rugby success as a means to gain support amongst white 
South Africans for their respective political campaigns.7 With the social prestige associated 
with being a top rugby player, it is not surprising that numerous Springboks, and other high-
ranking Afrikaner rugby players, where recruited into the Broederbond. The Broederbond 
                                                            
4 J. W. Loy, G.S. Kenyon: Sport, Culture and Society: A Reader on the Sociology of Sport, p. 14. 
5 J. Nauright, S.W. Pope (ed.): Routledge Companion to Sports History, p. 283 
6 A national sport implies that it is the sport in the country which, amongst other things, draws the largest 
following and has the greatest number of active participants. If this was to be accurately applied in apartheid 
South Africa it would most likely have been soccer which would be the country’s national sport. However, with 
a white Afrikaner government in power the national sport came to reflect that sport which was most popular 
amongst Afrikaners, making rugby the South Africa’s national sport. 
7 J. Nauright, D. Black: Rugby and the South African Nation, p. 62. 
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was an organisation consisting of the society’s most influential Afrikaners – dubbed the 
‘Super Afrikaners’ - and “strove for the ideal of an everlasting and separate Afrikaner 
nation…and the promotion of Afrikaner interests”.8 The Broederbond shared a close-knit 
relationship with the National Party and became a major, but subtle force in the cultural 
wellbeing of Afrikaner society. With the prerogative of the Broederbond, it attempted to 
capture those who held the most esteemed positions in Afrikaner society. Naturally, rugby 
managers, coaches, board members, and players, particularly national or provincial players 
made up significant numbers of Broeders (Brothers).  
In attempting to create a national identity for a collection of people who otherwise did not 
have much in common, the white South African government of the 1930s and 1940s used 
rugby as a tool through which to create a sense of national identity. The game was stripped of 
its British legacy and remoulded as Afrikaners made the game their own. Rugby became 
something which people could unite in and develop a sense of commonality. As a cultural 
expression of Afrikaner society the game developed close ties with the nationalist 
government who viewed it as a way to reinforce the sense of Afrikanerdom as a powerful, 
disciplined, and enduring society, as was depicted by those playing the game. In his analysis 
on rugby and Afrikaner nationalism Albert Grundlingh writes that “the rugged aspects of the 
game could easily be equated with a resurgent and rampant Afrikaner nationalism.”9  
Furthermore, rugby was used by the Afrikaners to outdo the British Empire at their own 
game, making rugby a powerful nationalistic mechanism in shaking off the shackles left by 
the British colonialism. With the desire to create an authentic Afrikaner culture in the 1930s 
and 1940s, much of Afrikaner nationalist intent was directed toward “a more prosperous 
future, free from British domination.”10 Writing on the relationship between rugby and 
Afrikaner nationalism, David Black and John Nauright have made the point that the game 
enabled Afrikaners to “indulge their continued animus towards the sons of the British 
Empire”.11 These hostilities also manifested themselves in South Africa – such as with 
derby’s between the Afrikaans Stellenbosch University and the English University of Cape 
Town – as well as on the test arena where the Springboks’ competed against England and the 
British and Irish Lions. These contests took on significance beyond the field. They became a 
                                                            
8 J. Nauright, D. Black: Rugby and the South African Nation, p. 62. 
9 A. Grundlingh: Potent Pastimes: Sport and Leisure Practices in Modern Afrikaner History, p. 61. 
10 Ibid. 
11 J. Nauright, D. Black: Rugby and the South African Nation, p. 62. 
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way for Afrikaners to express the symbolic power of their emergent society. The dominance 
of Springbok rugby served Afrikaner nationalism well, particularly in its success over the 
British Empire. The Springboks could stake a claim to be the best in the world, something 
that very few facets of Afrikaner society could do. Thus, the dominance of the Springboks 
came to serve as a form of “ethnic self-esteem” to the Afrikaner nation.12 This serves as the 
prowess of sport – it is ignored that a 15-man rugby team beat another 15-man rugby team, 
but instead one nation has beaten another nation. With the history of conflict and domination 
of the British Empire over Afrikaners, such successes meant a great deal more than a sporting 
victory to the Afrikaner society. The success of Afrikaners at rugby and the resounding 
successes of the Springboks on an international scale “came to symbolise both the actual and 
potential achievements of the Afrikaner people”.13 In essence, support rugby in South Africa 
transcended merely supporting a popular pastime. 
Although it has been observed that nationalistic tendencies emerging when supporting a 
national sporting side are not indicative of general nationalistic/patriotic tendencies, in South 
Africa, this was different. In his book, Potent Pastimes, Albert Grundlingh notes: “support 
for the Springboks was on the same continuum as membership of the National Party”.14 
There was a particularly strong correlation between the values of rugby and the values of 
emerging Afrikaner society. The fact that rugby, by and large, attracted conservative and 
authoritarian types further aided the development of Afrikaner culture as it “reinforced values 
like respect for perceived tradition, rules and authority, integral to the nationalist movement, 
and at the same time encouraged certain cultural conformity”.15 
South African Rugby and the International Sporting Boycott 
The international sporting boycott against South Africa refers to the movement that lasted 
from approximately 1960 until 1992, during which time foreign governments, sporting 
bodies, and anti-apartheid organisations attempted to isolate South African sport from all 
international competition. Along with limited economic sanctions, arms embargos, cultural 
and academic boycotts, it was hoped that isolating South Africa sport would be able to place 
sufficient pressure on the white government to abandon its apartheid policy. Although the 
                                                            
12 A. Grundlingh: Potent Pastimes, p. 69. 
13 J. Nauright, D. Black: Rugby and the South African Nation, p. 61. 
14 A. Grundlingh: Potent Pastimes, p. 64. 
15 Ibid. 
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sporting boycott alone could not have forced the removal of apartheid, the movement was 
relatively successful in isolating South African sport. This isolation was enough to force the 
Nationalist government of the 1960s and 1970s to implement certain concessions to sport.  
However, the movement struggled to isolate South African rugby. Due to the value of rugby 
to the Afrikaner society, the white government had a stake in ensuring that the game 
continued to compete internationally and were thus willing to take certain steps in order to 
safeguard rugby. Many of the concessions the government granted to South African sport 
during this period were born out of a desire to keep the country’s rugby going. Cricket, the 
other major white sport that was isolated by the boycott, was predominantly a game played 
amongst South Africa’s English citizens. With an Afrikaner oriented government at the helm, 
cricket did not receive the same concessions rugby did, as is perhaps most clearly illustrated 
by the Basil D’Oliviera affair in 1968.16 
By the latter half of the 1960s, the international movement to isolate South Africa sport had 
focused its gaze on rugby and the game found it increasingly difficult to keep its head above 
water. In 1960, an all-white All Black team - adhering to the Nationalist government’s 
request of not including Maoris on such tours - came to South Africa. The tourists were met 
with a degree of protest action by the South African Sports Association (SASA)17, as well as 
by the African National Congress Youth League, who protested against the exclusion of 
Maoris and the tour as a violation of the sporting boycott.  
However, perhaps one of the more telling events to take place during the sporting boycott, as 
will be elaborated on at a later stage, was the cancelation of the 1967 All Black tour of South 
Africa after the Nationalist government once again refused to allow Maori’s to tour with the 
All Blacks. A measure of protest against the exclusion of Maoris on South African tours had 
been developing in New Zealand since the late 1950s. By the time plans were being made for 
the 1967 tour, New Zealand’s Labour government had intervened in the situation and had 
                                                            
16 In 1968 Basil D’Oliviera, a talented coloured cricketer who had left South Africa due to apartheid, was 
selected to represent England on a tour of South Africa. D’Oliviera was, however, banned from coming to South 
Africa by B.J Vorster, SA Prime Minister and the same man who earlier that year had allowed future All Black 
rugby tours to SA to include Maoris. Vorster’s reasoning was that D’Oliviera was a political selection meant to 
humiliate the South African government. England responded by cancelling the tour, an act that heralded the 
onset of SA cricket’s isolation as by 1970 the International Cricket Council had placed a moratorium on tours to 
South Africa.      
17 The South African Sports Association was the first non-racial domestic umbrella organisation which lobbied 
to have international sport federations withdraw their recognition of their whites-only South African affiliates. 
The SASA was succeeded in the 1970s by the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) and 
the South African Council of Sports (SACOS).  
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insisted that the All Blacks would not be authorized to tour South Africa unless a fully 
representative side was selected, in essence a side which included Maoris. However, the 
South African government was unyielding in its policies and consequently the tour was 
cancelled.  
The cancelation of the 1967 tour was followed by a violent tour of Britain and Ireland in 
1969/70. On this tour, the Springboks caught a glimpse of the sort of international loathing 
that had developed towards white South Africans because of apartheid. The demonstrations 
the Springboks encountered in the United Kingdom were some of the worst they would 
experience during the sports boycott. The “Stop the Seventy Tour” campaign was heralded as 
one of the most successful mass-action campaigns in post-war Britain.18 Writing on the “Stop 
the Seventy Tour” campaign – but which is certainly applicable to the 1981 tour - Martin 
Nixon makes the point that one of the crucial features of the sporting boycott was its ability 
to grip the media “by generating spectacle”.19 The violent clashes between protestors and 
police in Swansea during the 1969 Springbok rugby tour were widely publicised. So too was 
David Wilton-Godberford’s threats of releasing a ravenous locust plague on England’s major 
playing fields if the 1969 Springbok tour went ahead. The infamous “flour-bomb test” 
between the Springboks and the All Blacks at Eden Park, Auckland, in 1981 is another 
example hereof. These uncanny events had the knack of drawing substantial media coverage, 
which in turn further publicised apartheid as the catalyst for these acts of protest. 
Following an equally violent tour of Australia in 1971, the Springboks found their touring 
prospects had somewhat dried up as the team became regarded as a liability and risked 
attracting civil unrest. However, ample teams still toured to South Africa to play the 
Springboks. Over the course of the next ten years, South Africa played all of its traditional 
rivals bar Australia, who were the only team to sever their ties with the South African Rugby 
Board.  South African rugby was proving exceptionally difficult to isolate. With the SARB 
being a founder member of the International Rugby Board it had been able to use its 
historically strong international standing to counter any attempts to have the Springboks 
removed from international competition.20 Furthermore, with the Springboks being regarded 
as one of the foremost teams in world rugby, it would be difficult to justify their exclusion 
                                                            
18 R. Nixon: “Apartheid on the Run: The South African Sports Boycott,” Transition, (Vol 58), 1992, p. 58. 
19 Ibid. 
20 D. Booth: “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott,” Journal of 
Contemporary History, (Vol 38), 2003, p. 479. 
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from the international circuit, as this would surely affect the progression of the game. To 
exclude the best from world rugby would mean not only affecting South Africa, but the game 
in general. This became a lingering question, particularly after South Africa was excluded 
from the first two Rugby World Cup (RWC) tournaments in 1987 and 1991 respectively. 
Questions were raised over whether a true world champion could be crowned while South 
Africa, who would have been one of the favourites to win the RWC, was excluded.  
Ultimately then, South African rugby became the last of the country’s major sporting codes 
to be internationally isolated, with tours neither leaving from nor coming to the country. John 
Nauright points out that by the early 1970s South African sport had become as sealed off as a 
faulty nuclear reactor, whereas rugby only felt true isolation by the late 1980s, particularly 
following the 1981 tour of New Zealand.21 It was, however, a comparably brief isolation, as 
by 1992 the Springboks had returned to the international fold with tours by first the All 
Blacks and then Australia, who had last played South Africa in 1971.  
Although the sports boycott operated fundamentally as an anti-apartheid effort, on several 
occasions the movement redefined its objectives, and it was only in the 1980s that the boycott 
made an outright demand that apartheid be scrapped before South African sport could return 
to normal. Douglas Booth makes the interesting observation that each time the National Party 
adhered to the requests of the boycott the movement would redefine their objectives in a 
manner that exceeded what the South African government was willing to implement at the 
time.22 Thus, when the boycott first started in the 1960s, its initial requests were that the 
government deracialize sport before the country’s sportsmen could return to the international 
fold. In essence, the boycott dangled the carrot of readmission in front of the Nationalist 
government, but every time the government implemented changes the carrot would be 
whipped away in an attempt to force continued change.   
By the start of the boycott in the 1960s, organisations like SASA had rallied to not have 
South African sportsmen isolated, but instead to see that “all South Africans be given a fair 
chance to compete on merit and ability”.23 They viewed the sports boycott as a means 
through which to bring about non-racial sport, which would see black athletes being able to 
                                                            
21 J. Nauright: Sport, Culture and Identities in South Africa, p. 146. 
22 D. Booth: “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott,” Journal of 
Contemporary History, (Vol 38), 2003, p. 482 
23 Ibid, p. 483. 
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compete on the same fields as their white counterparts. On the question of racial mixing 
during sport, the Nationalist government adopted an uncompromising stance:  
“whites and non-whites could not play mixed sport in South Africa; mixed teams 
could not compete abroad either; foreign teams touring South Africa to play 
whites could not contain non-white players; non-white sportsmen from abroad 
could compete in South Africa, but only against non-whites.”24  
The development of the South African Council of Sport (SACOS) in 1973 as a successor to 
SAS served to further the sporting boycott as the Council became one of the prominent 
voices in the fight to isolate South African sport. Initially, SACOS was not as radical as the 
Black People’s Sport Council (which was born out of the Black Consciousness Movement in 
the 1970s and which strongly opposed all negotiations and contact between black and white 
athletes until South Africa had been normalized). However, it became more politically active 
in the late 1970s under President Hassan Howa, who coined the phrase ‘no normal sport in an 
abnormal society’. SACOS came to be recognised (along with SANROC in London) as the 
sports wing of the anti-apartheid movement. Importantly, as SACOS radicalised, it changed 
its initial stance that sport could transcend race and politics and began to promote the notion 
that sport could not achieve anything while the society was grossly unequal.   
Under Howa and Sam Ramsamy of SANROC, SACOS launched an international awareness 
campaign that under no circumstances would non-racial sport be able to remedy the abhorrent 
social conditions that made up South Africa society. Even if black South Africans where 
integrated into establishment sport, this would not alter the fact that they “suffered mass 
unemployment and poor living conditions, inadequate health services and transport, housing 
shortages, inferior education and subsistence wages”.25 SACOS’s new drive changed the 
boycott, as it now no longer centred only on deracializing sport, as it had in the 1960s and 
1970s, but instead, by the 1980s, had turned on the apartheid policy. Perhaps the greatest 
impetus to SACOS’s new course of action was the 1976 Soweto uprising, during which a 
number of the protesting youths were injured or killed by South African police. The event 
caused ripples internationally and fostered the belief that apartheid needed to be fought 
through any means possible. The multiracial sport carrot that had been dangled in front of the 
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South African government for most of the 1970s had once again been whipped away. Instead, 
it was replaced with an ultimatum: apartheid needed to be removed before South African 
sport would be readmitted internationally. 
However, some of the events taking place within South African sport also precipitated the 
intensification of the boycott during the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, the cancelation of the 
1967 All Black tour to South Africa provided significant impetus to the boycott. As the 
National Party had a stake in international rugby with South Africa continuing, they were 
willing to implement certain concession to ensure this. By 1968, newly appointed South 
African Prime Minister, John Vorster, allowed future All Black teams to include Maoris on 
their South African tours. This was the first concession of its kind for South African sport and 
society. Fundamentally, Vorster was permitting racial mixing during white South Africa’s 
most prized and most watched sporting fixture. The significance of the decision is perhaps 
best displayed when considering that the concession resulted in the first of two splits in the 
NP when Albert Hertzog, a conservative MP, and his followers broke away to form the 
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). The fact that the government was seen to be willing to 
grant a concession to sport which clashed with their strict racial segregationist doctrine 
opened the door to further sport based protest.  
Perhaps, though, the irony of the matter remains that the government was not granting this 
concession due to pressure from the sports boycott, but instead a concession to ensure that it 
did not lose one of its oldest allies, New Zealand. Nevertheless, the 1967 tour cancelation was 
seen to have struck a nerve in Afrikanerdom, which the boycott took as a sign that sport, and 
particularly rugby, was an area where pressure could be applied. Arguably, from this point 
onwards the boycott shifted much of its attention to try to isolate South African rugby.    
Subsequently, protests against apartheid sport, particularly rugby, escalated in from 1967 
onward and forced the National Party reassess its sporting policy. Consequently, the 
government developed the “Multi-National Sports Policy”26 in 1971. While this policy did 
little to alter the existing order – and, if anything, only further compounded the separateness 
of South Africa’s racial groups -  it did further exemplify that pressure on sport could bring 
about a degree of change in the policies of the South African government. By the late 1970s, 
                                                            
26 The Multi-National Sports Policy entailed that each ‘nation’, which essentially meant each race, could 
develop their own representative teams that would then play against other ‘nations’. Thus, white teams would 
play black teams and so on. However, it did not mean that members of different races could play together for the 
same team.  
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sustained pressure on South Africa’s establishment sport had forced the government to 
legalise multiracial sport. This meant that anyone from any race was eligible to join any 
sports club and could legally be selected for South Africa’s national representative sides.       
South Africa – New Zealand Rugby Relations during the Sports Boycott 
The events that took place in New Zealand during the 1981 Springbok tour were not simply 
spontaneous. Instead, they were the result of New Zealanders growing increasingly uneasy 
over a number of years with their country’s willingness to compete against the Springboks. 
Although between 1967 and 1981 the Springboks and All Blacks only met in eight tests, the 
NZRFU did not sever its ties with the SARB, meaning that communication channels to 
arrange tours remained open. Many New Zealanders regarded those matches that did take 
place between the two nations as a violation of the sporting boycott and as condoning 
apartheid.  
Perhaps the tipping point for many New Zealanders was when the All Blacks toured South 
Africa shortly after the June 16, 1976, Soweto uprising during which a number of protesting 
schoolchildren were killed by police. The event sent shockwaves around the world and 
shored-up anti-apartheid attitudes. Many New Zealanders found it inexcusable that the All 
Blacks would still tour to South Africa despite such atrocities occurring. The 1976 tour was 
also the second time that the All Blacks had toured to South Africa shortly after an incident 
where there had been a mass killing of anti-apartheid protestors. The All Blacks had toured to 
South Africa shortly after peaceful protestors were massacred outside the Sharpeville police 
station on March 21, 1960. It seemed, though, that the tour to South Africa in 1976 was a 
bridge too far for many New Zealanders as they condemned the tour and any future tours 
between the two nations while apartheid remained in place. Perhaps, then, the 1981 tour 
became, amongst other things, an outlet for the antagonism harboured by many New 
Zealanders toward South Africa following the events of 1976.         
Historically, South Africa and New Zealand have had little reason to be connected to one-
another. Trade between the two countries has been minimal and, other than their political ties 
to the Commonwealth, there has been little to bring the two countries together.27 Yet rugby 
has served to bind these two societies. Through rugby, these two societies developed a closer 
bond with one-another than either developed with any other rugby playing nation. For as long 
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as the two nations have played the game they have competed against one-another, with the 
first official test between the Springboks and All Blacks taking place in 1921 in Dunedin, 
New Zealand. Reflecting on his childhood and growing up with stories of the Springbok-All 
Black rivalry, 1981 Springbok captain, Wynand Claassen, writes that:  
“Even in these childhood games our series were always closely contested with the 
All Blacks allowed to win at least one test, but with the Springboks going on to 
win the rubber. Certainly, it was here that the All Black dream was born and it 
never left me.”28 
Errol Tobias, South Africa’s first ‘black’ (technically coloured) Springbok writes that: 
“After all, it is the dream of every player in the green and gold to come up against the 
Kiwis.”29 The game has served as a major social event in both New Zealand and South 
African. Perhaps New Zealand’s willingness to exclude Maoris from South African 
tours prior to 1967 and South Africa’s willingness to break apartheid customs to allow 
Maoris to tour the country after 1967 can be seen as a measure of the value each society 
placed in maintaining rugby ties with the other. Through their rugby ties these two 
societies came to develop a sense of mutual respect for one-another. Afrikaners came to 
regard the All Blacks as “excellent species of manhood, strong and hardened by manual 
labour in a harsh climate…”30 While the Springboks were viewed by New Zealanders. 
in much the same terms. They were the descendants of the rugged voortrekkers who 
had etched out an existence in an unforgiving landscape.   
Furthermore, rugby became a way for two relatively isolated societies to stamp their mark on 
a global scale. After the All Black in 1905 and the Springboks defeated England in 1913, the 
two British territories came to be regarded as the best in the world at the game, something 
few other facets of either society could claim. As Paul Dobson put it, “…rugby is the most 
noteworthy thing that happens [in New Zealand].”31 The same comment certainly rings true 
for Afrikaner culture, as outside of the mining industry there was nothing else Afrikaner 
society could claim to be internationally dominant at. In their pursuit of world rugby 
supremacy, South Africa and New Zealand have met each other more frequently than they 
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have played any other team. Although a world cup tournament was implemented in 1987, 
whenever the Springboks and All Blacks met the world title was understood to be on the line.  
Tours between the two nations were eagerly anticipated years ahead of their arrival and the 
disappointment of cancelations during the apartheid era (as happened in 1967, 1973, and 
1985) were unrivalled. Under apartheid, though, rugby relations between the two nations 
proved increasingly difficult to maintain. By the start of the 1960s, many New Zealanders 
were questioning their country’s sustained contact with the racist South African regime. New 
Zealand had its own legacy of racial tensions (dating back to New Zealand’s colonial era), 
and maintaining contact with the openly racist South African regime seemed to be at odds 
with their country’s commitment to non-racialism. Significant aspects of New Zealand 
national identity were based on egalitarianism and racial harmony, with rugby and its 
multiracial character being regarded as proof of the successful assimilation within the 
society.32 
However, it has been contested New Zealand truly was the egalitarian society it considered 
itself to be and whether racial tensions existed in reality. There is cause to suggest that racial 
tensions did in fact exist within the New Zealand society. James Liu and Duncan Mills note 
that “New Zealanders are far less racially tolerant than their outside attitudes would lead an 
outside observer to believe”.33 Although the New Zealand historian, Keith Sinclair, points out 
that New Zealand in the twentieth century had relatively good race relations (in comparison 
to South Africa, South Australia, and South Dakota) he concedes that: 
 “[Maoris] are proportionately under-represented in executive and professional 
groups, and at universities. They are worse off in terms of most measurable 
indices of social status and prosperity. On average, they earn less money, live in 
worse houses and have less income than Europeans. They enjoy worse health.”34 
Despite the lack of institutionalised discrimination (such as that which existed in South 
Africa), New Zealand’s colonial legacy left disparities and conflicts within its society, 
particularly when it came to matters relating to land ownership. For much of the 1970s and 
                                                            
32 Liu and Mills quoted in A.D. Grainger et al: “Postcolonial Anxieties and the Browning of New Zealand 
Rugby,” The Contemporary Pacific, (Vol 24), 2012, p. 267. 
33 Ibid, p. 271. 
34 K. Sinclair: “Why are Race Relations in New Zealand better than in South Africa, South Australia, or South 
Dakota?,” New Zealand Journal of History, (Vol 5), 1971, p. 121.  
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1980s land claims were a majorly controversial matter in New Zealand society, forcing Bill 
Rowling’s Labour government to institute the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 to investigate 
alleged transgressions of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Treaty (signed on 6 February 1840 by 
various Maori chiefs and representatives of the British Crown) underlined that Maori tribes 
would accept British sovereignty in return for the rights of British citizenship. Most 
importantly, though, the Treaty guaranteed the protection of Maori tribal authority and the 
continued possession of traditional lands, fisheries, and forests. The Maori claimants of these 
transgressions came into conflict with non-Maori property holders accused of being in 
possession of traditional land which had been guaranteed by the Crown during the 1840 
Treaty. The Treaty itself, however, disturbed New Zealand Pakeha (Settlers or New 
Zealanders of European descent), many of whom regarded it as a form of ethnic 
discrimination and were uncomfortable with the “endless dwelling on the past” by Maoris.35 
The emerging tensions brought about by the land claims coupled with New Zealand’s 
Nationalist government continuing to abide by the South African customs of excluding 
Maoris from All Black rugby tours gave the distinct impression that perhaps New Zealand 
was not the egalitarian nation it prided itself on being.   
Initial protests over the exclusion of Maoris from South African tours concerned only a small 
section of the New Zealand society. However, protests grew substantially in the 1970s as the 
overall sports boycott shifted its focus to achieving non-racial sport in South Africa. The 
South African governments’ continued request that the NZRFU selected an all-white All 
Black side for South African tours lead to the first measure of protest against in the 
maintenance of rugby ties between the two countries. Despite the growing protests over the 
exclusion of Maoris from the 1960 All Black tour to South Africa, the tour went ahead as 
New Zealand Prime Minister, Walter Nash, had a policy of non-interference in sporting 
matters. Perhaps, as 1960 was an election year, Nash believed that stopping the tour could 
jeopardise the re-election of his Labour Party (the Labour Party still lost the election to the 
National Party). The NZRFU too had chosen to persist with the tour. The Union attempted to 
justify the exclusion of Maoris by declaring that they believed it would be a degrading 
experience for Maoris to tour to apartheid South Africa.  
By 1960, anti-racism was a growing force in New Zealand (and, perhaps, in the rest of the 
world when considering the widely publicised civil rights movement in the USA). 
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Consequently, the 1960 tour attracted the first considerable protests on New Zealand’s 
willingness to ‘play ball’ with the racist South African regime.36 However, these initial 
protests in New Zealand were not explicitly directed at the apartheid government but rather at 
the New Zealand government’s willingness to permit the exclusion of Maoris on the request 
of the racist South African government.37 By not intervening in the matter of rugby tours, the 
New Zealand government seemed to be refusing to condemn apartheid while their own 
country faced burgeoning racial issues. As a result, the 1960 tour protests took on an overtly 
racial character.   
The 1960 tour demonstrations were known by their mantra of “No Maoris, No Tour”, coined 
by the Citizens’ All Black Tour Association (CABTA), who were responsible for co-
ordinating the protests.38 CABTA officials had attempted to meet with leading rugby official 
in the NZRFU in order to dissuade them from touring South Africa until Maoris could be 
included on such tours. However, no such meeting materialised and the tour went ahead, even 
after a petition with over 162,000 signatures (of a population of two million adults) opposing 
the tour was handed over to the government.39 The SARB had held the NZRFU to its 
contractual obligations to proceed with the tour, arguing that the cancelation of the tour so 
soon before kick-off would not permit the SARB enough time to arrange an alternate tour. 
While the 1960 protestors failed to have the All Black tour called off, their initiative did serve 
to bring greater consideration to the Maori questions and kept the matter alive. In 1967, the 
New Zealand government took formal action to oppose the exclusion of Maoris on South 
African tours. 
With the 1965 Springbok tour of New Zealand looming, the question over maintaining 
contact with apartheid South Africa was once again raised in New Zealand. The question 
over whether Maoris would be able to tour to South Africa in the future was once again the 
center of attention. The Springboks were greeted in New Zealand by measure of protest 
organized by the Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE). The Auckland based 
organization would be one of the biggest instigators of protest action during the 1981 tour. 
While touring with the Springboks in 1965, the SARB Chairman, Danie Craven, was at pains 
to make overtures to the NZRFU and New Zealand government that he would see to it that 
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Maoris would be able to tour South Africa in the future. Craven had gone to New Zealand to 
try and patch up any residual feelings of resentment toward South Africa over the Maori 
question.40 Under Craven’s supervision, the 1965 Springboks tried to restore a sense of good 
faith between Maoris and Springbok rugby. The team was captured in the press holding 
Maori babies, rubbing noses with old Maori women (a sign of respect in Maori culture), and 
doing traditional Maori dances.41 
However, while in the Springboks were in New Zealand in 1965 their future dealings with the 
New Zealanders was dealt a telling blow. Back in South Africa, Prime Minister H.F. 
Verwoerd, delivered what came to be known as the ‘Loskopdam Speech’. During the speech, 
Verwoerd indicated that Maoris would not be allowed to tour with New Zealand sides if they 
intended on playing against white South Africans. Verwoerd, credited as the ‘architect of 
apartheid’, stated that: 
“Our standpoint is that just as we subject ourselves to another country’s customs 
and traditions without flinching, without any criticism and cheerfully, so do we 
expect that when another country sends representatives to us they will behave in 
the same way, namely not involving themselves in our affairs, and they will adapt 
themselves to our customs.”42  
After refusing to comment on the Maori question for some years, Verwoerd now made the 
stance of his government abundantly clear. Consequently, the speech hardened New Zealand 
attitudes toward South Africa. Since its ascension to power in 1960, the Nationalist New 
Zealand government had refused to implement sporting sanctions against apartheid. The New 
Zealand government had justified this by claiming that closer working South Africa could 
help to curb apartheid.43 Now, should the New Zealand government and NZRFU have 
yielded to Verwoerd’s demands, New Zealand may well have found its professed racial 
harmony in jeopardy. With a planned All Black tour of South Africa in 1967 looming, the 
New Zealand government would need to act swiftly to offset any race-based conflict the tour 
might attract amongst New Zealanders.  
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Perhaps fearing that left to its own devices, the NZRFU would adhere to Verwoerd’s 
demands and proceed with an all-white All Black tour, the New Zealand government 
intervened in the matter. Speaking on the proposed 1967 tour, New Zealand Prime Minister, 
Keith Holyoake, stated: “as we are one people we cannot be fully and truly represented by a 
team chosen on racial lines.”44  Unless Maoris were allowed to tour South Africa with the All 
Blacks from 1967 onwards, it would be difficult to justify maintaining rugby ties with the 
South Africans. Although Verwoerd was assassinated in 1966, the South African government 
refused to bow on the Maori question and consequently the NZRFU, under pressure from the 
New Zealand government, cancelled the 1967 All Black tour of South Africa. 
It should be noted, however, that the protests that started in the 1960s and culminated in the 
cancellation of the 1967 tour were protests aimed at the New Zealand government and 
NZRFU, rather than at apartheid South Africa. The acceptance by the NZRFU and 
government of apartheid sports customs had been the catalyst for the growing protest 
movement in the 1960s. Although the 1967 tour cancelation coincided with the growing 
momentum of the international sporting boycott of apartheid South Africa, the New Zealand 
protests were primarily concerned with ensuring racial harmony and equality in their own 
country. New Zealand demonstrators came to see South African sporting customs as 
potentially harmful to their country’s bourgeoning racial issues. Thus, their primary concern 
was bringing about a change in New Zealand’s adherence to these racist customs. However, 
this changed in the 1970s, as New Zealand protests became increasingly anti-apartheid. The 
events during the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand are essentially the pinnacle of these 
protests. 
By canceling the 1967 All Black tour, New Zealand had managed to force the hand of 
apartheid. By 1968, new South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, had amended the 
country’s policy of forbidding Maoris and South African whites from competing against one 
another on South Africa soil. Vorster henceforth permitted New Zealand to send a “fully 
representative team of the best players available” on South Africa tours.45 Vorster’s only 
reservations were that these players not be too dark, there not be large numbers of them, and 
that these players not be selected with a political motive. While Vorster’s decision was in no 
way a step towards dismantling apartheid, it was a significant concession as it parted ways 
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with the Verwoerdian style of grand-apartheid that disallowed any form of racial mixing. The 
concession meant that rugby, one of the bastions of Afrikaner power, would henceforth be 
engaging in racial mixing with Maoris during All Black tours, something that would have had 
Verwoerd turning in his grave. Vorster’s concession was also made to ensure that South 
Africa kept its oldest rugby ally in a time where the international sporting boycott was 
managing to isolate more and more of South Africa’s sporting codes. In this regard, the 
concession worked as the New Zealand government permitted the NZRFU to send a Maori 
speckled All Black team to South Africa in 1970.  
However, the 1967 tour cancelation and subsequent concession by Vorster had provided the 
international sporting boycott with considerable legitimacy. Although the sporting boycott 
had not been directly responsible for Vorster granting a concession to New Zealand, the 
future presence of Maoris on South African fields was heralded as a victory for the boycott. 
By granting a concession to Maoris to tour with the All Blacks to South Africa, Vorster had 
legitimized the claims by those advocating the boycott that pressure on white sport could 
bring about a certain measure of change to apartheid. 
By the start of the 1970s, the international sporting boycott had gathered substantial 
momentum. By 1970, the International Cricket Council (ICC) announced a moratorium on 
international tours to and from South Africa. Furthermore, that same year South Africa was 
formally expelled from the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The 1970s also heralded 
a change in the objectives of the boycott. While the 1960s had been spent gathering sufficient 
support to isolate South African sport, by the 1970s the objective of the boycott was to 
deracialize South African sport before the country could return to international competition.  
By the time of the 1970 All Black tour of South Africa, demonstrators in New Zealand had 
taken up the mantle of the sporting boycott. Demonstrators demanded non-racial sport in 
South Africa before sporting contact between New Zealand and South Africa could resume. 
Many New Zealanders felt that by participating in sport against South Africa, their 
government was condoning the sort of racially discriminatory practices that had been 
removed from their own society. The campaigned against the 1970 tour reasoned that by 
maintain rugby ties with South Africa, New Zealand appeared to be an “acquiescent partner 
in the philosophy of apartheid”.46  
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Although in 1968 Vorster formally allowed Maoris to join the All Blacks on South African 
tours, that same year the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students passed a resolution 
opposing the 1970 All Black tour of South Africa. Amongst Maoris, new forms of opposition 
toward South Africa developed, as they demanded that no Maori sportsmen should be able to 
play on a field where no South African of color was allowed. Although these first forms of 
opposition were directed at deracializing South African sport, they marked the first forms of 
opposition to the apartheid system. This opposition would grow during the 1970s until it 
became an outright condemnation of apartheid by the 1980s. The opposition of Maori 
students echoed most of New Zealand’s Labor MPs, who feared that New Zealand could 
attract unwanted ramifications from sustaining contact with South African rugby. Together, 
these became some of the first voices to denounce the 1970 tour. However, more were to 
follow. 
With the success of their ‘no Maoris, no tour’ campaign, CARE now demanded a moratorium 
on sporting ties between New Zealand and South Africa. Their first port of call was 
attempting to stop the 1970 All Black tour of South Africa. This time around, though, 
CARE’s campaign received much wider support as university professors, students, Maori 
leaders, church leaders, and members of parliament attached themselves to the campaign.47 
Furthermore, CARE established links with the London-based South African anti-apartheid 
organization, SANROC, who had become one of the foremost bodies advocating the sporting 
boycott. CARE also invited Dennis Brutus, former President of SANROC, to New Zealand. 
Once there, Brutus undertook an extensive tour of the country, speaking to schools, church 
groups, public rallies and meetings, universities, and even appeared on radio stations and 
television to try to discourage sport with South Africa.48 Brutus also met with the New 
Zealand Federation of Labor and the Executive of the National Council of Churches, but was 
refused an audience by the NZRFU, who considered him a troublemaker.49   
In 1969, the anti-tour campaign formed the umbrella body Halt All Racist Tours (HART). 
The organization was established in order to incorporate all opposition groups to the tour into 
a united front.50 Over the next 10 years, HART became the center of New Zealand anti-South 
African sentiments. By the time the Springboks arrived in New Zealand in 1981, HART had 
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developed into a substantial organization and coordinated mass protests against the touring 
Springbok team.  
By 1969, anti-tour protests had become an established feature in New Zealand. By this point, 
three major groups had emerged as leaders in the anti-tour movement, namely trade unions, 
churches, and Maoris. The question over the 1970 tour had caused rifts within Maori society, 
as the older Maori councils supported the tour while the younger Maori student organizations 
strongly opposed the tour. While there was not unanimous opposition from New Zealand’s 
church groups towards the tour, the National Council of Churches did come out strongly 
against apartheid and believed that the 1970 tour should be closely monitored in terms of how 
it would affect race relations in South Africa. The tour had been justified in New Zealand 
political and rugby circles as having the ability to breakdown racial barriers that existed in 
South Africa.   
With the 1970 tour drawing nearer, protests took a more sinister turn as a last gasp effort was 
made to have the tour called off. In early 1970, All Black trial matches in Christchurch, 
Palmerston North, and Wellington were met with demonstrations. Although initially 
peaceful, protestors in Wellington were arrested after invading the field with banners 
proclaiming ‘Resist Racist Rugby’. In an adjoining field, a man was arrested after he poured 
petrol over himself and threatened to set himself alight if the tour was not called off. In May 
1970, a firebomb was thrown through a window of the Auckland Rugby Union, one of the 
strongest advocates of the tour, causing extensive damage to the property. By June, massive 
demonstrations were taking place in the streets of Wellington.51 These acts illustrated that 
many New Zealanders possessed the motivation to mount fierce protests over the South 
African matter, as it proved to be a burning topic, in some cases quite literally. 
Ultimately, however, those who opposed the tour could have little success if the New Zealand 
government did not join the fray. The government remained the only body who could see to it 
that the NZRFU cancelled the tour. Despite intervening in the 1967 tour issue, New Zealand 
Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, did not deem it necessary to become involved in the 1970 
tour matter. The government maintained that the tour did not pose any serious political 
implications to their country, and that therefore it was not their place to become involved in 
the matter. Although the New Zealand Labor Party passed a resolution in 1970 opposing the 
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tour, they were not in a position to do anything about it. Thus, the NZRFU had relative 
autonomy over its own business and the 1970 tour of South Africa proceeded.  
The 1970 anti-tour campaign marks a definitive shift in New Zealand protest politics. While 
protests in the 1960s had concerned the exclusion of Maoris on South African tours, protests 
in the 1970s believed there should be a moratorium on sporting ties with South Africa until 
the country implemented non-racial sport. Upon closer inspection, a shift in the dynamics of 
the protests soon becomes apparent: while the 1960s protests concerned a matter which was 
considered integral to the wellbeing of New Zealand society, by the 1970s, these protests had 
shifted their concern to the struggles of black South African under apartheid, albeit only to 
achieve non-racial sport. By the time the Springboks toured New Zealand in 1981, the 
objective of New Zealand protestors had once again changed as they no longer advocated 
only the desegregation of South African sport, but of the society as a whole. The protests in 
New Zealand mimicked the overall trend in the international sporting boycott as this too 
called for non-racial sport in the 1970s and a non-racial society in the 1980s.  
Although the 1970 All Black tour went ahead, newly elected New Zealand Prime Minister, 
Normal Kirk, called off a scheduled Springbok tour of New Zealand in 1973. Kirk, a member 
of the Labor Party, which had come out strongly against the 1970 All Black tour, refused to 
allow the Springboks to tour New Zealand unless they selected a team on genuine merit.52 
Upon request that South Africa field a racial mixed team SARB President, Danie Craven, 
gave an unequivocal response: 
“I am not going to allow multiracial trials to take place. If we simply run off and 
stage multiracial trials against lawful policy then we become anarchists like the 
rest of them.”53  
Craven’s response likely cost his country the tour. However, Kirk had also been deterred by 
the fact that Christchurch was scheduled to host the 1974 Commonwealth Games, something 
which the Springbok tour may well have turned into a political football. By 1973, India, 
along with thirty African Commonwealth countries, had indicated their intentions to boycott 
the games should the New Zealand government not take immediate steps to halt the proposed 
Springbok tour.54 Furthermore, a report by New Zealand police chief on the potential for the 
                                                            
52 “S African rugby chief rejects mixed trials,” The Times (England), 22 February 1973, p. 8. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Indian threat on NZ games,” The Times (England), 8 February 1973, p. 8.  
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greatest eruption of violence New Zealand had ever known should the tour go ahead was 
enough to seal the tours fate as it was duly called off by the NZRFU. The police report 
seemed to be a sign of what was to come as the next time the Springboks would travel to 
New Zealand was in 1981. 
By 1975, both the SARB and NZRFU had set about planning an All Black tour of South 
Africa for 1976, as the 1973 tour had been labelled as ‘postponed’. It seemed that for the time 
being, a Springbok tour of New Zealand was not probable as it would draw demonstrations. 
Thus, it became a much more viable option for South Africa to host tours, as there was less 
likelihood of disruptions to such a tour. However, both Craven and Jack Sullivan, NZRFU 
President, acknowledged that the upcoming New Zealand general elections in November 
1975 would play a role in whether the proposed 1976 tour would take place.55 While the New 
Zealand Labour Party had traditionally opposed sporting contact with South Africa, the 
National Party was less likely to prevent the All Blacks and Springboks from playing each 
other.56 A victory for Bill Rowling of the Labour Party would most likely mean that the tour 
would not take place as under previous incumbent, Norman Kirk, the party had seen to it that 
the 1973 tour did not take place. 
In South Africa, there was an air of desperation around the tour. The sporting boycott was 
going from strength to strength in isolating South African sport and South Africa’s oldest 
rugby ally was on the brink of cancelling a third tour in nine years. However, there were 
reports Craven had thrown a spanner into the works of the New Zealand general election. 
CARE accused Craven of publically indicating that if a change in government in New 
Zealand permitted a Springbok–All Black tour, that the SARB would be willing to exchange 
the proposed All Black tour of South Africa for a Springbok tour of New Zealand in 1976. 
This was, of course, dependant on whether the National Party came to power in New 
Zealand. A newspaper report published the following telegram sent to Craven by CARE: 
“Airmailing you police report proposed 1973 Springbok tour predicted greatest 
outbreak of violence in New Zealand history. Is it your intention to provoke this? 
If not, why blatantly intervene in New Zealand election campaign?”57  
                                                            
55 South African Rugby Board Archive (Stellenbosch University), Collection Newspaper Clipping. “Elections 
key to Bok tour,” The Argus, 21 July 1975. 
56 “New NZ voters may sway result in today’s election,” The Times (England), 29 November 1975, p. 6. 
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1975. 
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Craven’s only response was that the telegram would end up in his wastebasket. To Craven’s 
relief, the National Party were successful in their election to power, making a Springbok-All 
Black rugby contest more likely. While still Prime Minister, Bill Rowling had met with Jack 
Sullivan to request that he reconsider the tour. However, this was to no avail. By July 1975, 
the NZRFU confirmed that the proposed tour of South Africa would be going ahead. Perhaps 
the biggest boost for the tour, though, was the fact that a multiracial South African team was 
fielded against a touring French side in 1975 at Newlands. Albert Ferasse, President of the 
French Rugby Board, had pressured Craven to field a multiracial team. After initial rebuffs 
by Piet Koornhof, Minister of Sport, the match was authorised.58 The match afforded those in 
New Zealand who supported sporting contacts with South Africa a chance to justify sustained 
contact. Sport, it was reasoned, could provide a way to facilitate racial mixing, thereby 
kicking away one of the struts of apartheid.   
At the eleventh hour, however, the tour was plunged into jeopardy as shortly before the All 
Blacks were scheduled to arrive in 1976, South African police had gunned down protesting 
school children in Soweto, one of South Africa’s biggest calamities in the twenties century. 
The incident escalated anti-South African feelings around the world, but still the All Blacks 
controversially toured South Africa barely a month after the fatal Soweto uprising. The tour 
“precipitated a major peacetime international crisis for New Zealand” as the country was 
censured for the tour.59 The 1976 Montreal Summer Olympic Games were boycotted by 
African nations in protest at the presence of New Zealand athletes. For white South Africans, 
however, the tour and particularly the series victory over the All Blacks provided some relief 
in the ever-darkening South African scene. “Thank God for the All Blacks” commented one 
South African journalist, “at least disaster has not taken to the rugby field yet.”60  
However, there was a sense after the 1976 tour that things may no longer be the same 
between the All Blacks and Springboks. A quote from New Zealand newspaper, The 
Dominion, published in The Times (England) summed up the speculations: 
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“Whatever the image of South Africa when the dust settles, it seems clear that the 
Ellis Park referee [after the final test of the 1976 series] blew the whistle also on 
Springbok-All Black encounters as they have been known for 50 years.”61 
The Dominion made a valid point, as the next time the Springboks and All Blacks would 
meet was in 1981 under the harshest conditions ever to befall a rugby series. The sides would 
meet again in 1986, although not as the All Blacks but as the Cavaliers, as the so called ‘rebel 
tours’ became the only way for South Africa to secure international competition.    
By 1977, the South African government started to reformulate its sporting policies. The 
failure of the government’s Multi-National Sport policy in alleviating the pressure the 
international boycott was putting on South African sport, had left it with little alternative but 
to reconsider multiracial sport. By 1977, Danie Craven was permitted to hold mixed national 
trials, drawing on players of colour from the black South African Rugby Association (SARA) 
and coloured South African Rugby Football Federation (SARFF). By 1978, the three bodies 
had amalgamated to form the South African Rugby Board, though the white body still 
dominated the arrangement.62 Following the conclusion of the 1976 All Black tour, New 
Zealand Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, commented that the only way the Springboks 
would be welcomed back to New Zealand was if they selected a side on merit.63 Certainly, 
after the amalgamation of the three rugby bodies the infrastructure existed to choose a merit 
selected Springbok-side (which, fundamentally, came down to selecting a multiracial 
Springbok-side). Thus, for the Craven and the SARB the inclusion of players of colour in top 
level rugby provide a way back into New Zealand and a way to satisfy the sporting boycott’s 
demands for non-racial rugby.  
However, the extent to which Springbok teams of the 1980s could be considered as 
representative sides is questionable. While Errol Tobias was selected in 1981 as South 
Africa’s first Springbok of colour, it took until 1984 before a second player of colour could 
don the green jersey when Avrill Williams was selected to play against the touring England 
side. Williams and Tobias were the only players of colour to play for the Springboks in the 
1980s. One would be hard pressed to consider Springbok rugby in the 1980s as representative 
of South African society with multiracial sport. Despite the fact that Tobias and Williams 
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were able to prove themselves as world-class rugby players, they were labelled by the 
opponents of apartheid as ‘window dressing’, inclusions which were meant to take the 
political heat off of Springbok rugby.     
In 1980, the Springboks received an invitation from the NZRFU to tour to New Zealand the 
following year. Even after approving the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement64, an agreement by 
Commonwealth governments to discourage sporting contact between their own country’s 
athletes and South Africa, Robert Muldoon insisted that a merit selected Springbok-side 
would be welcome in New Zealand. The changes made in South African rugby in the late 
1970s were considered extensive enough to invite the Springboks. In 1981, a merit-selected 
Springbok-side arrived in New Zealand, albeit with Tobias as the sole player of colour and 
Abie Williams as a coloured assistant manager. The tour was a violation of the Gleneagles 
Agreement and the international sporting boycott. The implementation of multiracial sport 
and the consequential first merit selected Springbok team was hailed by those in New 
Zealand who supported contact with South Africa as further evidence that sport could build 
bridges amongst South African people. While the governing New Zealand National Party 
formally opposed the tour, it had very loosely applied the Gleneagles principle of 
‘discouraging’ sporting ties with South Africa. Muldoon had refused to cancel the tour as he 
believed this to be a violation of the basic freedoms of citizens. However, the tour caused 
such ramifications for both New Zealand and South African rugby that the next time the 
Springboks and All Blacks would face each other was in 1992, by which point the South 
Africa government had started formally dismantling apartheid. Essentially, as this thesis will 
illustrate, the ripples of the 1981 tour resulted in the degradation and isolation of South 
African rugby over the course of the 1980s.    
Conclusion 
By the start of the 1960s, an international sporting boycott was implemented against 
apartheid South Africa. It was believed that, by isolating the generally sport-mad South 
Africans, sufficient pressure could be placed on the government to re-examine its apartheid 
policies. Although a sporting boycott alone could not have succeeded in forcing the 
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nations in order to support the sporting boycott of South Africa. While the agreement did not force governments 
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a stop to South African rugby, and particularly its ties with New Zealand which it valued above all else. 
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Nationalist government to scrap apartheid, it was a way to deliver a blow to the soft 
underbelly of Afrikaner nationalism, particularly if South African rugby could be isolated. 
The symbolic value of rugby to Afrikaner nationalism meant the government had a stake in it 
continuing, and were thus willing to implement certain concession to ensure that the game 
remained in the international fold. Thus, rugby would not be easily isolated and in fact was 
only truly isolated in the 1980s, by which point most other South African sports had been 
isolated for well over a decade. However, the boycott was able to bring about some change in 
South Africa, as first the Multi-National Sports Policy and then the implementation of 
multiracial sport can be attributed to pressure from the boycott. By implementing these 
changes, the South African government had hoped to alleviate some of the pressure the 
boycott was placing on South African sport. During the 1970s, those who advocated the 
boycott had demanded that South Africa implement non-racial/multiracial sport before the 
country’s sporting bodies could return to international competition. However, as the 
government implemented these changes the boycott changed its objectives and demanded 
that only when society was free of apartheid could South Africa compete internationally. 
Thus, by the time the Springboks arrived in New Zealand in 1981 demonstrators were not 
demanding non-racial sports, but a non-racial South African society.    
The international sporting boycott against apartheid provided South Africa and New Zealand 
with the increasingly difficult task of sustaining their historic rugby ties. The fact that an All 
Black tour cancelation in 1967 was able to extract the first concession from the Nationalist 
government served to legitimise claims that sport, and particularly rugby, as an area where 
pressure could be applied to the apartheid regime. For the most part, the sporting boycott 
invested a lot of energy in putting a stop to Springbok-All Black rugby encounters as this was 
white South Africa’s most prized contest. For those New Zealanders who opposed apartheid, 
the sporting boycott became one of the few ways through which to do so. New Zealand and 
South African did not engage in major trade or have particularly strong diplomatic ties. 
Arguably, rugby was the most significant thing that took place between the two countries.  
Although the South African government had granted Maoris permission to tour South Africa 
from 1968 onwards, this did not allay the building pressure that had been mounting in New 
Zealand over the sustained contact with a racist regime. Increasingly violent protests 
surrounding the 1970 All Black tour of South Africa and the prospect of never before seen 
violence if the Springboks toured New Zealand in 1973, led many New Zealanders to 
question the feasibility of sustaining contact with South Africa at all costs. However, the 
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NZRFU refused to break ties with South Africa under the auspices that sport could build 
bridges amongst South Africa’s racial groups. Consequently, the All Blacks toured South 
Africa in 1976, only a month after numerous protestors were gunned down by police during 
the Soweto uprising. New Zealand faced an international backlash for the tour as anti-South 
African attitudes – and anyone who played ball with them – skyrocketed after the events in 
Soweto. The next time the two countries would meet on a rugby field was in 1981, a tour 






















Preparing for New Zealand: The 1981 Ireland Tour of South 
Africa 
“Whether we agree with mixed teams or not, we have to decide whether we want 
tours or not”.65  
For South Africa’s rugby enthusiasts 1980 and 1981 looked like the years that would finally 
see off the fear of total isolation. Rugby fans were greeted with the news that tests would be 
played against the British and Irish Lions, France, South American Jaguars, Ireland, the USA, 
and the biggest of them all, a three month Springbok tour to New Zealand, including three 
tests against the All Blacks. It seemed that with the breaking of the Springboks’ sixteen-year 
hiatus from New Zealand soil things were starting to regain some semblance of normality for 
South African rugby after the struggles of the 1970s. Despite growing hope in rugby circles 
that the isolation period was beginning to wear off, Fritz Eloff, SARB vice-president, thought 
otherwise. Eloff cautioned that despite a relatively busy season in 1980, it was too early to be 
optimistic, considering that the Springboks were still not welcome in the United Kingdom, 
France, Australia, and Argentina.66 By depriving South Africa of regular and strong 
international tours, the boycott damaged the country’s rugby.   
However, with the amalgamation of the SARA, SARFF, and SARB in 1978 came hope that 
multiracial rugby would be cultivated in South Africa, thus helping to allay the international 
conscience on playing rugby against South Africa. After all, the sporting boycott had insisted 
that South Africa needed to implement multiracial sport before it could return to international 
competition. In the years surrounding the first mixed national rugby trials in 1977, Craven 
had certainly been active in trying to bring about greater racial integration in South African 
rugby. This, in part, had to do with the fact that in 1977 Craven had travelled to London to 
meet with Peter Hain, one of the coordinators of the demonstrations against the Springboks in 
the UK in 1969/70l, and a prominent figure in the sporting boycott against South Africa.67 
Hain had handed Craven a list of reforms as a starting point before lifting of the sporting 
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boycott could be considered.68  Craven emerged from the meeting with the realisation that 
progress in South African rugby would not be made unless there was dialogue between the 
countries rugby playing people.  
Craven’s initiative to set up the Rugby Advisory Council with representatives from three of 
South Africa’s four rugby bodies (the South African Rugby Union refused to participate in 
negotiations until the removal of apartheid) helped to establish fluid contact between these 
bodies and opened the doors to the 1978 amalgamation of the white, black, and coloured 
rugby bodies. The following year the South African Barbarians became the first multiracial 
team to tour outside of South Africa as they played in Wales, England, and Scotland.69 The 
team consisted of eight white, eight black, and eight coloured players with Chick Henderson 
as manager and Dougie Dyers from the SARFF as coach. While the team was the first of its 
kind for South Africa, it still drew substantial criticism as many people saw it as a front to 
soften attitudes towards the proposed 1980 British and Irish Lions tour of South Africa, 
something admitted by the SARB rugby chiefs in later years.70 However, despite the 
Barbarians tour being criticised in the UK as ‘political window dressing’ it was still an 
encouraging sight to many around the world. Ten years ago in South Africa, it would have 
been illegal for players of different races to play together.71 In truth, the steps made toward 
integrated rugby in South Africa, for whatever purposes, were significant and were certainly 
head-and-shoulders above any other sector of South African society in doing so. South 
Africa’s rugby future was looking up.    
Selling South African Rugby to the World: the 1981 Irish Tour of South Africa 
Upon return from South Africa as a guest of the SARB for the 1980 British and Irish Lions 
tour, Jimmy Montgomery, outgoing president of the Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU), was 
quoted as saying: “I believe we should support rugby in South Africa and should go on the 
proposed tour at the end of next season.”72 Montgomery stressed that during his stay in South 
Africa he saw no trouble with the society and that therefore contact with South African rugby 
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should pursued if that game was expected to survive in South Africa. Montgomery adopted a 
stance which had become commonplace amongst rugby officials around the world, that rugby 
was at the forefront of change in South Africa and that therefore the game should be 
supported. Montgomery’s view was certainly in contrast with many of the reports coming out 
of South Africa during the Lions tour. James Ross, President of the Scottish Rugby Union, 
wrote to Danie Craven that although the tour went ahead unhindered it was apparent that 
South Africa still had significant problems.73 Similarly, a number of Irish journalists who 
covered the British and Irish Lions tour in South Africa came to the verdict that the changes 
that had been made in South African rugby were purely cosmetic “and made no difference to 
the basic injustice of apartheid.”74 A journalist from the Irish Times wrote that the tour 
“would do nothing to help the non-white players…it would inhibit the essential march toward 
bringing some semblance of justice to the game there.”75  
However significant South Africa’s problems were in 1980, it did not deter South African 
and Irish rugby bodies from discussing a possible Irish tour of South Africa in 1981, thereby 
breaking Ireland’s 20 year absence from South African fields. Harry McKibben, President of 
the IRFU, set about probing Irish political territory regarding contact with South Africa. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the SARB learnt that following McKibben’s meeting with Brian 
Lenihan, Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs, McKibben was advised that the Irish government 
would discourage any contact with South African rugby.76 The Irish government feared that 
sporting contact with South Africa would endanger their international reputation, perhaps 
after witnessing how New Zealand had fallen out of favour internationally after the 1976 All 
Black tour of South Africa. Thus, the government would attempt to persuade Irish rugby 
administrators not to go ahead with the tour.77 However, McKibben assured Craven that the 
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Irish government would not take any significant steps to see that the tour was cancelled. 
Lenihan had informed McKibben that, despite Irish government’s reservations on the tour, 
there was no question of official action, such as impounding players’ passports.78 However, 
in order to pressure the IRFU not to accept the invitation from South Africa, a government 
grant to the IRFU, amounting to R24,550, would be withdrawn.79 Furthermore, it was 
stipulated by the government that no State employee selected for the Irish side would be 
given special leave to go on the controversial tour.80  
The Irish government was, however, not the only force the IRFU would have to contend with 
over the tour issue, as the country had developed a substantial anti-tour, anti-apartheid 
movement with a significant following. As news about the possibility of an Irish tour spread, 
the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement (IAAM) compiled a comprehensive memorandum to be 
sent to the IRFU, which it endorsed as the truth behind rugby in South Africa. The anti-tour 
memorandum provided a good insight into the prevailing conditions in South Africa and 
South African rugby (in comparison to some of the other documents, both pro and anti-South 
African, which were coming out of the rest of the world). This can be put down to the fact 
that Kadar Asmal, an exiled South African activist and close friend of Nelson Mandela, had 
founded the IAAM and chaired it.  
In order to shore up support against the tour, the IAAM circulated a flyer depicting the 
sketched outline of a police officer about to bring down a baton on the head of what can only 
be assumed to be a black South African.81 The caption to the flyer reads: “If you could see 
their national sport, you might be less keen to see their rugby.”82  The IAAM called on rugby 
officials, players and supporters, and the government to impress on the IRFU to abandon the 
proposed tour for moral reasons. The IAAM also advocated support for South Africa’s true 
non-racial rugby body, the South African Rugby Union, which had refused to become 
affiliated to the SARB as it believed the Board was not doing all it could to ensure non-racial 
rugby.83 
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For the SARB, the mounting opposition in Ireland posed potential problems in securing the 
tour. With South Africa having no diplomatic ties with Ireland at the time, the IRFU was left 
to fight for the tour on its own. Upon the insistence of McKibben, the SARB executive 
decided that it would be worthwhile to send some of their representatives to Ireland to present 
a more favourable version of what was being done in South Africa to develop multiracial 
rugby. It was decided that Chick Henderson, manager of the multiracial Barbarians side that 
travelled to the UK in 1979, would travel to Ireland to try and combat the negative publicity 
the IAAM had been giving the tour. Henderson would travel to New Zealand later in 1981 to 
perform a similar task. Ultimately, though, and despite government reservations on the tour, 
the opposition in Ireland did not prove formidable enough and an Irish tour of South Africa 
was duly scheduled for May of 1981, consisting of eight matches.   
For the SARB, though, the Irish tour, and to a larger extent the New Zealand tour later in 
1981, was of importance that transcended rugby. In a confidential SARB document regarding 
the itinerary of the Irish tour, Danie Craven makes the following statement: 
“As I see things we have been given grace in that we can still prove to the world 
during the Irish and New Zealand tours that we are on the right road as far as 
public opinion and ourselves are concerned.”84   
For the SARB the start of the 1980s had resembled the first sort of rugby normality since 
sanctions were applied against South African sport. For South Africa’s rugby enthusiasts the 
series against Ireland and New Zealand in short succession and coming on the back of a 
French and Lions tour must have warranted the thought that international rugby competition 
was returning to normal for South Africa. However, the SARB were cautious with their 
jubilation. If South African rugby hoped to shrug off the fear of isolation, the Ireland and 
New Zealand tours would need to be an advertisement for how South African rugby had 
changed for the good. As can be inferred from the above extract, Springbok rugby, as a 
representative of South African society, would have to illustrate that the country was on the 
right path and hopefully thereby deliver a telling blow to those who advocated sanctions.  
Realising that much attention would be on South Africa during the Ireland tour and on the 
opinions of the returning Irish team, the SARB hailed the tour as a “pioneer’s tour”.85  The 
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tour was coined this becuase the SARB emphasised the need for the tour to feature mixed 
rugby teams to play against Ireland. The SARB were painfully aware that unless South 
African rugby made a concerted effort to feature mixed rugby more prominently on tours the 
Board could lose further international faith. After all, the sporting boycott had requested that 
multiracial sport needed to take place in South Africa. Thus, if the SARB could feature mixed 
teams against touring opposition it would certainly look like the Board was committed to 
integrated rugby.  
Perhaps also weighing on the mind of Danie Craven and others, was the fact that although a 
tour of New Zealand had been organised, it was not yet a done deal. A large and wide spread 
anti-tour movement had developed in New Zealand that was hell-bent on stopping the 
Springbok tour later that year. In addition to this, there was increasing international pressure 
on Robert Muldoon, New Zealand Prime Minister, from the Commonwealth and African 
states to call off the tour as it was a violation of the Gleneagles Agreement and the sporting 
boycott. 
Therefore, the Irish tour took on more significance than it otherwise would have. The SARB 
believed that if the Irish team could be seen to be playing against mixed teams, it could open 
up the opportunity for further international tours. The Irish tour itinerary states that: “If 
touring teams can, therefore tell the world that they will be playing mixed teams they have a 
case in their favour and ours.”86 Thus, if Ireland could illustrate to the world that on an 
official tour of South Africa they would be playing racially mixed teams, heralding the future 
of South African rugby, a climate more conducive to touring could be fostered. Similarly, if 
the NZRFU could make the case that Ireland had played against mixed sides in South Africa, 
a sign of change in the country, it may serve to justify their invitation to South Africa for a 
tour of New Zealand. 
Despite the changes implemented by the SARB to facilitate mixed rugby, these changes were 
still criticised internationally as being purely ‘cosmetic’. There is, perhaps, a truth to this, as 
it remains a moot point whether the SARB would have had the same drive to implement 
multiracial rugby had it not been under international pressure to do so. Although by the late 
1970s multiracial rugby was a legal reality, it was predominantly implemented at senior level 
amongst provincial and national teams, while club and school rugby remained largely 
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segregated. With regard to the development of multiracial teams, the SARB commented that: 
“Whether we agree with this or not, we have to decide whether we want tours or not.”87 To 
field racially mixed teams against Ireland might well have served to relieve the pressure on 
the forthcoming New Zealand tour and possibly even relieve overall international pressure on 
Springbok rugby.  
The Irish tour therefore became increasingly significant to the SARB as it was hoped that the 
strategies implemented for this tour would, firstly, secure the New Zealand tour, and 
secondly, help in shoring up international confidence in South African rugby. The idea was to 
have the Irish team return home with an optimistic outlook on South African rugby as 
foreshadowing change in the greater South African context. This sentiment is perhaps best 
captured in the message Danie Craven delivered to the Springboks before their first test 
match against Ireland. During this message, Craven stated that: “For those of us who carry 
rugby close to our hearts, the result of the match is not as important as the result of the 
tour.”88 The Irish team would also be toured around the Cape, and Cape Town in particular, 
where “they will observe the good relationship due to the change existing in this province.”89 
Arguably, the Cape had the greatest levels of transformation in implementing multiracial 
rugby, and while race relations in the rest of the country were faltering, coloured and white 
rugby players in the Cape seemed to have found common ground through their affinity to the 
game.   
Thus, the Irish team was not toured around other provinces in the same manner because the 
levels of integration were not of the same standard as in the Cape. The white Transvaal and 
Free State rugby fraternities had been less willing to implement multiracial rugby or even to 
compete against ‘non-white’ rugby teams. In 1980, numerous white Eastern Transvaal 
schools had refused to allow their players to take part in the national Craven-Week, a youth 
developmental tournament, because a SARFF-Schools team had been entered for the first 
time.90 The incident led the Rand Daily Mail to report that the SARB was misleading world 
rugby by stating that the game had become multiracial, as there was clearly still great 
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resistance to integration at grass roots level.91  Thus, what the Irish team were shown in the 
Cape did not truly reflect the rugby scene in South Africa, but this was the image that the 
SARB had hoped the Irish would convey to the world upon their return home. 
A further strategy developed by the SARB to get a favourable review from the Irish team, 
albeit an unusual one, boiled down to the fact that “the more matches a touring team wins the 
better they feel”, according to the tours itinerary.92 Coming into the tour, Irish rugby was in 
somewhat of a slump. After having been expected to win the northern hemisphere’s Five 
Nations Championship in 1981, the team capitulated without recording a single victory. Thus, 
apart from two tests against the Springboks, the Board scheduled matches for the Irish team 
against the likes of the Combined Mines XV, the President’s Trophy XV, the Gold Cup XV, 
and the S.A Country XV ‘B’, all of which were either racially mixed teams or teams of 
colour. The thinking behind this was that the Board could kill two birds with one stone by 
having the Irish team play mixed teams or teams of colour, and would most likely be able to 
rack up victories against these teams, which were not accustomed to the calibre of rugby a 
national side would play. The results were, to say the least, somewhat surprising as Ireland 
lost six of their nine matches, including a narrow single point loss to South African Country 
XV ‘B’ side.   
Whether the average South African was aware of the strings the SARB was pulling behind 
the scenes of the Irish tour is unlikely. For many South African it must have seemed that 
rugby was returning to normal. They were most likely wholly unaware of the lengths to 
which the SARB was going in order to secure tests. What the Ireland tour demonstrates is 
that the Board was desperate to secure tours. Tours provided an opportunity to demonstrate 
how far South African rugby had integrated, which, it was hoped, would have upshot of 
relieving some of the pressure on South African rugby. With integration having achieved its 
highest levels thus far by 1981, the Board felt that this was their best opportunity in some 
time to try to regain the faith of the international rugby community. In a sense, the central 
focus of the Board during the Ireland tour was not the rugby at hand, but securing the rugby 
to come. Securing the New Zealand tour would have been weighing heavily on the minds of 
Craven and others. Thus, not only were the Irish matches being used to test potential 
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Springbok combinations for their New Zealand tour, but also to provide New Zealand’s pro-
tour faction with some ammunition against their anti-tour counterparts.  
The Build Up: Preparing from New Zealand in 1981 
By 1980, the SARB and NZRFU were engaged in talks over the possibility of a Springbok 
tour of New Zealand the following year. Later that same year the NZRFU extended a formal 
invitation for the Springboks to tour New Zealand in 1981. This would be the Springboks’ 
first tour to New Zealand in 16 years and only their second overseas tour since the protestor 
plagued tour of Australia in 1971. By 1980, Jim Frazer, president of the NZRFU, started 
testing the waters for the feasibility of a tour. Frazer requested that a report be written by the 
two non-white rugby bodies affiliated to the SARB, the SARA and SARFF, on the status of 
integrated rugby in the country. John Cupido, Vice-President of the SARFF, was the first to 
respond to Frazer. In a report, titled “Progress toward the normalisation of rugby in South 
Africa as seen by the SARFF, the national controlling body of coloured rugby”, Cupido urged 
Frazer that the isolation of rugby could not fix the social problems in South Africa and that 
those advocating isolation must be either misinformed or uninformed about the situation in 
the country.93  Curnick Mdyesha, Secretary of the SARA, also responded to Frazer with a 
report. Although Mdyesha criticises the lack of development of black rugby, he also urges 
Frazer that isolation is not the way forward for South Africa.94 Frazer did not, however, 
requested a report from the non-racial SARU, a non-affiliate of the SARB, who would 
undoubtedly have provided a highly critical report of rugby in South Africa. 
As affiliates of the SARB, though, the reports by the SARA and SARFF were perhaps more 
flattering of the status of rugby normalisation in South Africa than it truly was. In 1982, a 
report titled “Sport in the Republic of South Africa” by the Human Sciences Research 
Council illustrated that there was still a chronic shortage of sporting facilities in South Africa. 
The report stated that the capital did not exist to maintain the majority of sports facilities, let 
alone build new ones.95 Both Cupido and Mdyesha could not have failed to comprehend, 
though, that their reports could be integral in securing the Springbok tour of New Zealand. It 
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is perhaps also conceivable that Cupido and Mdyesha knew that the white SARB Executive 
would be seeing these reports and that if a critical report cost South Africa the New Zealand 
tour, it could lead to withholding benefits from the two non-white bodies. 
These reports would serve as ammunition for Frazer through which to defend the NZRFU’s 
invitation to the Springboks. Thus, a critical report by SARU, who were regarded by those 
who advocated the sporting boycott as the only true non-racial rugby body in South Africa, 
would provide further pressure on the NZRFU to not invite the Springboks. However, if 
Frazer could show the anti-apartheid, anti-tour lobby a report written by the two non-white 
rugby administrator advocating a case against isolation, it could form a seminal piece in the 
NZRFU’s bid for a tour to go ahead. 
With the conclusion of the Irish tour of South Africa, it seemed a given that the New Zealand 
tour would take place. The invitation to the SARB by the NZRFU had been condemned 
internationally, as well as by many New Zealanders who believed that playing rugby with 
South Africa would only serve to prop-up apartheid, but was not enough to deter the two 
rugby bodies. A full Springbok side under the management of Johan Claassen and Coach 
Nelie Smith was scheduled to depart for New Zealand in late July 1981. The prospect of the 
tour brought excitement to both countries. South African newspapers were abuzz with reports 
and statistics weighing up the odds of a tour victory, speculating on how the wet weather 
would affect the Springboks, and what role refereeing would play in the encounters. Foreign 
correspondents for South Africa newspapers worked tirelessly for any inside information 
regarding the All Blacks team selection. In the month before the tour, the Afrikaans 
newspaper, Die Burger, publish on a daily basis articles such as “Waikato warns 
Springboks”, “All Blacks no better”, and “All Black eight weaker than in 1965” [Translated]. 
The breaking of the Springboks’ 16-year hiatus from New Zealand caused a stir in both 
countries, but perhaps a little more so in New Zealand. 
While New Zealand’s rugby public were gripped by rugby fever, an anti-tour movement had 
been developing since the 1970s and had amassed a substantial following by 1981. This 
movement was kick-started in 1980 by Prime Minster Robert Muldoon’s refusal to intervene 
in the tour, thus violating of the Commonwealth’s Gleneagles Agreement. Many New 
Zealanders felt that by allowing the tour to go ahead, Muldoon was opening up the country to 
an international backlash. For those who opposed the tour for moral reasons, contact with 
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South African rugby was tantamount to support for apartheid, as the tour would alleviate 
some of the pressure that sanctions were apply to South Africa.  
While Muldoon was often quoted as saying that he did not want the Springboks in New 
Zealand, upon closer inspection there may well have been a specific agenda to his refusal to 
intervene in the tour.96 For New Zealand, 1981 was an election year and Muldoon knew that 
at least half of the country’s population were in favour of the tour, which meant that the tour 
could potentially become an electoral matter. While Muldoon conceded that the tour could 
pose potential problems for the re-election of his Nationalist Party, it was likely that he would 
draw significant votes from those who supported the tour and, in particular, votes from rural 
New Zealand.97 According to one New Zealand journalist, Muldoon was short of votes from 
rural areas.98 Much of New Zealand’s rural districts consisted of passionate rugby 
communities which were pro-tour in 1981, and thus by letting the tour continue, Muldoon 
could potentially gain votes from these districts as he would be seen to be standing up against 
those who were trying to intervene in the tour.99   
The sight of mass mobilisation in New Zealand against the tour left South Africa’s rugby 
enthusiasts with a creeping sense of unease. South Africans were greeted on a daily basis 
with newspaper articles or images of anti-tour protests in New Zealand, some of which 
numbered near 30,000 protestors. One reader of Cape Times pointed out that the tour: 
“…would be like gate-crashing at a party. If one is not invited to a party, one should not push 
one’s way in. We are clearly not welcome in New Zealand and should not subject our players 
to unnecessary humiliation.”100 Those who had lived through the 1969/70 tour of the United 
Kingdom were well aware of the effect that protestors could have on rugby. However, despite 
the reality of the growing anti-tour campaign in New Zealand, Die Burger assured its 
readership that protest action in New Zealand was continually suffering setbacks in their 
plans to disrupt the tour. When the newspaper reported on anti-tour protests in New Zealand, 
it always had the added comfort that these protests were half the size of the ones a week 
earlier. Readers were also informed that the tour venues had been selected with the purpose 
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of not playing more than three matches in any vicinity where protestors could be a 
problem.101 It was believed that by structuring the tour in such a manner it would force 
protestors to continuously be on the move, which would surely have a detrimental effect on 
their numbers. 
For Die Burger, the increasingly visible Communist element amongst the New Zealand 
protestors was alarming. As the mouthpiece of the Cape NP, Die Burger reflected the 
governing party’s anxieties over Communism. White South Africa, as the last remaining 
westernized nation in southern Africa, believed itself to be in the midst of a battle against a 
growing Communist presence, both internally and externally. A number of South Africa’s 
neighbours in southern Africa had adopted broadly Communistic ideologies. Others were 
fighting civil wars against insurgents backed by Communist nations. With regard to the 
liberation struggle within South Africa, the ANC also espoused broadly Communistic 
ideologies and had received support from the Soviet Union after being exiled from South 
Africa. This led the NP to believe that South Africa would be engulfed in Communism 
should the ANC gain a foothold in the country. Reflecting on the 1980s, former state 
President, Nelson Mandela, wrote that:  
“The National Party accepted the most hide-bound of the 1950s Cold War 
ideology and regarded the Soviet Union as the evil empire and communism as the 
work of the devil.”102  
However, the South African government, in order to explain away certain happenings, 
particularly on sporting grounds, also made use of the Communist rhetoric. When South 
Africa was barred from the 1968 Olympic Games and eventually expelled from the 
International Olympic Committee in 1970, it was put down to the large Russian contingent in 
the IOC working against the country and its ties to the USA. Similarly, protesters against the 
Springboks in the UK in 1969/70 were dismissed as a bunch of Communist troublemakers. In 
New Zealand in 1981, the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) was anti-tour and thus 
become a visible element in the protests surrounding the tour. Die Burger reported that 
during a rally in Auckland the CPNZ were distributing anti-South Africa pamphlets, which 
condemned the mineral rich country for using apartheid to create cheap slave labour and as a 
country that was of great strategic importance to Ronald Reagan’s USA (one of the few 
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countries with whom South Africa still had a good relationship).103 Thus, the by now familiar 
struggle in South Africa between the West and Communism was displaced to New Zealand, 
where the Springboks would have to contest with the Communist hordes trying to disrupt the 
tour.  
While white South African newspapers were putting on a brave face for their readership that 
the tour would go ahead, the SARB were well aware of some of the difficulties the tour could 
face. Danie Craven had been in regular correspondence with NZRFU officials, and in 
particular with Ron Don, Auckland Rugby Union President, over the matter of potential tour 
disruptions. Don, and the Auckland Rugby Union, had been amongst the most vocal pro-tour 
supporters in the months leading up to the tour, a position that soon had Don labelled as 
“Enemy Number One” by the anti-tour movement.104 Don had informed Craven that large 
tracts of New Zealand society were turning against the coming tour. He claimed that the 
majority of New Zealand newspapers “[had] made an organised combined effort to stop the 
tour” and that they were printing on a daily basis anti-South Africa propaganda in an effort to 
turn opinions against the tour.105 However, Don remained adamant that although some 
problems with “Communist inspired” protestors were to be expected, the police would quite 
easily be able to deal with demonstrations.106  
Despite Don’s optimistic statement in April 1981 that “we won the battle…the tour is on”, it 
was not yet a done deal that the Springboks would tour. Shortly before the Springboks’ 
scheduled departure for New Zealand, South Africans learnt that an appeal had been lodged 
with the New Zealand Human Rights Commission (NZHRC) to stop the tour from going 
ahead. The appeal, which had been lodged by HART, the largest of the anti-tour groups, 
contended that the tour was not in the best interests of New Zealand society and could well 
have an adverse effect on race relations in the country. The appeal targeted the outlawing of 
the decision to grant visas to the Springboks, without which the tour would not be able to take 
place. Quoting a legal source in New Zealand, the Rand Daily Mail reported that: “the 
commission may be obliged, under two international human rights accords, to rule that the 
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government must withhold entry visas from the Springbok players and officials”.107 As New 
Zealand was a signatory of the 1969 United Nations convention to eliminate all racial 
discrimination, as well as a signatory of the Gleneagles Agreement, the NZHRC would 
attempt to prove that by allowing the Springboks to tour, Muldoon would be contravening 
two agreements to which New Zealand had pledged itself.108 
With the court’s verdict pending, South Africans heard that the NZRFU would also be 
convening an emergency meeting during which a final decision on the feasibility of the tour 
would be taken. Many New Zealanders felt certain that the NZRFU would come to its senses 
and call off the tour as a matter of national security. Fortunately for the SARB and South 
Africa’s rugby public, neither the Human Rights Commission, nor the NZRFU found any 
reason for the tour to be called off or even delayed, despite the quite apparent effect it could 
have on New Zealand. The news came as a welcome relief to Craven who, despite being 
adamant that he had never doubted that the tour would take place, must have had his heart in 
his mouth in the early weeks of July as he witnessed New Zealand society become 
increasingly agitated over the tour. On July 11, less than two weeks before the Springboks 
were scheduled to depart for New Zealand, the NZRFU committed to proceeding with the 
tour. For the first time since the invitation was extended to the SARB in 1980, South Africans 
could feel supremely confident that the tour would take place. Robert Muldoon, although 
confessing his disappointment in the decision of the Rugby Union, reiterated that it was not 
his place to intervene in the tour, which essentially meant that there were no obstacles to the 
tour going ahead. 
For New Zealand’s anti-tour movement, the court appeal and NZRFU emergency meeting 
had been a great disappointment, as both had fallen through and the tour seemed destined to 
continue. In a last gasp effort to try and deter the tour from happening, large protests took 
place in Auckland, Christchurch, and Wellington. Many of these gatherings were 
characterised by the physical altercations that took place in the streets between pro- and anti-
tour groups, essentially foreshadowing what would become a weekly occurrence while the 
Springboks were in New Zealand. In Christchurch, protestors wrote anti-tour slogans against 
the walls of the Canterbury rugby office in blood.109 There was also a hunger strike by 
Christchurch protestors who had been arrested for unlawful protesting and were refusing to 
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pay bail.110 However, in spite of these last minute difficulties the tour was scheduled to go 
ahead. 
Despite their failure in preventing the tour, protestors were not deterred as their new objective 
now became the duration of the tour. John Minto, national Chairman of HART, released a 
statement promising that the demonstrations during the tour would be a protracted endeavour 
during which protesters would do their worst.111 The New Zealand government had given the 
police full discretion over either shortening or cancelling the tour if it became a matter of 
national safety. Essentially, this painted a target on the police, as protestors knew that if they 
could overextend the police they had a real chance of affecting the duration of the tour.  
Through various newspaper articles, South Africans had learnt that the tour could be 
jeopardised if protests escalated to uncontrollable levels. They were also informed that in 
protest over the tour, New Zealand television had threatened not to broadcast matches 
internationally, specifically so that South Africans could not view them. However, the threat 
proved empty and matches were broadcast internationally. Ironically, the fact that the 
matches were aired proved pivotal in showing the outside world the mayhem that unfolded in 
New Zealand during the tour. International audiences could see the sort of chaos a touring 
Springbok side could attract, which proved decisive in deterring many rugby nations from 
inviting the Springboks to tour after 1981.  
Although the Springboks had gone to New Zealand under the auspices of being a ‘pioneers 
tour’ during which they would show the world that they were still on the right track, the 
Springboks, and for that matter the All Blacks, would find that the fate of the tour no longer 
resided in their hands.112 Regardless of how diplomatic the Springboks were on tour, their 
fate lay in the hands of the police and the demonstrations, or as Die Burger dubbed the 
protestors, “the enemies of South Africa”.113 In a sense then, the Springboks and their 
supporters would be helpless onlookers as their tour was either completed or called off short.  
It seemed that, amidst the increasing difficulties surrounding the New Zealand protests and 
actually securing the tour, the rugby aspect of the tour had been somewhat overshadowed. 
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South African rugby enthusiasts would be hoping, though, that history did not repeat itself.  
Those who could recall the disastrous 1969/70 tour of Britain, the first of the ‘demo’ tours, 
would remember the Springboks losing all but their last match in the face of fierce protests, 
the sort of protests that it seemed would be rivalled in New Zealand. As one reader lamented 
in Die Burger, the fact that the Springboks would have to remain calm in the face of protests, 
as in 1969/70, meant “they will seldom deliver their best, because there is a lack of 
aggressiveness, which suffocates attacking rugby.”114 With the stories coming out of New 
Zealand regarding the anticipated levels of protest action, South Africans knew that the tour 
would be difficult, but it is unlikely that they would have anticipated what was to come. 
The 1981 Springbok Tour on the International Radar 
Perhaps more so than with any other tour, the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand became 
an international event as the eyes of the world turned to the tour. By allowing the tour to take 
place, Robert Muldoon had made New Zealand the centre of much international criticism. 
One New Zealand newspaper, fearing the worst, called on New Zealanders of all convictions 
to restrain their anger toward other groups as New Zealand’s international loss would be so 
great because of the tour that it could not afford any form of civil war as well.115 By allowing 
the tour, New Zealand had come to be regarded by many as a sympathiser of apartheid, and 
was consequently treated as such.  
Those who advocated the sporting boycott also targeted New Zealand, as they believed that 
severing Springbok-All Black ties would deliver a telling blow towards isolating white South 
Africa’s most revered sport. David Black and John Nauright make this point and argue: 
“from the mid-1970s the effort to force the severing of New Zealand-South Africa rugby 
relations was the single-most important driving force behind the extension of sport sanctions 
internationally.”116 Thus, the decision to allow the tour to proceed provoked more 
international anger towards New Zealand than it did toward, for instance, Ireland or France, 
both of whom had recently toured to South Africa. The perceived pivotal importance of New 
Zealand in bringing about the isolation of South African rugby meant it attracted heavy 
criticism when it did not play ball with the boycott, such as in 1970 and 1976 when the All 
Blacks had continued to tour South Africa in spite of the boycott.   
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At the forefront of much of the international criticism were the Commonwealth countries. 
Much of their criticism over the tour was directed at Robert Muldoon, whom they regarded as 
having disobeyed the Gleneagles Agreement to which he had agreed in 1977. This was not 
the first time that New Zealand had found itself in hot water over maintaining rugby ties with 
South Africa. The 1973 All Black tour of South Africa had been cancelled partly due to 
threats from black Commonwealth countries to boycott the 1974 Commonwealth games in 
Christchurch. Furthermore, following an All Black tour of South Africa in 1976, shortly after 
the shooting of protestors during the Soweto uprising, twenty-one African countries, as well 
as Guyana, boycotted the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympic Games because of New Zealand’s 
participation in the games. The Gleneagles Agreement had, to a certain extent, come about in 
order to prevent a similar boycott at the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games over the 
1976 All Black tour of South Africa.117 In essence, though, the agreement was born out of the 
desire to put a stop to Springbok-All Black rugby contests and the repercussion’s these 
contests were causing. With the 1981 tour set to take place and Robert Muldoon continuing to 
defend his decision, it seemed likely that New Zealand’s presence at the 1982 
Commonwealth Games in Australia would again result in the games being boycotted by the 
black Commonwealth affiliates. 
Perhaps, though, New Zealand’s most vociferous critic was Australia. Australia had adopted 
a strong approach of zero contact with South African sport teams and had severed its contact 
with South African rugby after the troublesome 1971 Springbok tour of Australia. The 
country had made its disappointment with New Zealand well known after the 1981 tour had 
been confirmed. Being the host nation for the following years Commonwealth Games, 
Australia felt the Springbok tour would likely bring on a mass boycott of the games if New 
Zealand athletes took part. Leslie Martyn, President of the Australian Commonwealth Games 
Association, warned New Zealand that an invitation to the Springboks could jeopardise the 
place of New Zealand athletes at the 1982 games.118 Martyn pointed out that, as many of the 
Commonwealth members were black African states, it was possible that they could pass a 
resolution that New Zealand should not be represented at the games.119  If New Zealand 
followed through with the tour invitation, thereby violating the sporting boycott and the 
Gleneagles Agreement, they could well be targeted by sports sanctions. The IOC and its 
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Communist affiliates had in the past been sympathetic to anti-South African, anti-racist 
protests. If New Zealand continued with the invitation to the Springboks, it was likely that 
they would be treated in the same way that South African athletes were being treated.120  
Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, had also been vocal in his criticism of the New 
Zealand government’s decision not to intervene in the tour. In addition to forbidding any 
Australian referee to officiate tour matches, Fraser had insisted that New Zealand be 
reprimanded by moving the scheduled Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting in 
Auckland later in 1981 to another country. This decision had been made by the 
Commonwealth and had given New Zealand up until 21 July, the day before the first 
scheduled match of the tour, to call off the tour, before steps would be taken against the 
country.121 It also became apparent that a Commonwealth Heads of State meeting scheduled 
for Sydney the following year would be boycotted if an invitation was extended to Robert 
Muldoon.122  
Amongst some of the others to come out against New Zealand were Kenneth Kaunda, 
President of Zambia, and Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, both of whom issued 
statements in which they impressed upon New Zealand to give in to international pressure 
and to call off the proposed tour.123 Muldoon’s response to these requests was that he would 
not interfere in the country’s sport, as it would deny New Zealanders their right to watch 
sport. Out of protest at the tour, a West Indian cricket tour to New Zealand in 1981 was also 
cancelled.124 
By allowing the tour to proceed, New Zealand had labelled itself as an apartheid sympathiser, 
and would be treated as such. New Zealand was seen as providing relief through rugby to a 
system which, by the 1980s, was abhorred by most of the world and who advocated that 
apartheid be fought through any means possible, including sport. Again, though, had 
Springbok-All Black ties not been of such significance to South African rugby, it is unlikely 
that the tour would have evoked as strong a response as it did toward New Zealand. 
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White South Africans had hoped that 1981 would be the year that saw off the fear of rugby 
isolation. With the Irish returning to South African fields for the first time in 21 years and the 
Springboks returning to New Zealand fields for the first time in 16 years, it was not hard to 
see why 1981 looked like end of isolation. For Danie Craven the future was clear: the New 
Zealand tour would either open the doors to international acceptance or shut them entirely. 
For this reason, the 1981 tour was possibly the most important tour ever undertaken by a 
Springbok side, as they carried not only the responsibility of their own tour, but of restoring 
South Africa’s rugby future. It seemed somewhat unreasonable that such a diplomatic 
responsibility rested on a group of young men, most of whom were politically ignorant or 
indifferent. After all, they were not politicians but sportsmen, staring down a matter that was 
ultimately a political conundrum.125 The tour would need to be an advertisement for 
Springbok rugby and South Africa in general if the SARB wished to be readmitted to full 
international competition. Commenting on this facet of the tour, Die Burger reported that: 
“the Springboks, win or lose, be worthy opponents and play the sort of rugby that would 
command respect from New Zealand and the rest of the world.”126  
As Craven reiterated at the teams official send off, they would be expected to be ambassadors 
for their country and sport in what was anticipated to be harsh conditions as the tour was 
being turned into a game of political football.127 Any disreputable incidents on the playing 
field could close the doors on South Africa’s international rugby hopes (the message seemed 
not to have been passed on to Springbok centre, Danie Gerber, who would go on to knocked-
out All Black, Stu Wilson, with a punch in the first test of the tour).128 For the Springboks it 
seemed that, as an earlier mentioned reader of Die Burger pointed out, they would be 
constrained from playing their natural style of aggressive rugby, yet in the same breath were 
expected to play a quality of rugby that would serve as an advertisement for Springbok rugby. 
Furthermore, Johan Claassen, who had coached the Springboks on the 1969/70 UK ‘demo’ 
tour, was the only member of the touring party who had dealt with demonstrators. Therefore, 
Craven tasked Claassen with educating the players on the “provocative and nerve-wracking” 
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tactics employed by protestors.129 Ultimately, though, nothing would prepare the Springboks 
for the events that took place in New Zealand and the USA. In the months leading up to the 
tour, South African newspapers had commented that, while demonstrations would put strain 
on the Springboks, there was no possibility of the demonstrations being as severe as they had 
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“One, two, three, four, we don’t want your racist tour”: The 
Springboks in New Zealand 
“I will never forget what Doc said to us before we left. He said there will never 
be another Springbok team like this to leave our shores”.131 
All attempts to scuttle the Springbok tour before it got off the ground had failed. As a result, a 
Springbok side departed on 16 July for a sixteen-match tour of New Zealand and a three 
match stopover in the USA on the way back. The Springboks left South Africa under the 
auspices of being the first ‘merit-selected’ Springbok team to tour abroad. The team included 
South Africa’s first Springbok of colour, Errol Tobias, a builder from Caledon in the Western 
Cape, as well as Abe Williams, a SARFF official who was assistant manager for the tour. 
However, getting to New Zealand would be a feat on its own. As the Springboks were barred 
from touching down on Australian soil, what should have been a two-day trip was turned into 
four. The Springboks had to travel from Johannesburg to New York, to Los Angeles, to 
Honolulu in Hawaii, before traveling from there to New Zealand. The team had been warned 
that they would be met by a measure of protests in the US when their plane touched down in 
New York, foreshadowing what was to come when they would play the US on route back 
from New Zealand.132   
John Minto of HART had guaranteed that the demonstration that would meet the Springboks 
at Auckland airport upon their arrival would be one of the largest to date.133  However, due to 
the convoluted travel arrangements, New Zealand protesters wanting to ‘welcome’ the 
Springboks were in some disarray about when the team was scheduled to touch down in 
Auckland. When the Springboks arrived on 19 July, it was a disappointing turn out for the 
protestors, who had planned this to be a showpiece moment to warn the Springboks of what 
they were set to encounter over the coming months. Upon arrival in Auckland, the 
Springboks must have felt somewhat better about the situation they were facing when they 
were met with only a handful of protesters who were easily cleared away by police.   
                                                            
131 Interview with DeVilliers Visser, 7 June 2015. 
132 “Yank- betogers wag Bokke in,” Die Burger, 16 July 1981, p. 1. 
133 “Duiwelse plan teen Bokke,” Die Burger, 17 July 1981, p. 1. 




Gisborne: Springboks vs. Poverty Bay 
Following a brief stay in Auckland, the Springboks departed for Gisborne, where they were 
scheduled to play the first match of the tour on 22 July against Poverty Bay. Opinions in New 
Zealand were polarised over the tour to the extent that within families there was disagreement 
over the tour matter.134 As one police officer recalled, while he would be preparing to go out 
and confront a demonstration his brother would be in the next room strapping pillows to 
himself so that he did not get injured while protesting against the tour.135 The first match of 
the tour was a chance to test the waters regarding what could be expected for the rest of the 
tour. The anti-tour movement had vowed that the Springbok tour would not last for its full 
duration as they planned to force it into being either shortened, or called off completely. 
Newspapers informed South Africans that New Zealand protestors were distributing 
pamphlets with instructions on how to make petrol bombs and how to shatter glass effectively 
so it could be spread over playing fields where matches would be taking place.136 In New 
Zealand, concern was rising over the potential for violence erupting between the protestors 
and rugby supporters wanting to see the Springboks play. In the run-up to the tour, there had 
been numerous scuffles during demonstrations between pro- and anti-tour supporters.   
Gisborne did not have a reputation for having a significant anti-tour movement. It was some 
distances from major cities and universities, which were expected to yield the greatest 
number of demonstrators. However, Gisborne had a significant Maori community who, 
somewhat unexpectedly, gave the Springboks an official welcome at the local Marae137. As 
with the rest of New Zealand, the tour was a fractious issue amongst Maori and was not 
unanimously rejected or accepted. During the welcoming ceremony Graham Latimer, 
President of the Maori Council, made it clear to the Springboks that he was against the tour 
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and stated that: “we [the Maori Council] will not make another such welcome unless your 
government changes its apartheid policy.”138  
For Johan Claassen it also became apparent that the New Zealand media would be going out 
of their way to make the tour difficult. During the Springboks’ first press conference in New 
Zealand, Claassen fought a losing battle to try to keep the conference focused on rugby. 
Claassen was peppered with questions from the start on whether he was at all concerned that 
the ripples of the tour would stretch beyond rugby. Furthermore, Errol Tobias became the 
subject of much debate in the New Zealand press, most of whom dismissed him as ‘window 
dressing’, an inclusion meant to take some political heat off the mainly white Springbok 
team. During the first press conference, Abe Williams was also questioned on whether he 
thought it was more important that he and Tobias be involved in Springbok rugby or got 
voting rights in South Africa.139 Consequently, Tobias became a representative of black 
South Africa through which journalists would question apartheid policies. Journalists would 
use Tobias as an example when there were questions about the Pass Laws140, which of course 
Tobias did not have to adhere to because he was coloured not black, or the Group Areas 
Act141. Consequently, Tobias had a somewhat torrid time on the tour and was treated with 
disdain by the white Springbok management, as he came to embody much of hardship the 
management had to endure at the hands of the media and protestors.142 On several occasions, 
Tobias requested to go home, but Craven convinced him to stay.143  
The New Zealand media played a large part in the tour, as they sided with the anti-tour 
movement and subsequently gave substantial coverage to protests. This was much to the 
annoyance of Robert Muldoon and those trying to underplay the scale of events unfolding in 
New Zealand. The media coverage was seen to be spurring on the protestors as they could 
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spread their anti-tour message to a wider audience through the media. One New Zealand 
reporter recalled how, while out covering an anti-tour riot, a civilian yelled at him that “this is 
all your fault”, implying that the excessive media coverage was sparking larger and more 
violent protests.144 With the widespread media coverage of the tour bringing news into 
people’s homes through television and radio, it made it ever more difficult for New 
Zealanders not to choose a side.  
The night before the first match, though, protest action in Gisborne escalated. Protestors 
broke into the stadium where the match was to be played and strew shattered glass on the 
field. That same night, a large group of protestors gathered outside the Springboks’ hotel with 
whistles and megaphones trying to cause the team a sleepless night in order to affect their 
performance the next day. In addition to this, police discovered a protestor carrying a deadly 
gas in his vehicle in front of the Springboks’ hotel, which was likely intended to be triggered 
when the team emerged to leave for their match.145 A warning was also given to the 
Springboks that a sort of teargas would be sprayed over the field for crowd control purposes 
in the event that things got out of hand.146   
The morning of the first match an air of uneasiness lay over the quite town as the eyes of the 
world turned to it. Poverty Bay was not renowned for being among the strongest provincial 
teams in New Zealand as they had ended fifth in the second division of the provincial 
tournament the year before. Thus, there was not as much interest in the outcome of the match 
as there was in the conditions under which the match would be played. Upon arrival at 
Gisborne airport, the Springboks encountered forty protestors, hardly something to make 
them shake in their boots. However, the news was that HART had organised protestors to 
travel to Gisborne to make an immediate impact on the tour. 
HART had labelled the match the ‘National Day of Shame’ and protestors were set to try to 
disrupt the contest. For the Springboks, the match itself would not be an easy one. Despite 
Poverty Bay’s weakness in their domestic contest, Prof Claassen reminded his players that it 
was an honour for any New Zealand side to play the Springboks and that these teams usually 
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performed above their capabilities in these matches.147  A substantial police presence of over 
300 guarded the venue, giving rest to any lingering thoughts about protestors.  
A crowd of some 20,000 spectators, more than the entire population of Gisborne, gathered to 
watch the first Springbok match on New Zealand soil in 16 years. They were unaware, 
though, that a group of over 400 protestors was making its way to the ground with the intent 
of storming the field. The protestors carried banners with massive swastikas in green and 
gold (the Springboks’ traditional playing colours) and various other anti-tour and anti-
apartheid banners.148 All 400 of the protestors were engaged in chants of “Amandla Awethu”, 
a rallying cry that was used by the ANC during apartheid, meaning ‘power to the people’.149  
However, the protestors had inadvertently charged the most inaccessible part of the ground, 
as steep grass embankment, which after days of rain had made it a slippery slope to climb, lay 
between them and the ground. At the top of the embankment, a reinforced three-meter high 
fence prevented those determined protestors who had made it up the bank from entering the 
ground. A police line had formed to stop protestors from trying to rip down the fence and 
subsequently turned into the first of many battles waged between police and protestors over 
the coming months. As one reporter noted, the police line did not put off the protestors as 
they attempted to walk straight through it or, in some cases, straight over the police.150 Hone 
Ngata, a Gisborne social worker and anti-tour campaigner who was part of the protest that 
day, recalled coming up against numerous members of his own family who were in the police 
trying to prevent him and other protestors from getting into the ground.151  Further trouble 
arose when some of the rugby spectators standing on the inside of the ground climbed the 
fence in an attempt to confront the demonstrators. Fistfights erupted up and down the 
embankment between spectators and protestors.  
The match, however, was uninterrupted and the Springboks emerged victorious, 26-4. To a 
lesser extent, it was a victory for the police as well, as they had prevented the demonstration 
from making it onto the field. Although the police had kept the match from being disrupted, 
they had been stretched and were rudely awakened to the length that protestors were willing 
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to go to.152 Even though Gisborne turned out to be one of the smaller demonstrations, it had 
illustrated that protestor numbers did not matter, but instead the intensity with which they 
went about performing their task. Protestors were willing to accept arrest for their actions, 
meaning they were willing to cross the borders of what was legal. Gisborne came as a 
sobering reality for many New Zealand on the extent to which their existed malevolent 
capabilities amongst both the pro- and anti-tour campaigners.   
In South Africa, rugby fans had been able to listen to a live radio broadcast of the match in 
the early hours of the morning on 22 July. For them it had seemed that rugby as normal had 
taken place which, in a certain respect, it had, as they only found out about the 
demonstrations in the following days newspaper. Certainly, the protestors did not put off the 
Springboks and whether they were even aware of what was going on outside the stadium is 
unlikely. Speaking on whether the protests ever distracted the Springboks during matches, 
Theuns Stofberg had the following to say: “When you ran out onto that field you were not 
thinking about protestors. You play the game and there is no time to think about a protestor. 
It [the game] was simply too fast.”153  
However, the Gisborne demonstrations had not been an isolated event, as across New 
Zealand around 14,000 people had taken to the streets in protest against the first match of the 
tour, with more than 100 arrests for unlawful actions. In Wellington, a large group of 
protestors stormed the head office of the National Party and proceeded to occupy it for some 
time before being forcefully ejected by police. The same was done at the National Party 
offices in Dunedin, where protestors chained themselves to equipment in the offices. 
Numerous other incidents were reported of protestors causing damage around the country, 
largely directed at damaging rugby grounds.   
For New Zealanders these sorts of civil disobedience campaigns were unknown. The last 
major protests in New Zealand before the Springbok question came about were in the 1960s 
against the Vietnam War, which had certainly not had the effect of polarising the country. 
The tour would come to grip the attention of New Zealanders, as it became impossible not to 
choose a side or ignore what was going on around the country. For South Africans, however, 
the events surrounding the first match of the tour were not a cause for great concern. Four 
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hundred protestors had failed to make it over a small hill and onto the ground. Those who 
could recall the 1969/70 UK tour would remember thousands of unruly protestors who tried 
to disrupt matches, or get close enough to spite in the faces of the Springboks. The initial 
demonstrations in New Zealand must have validated the predications of Die Burger that 
protestors would certainly not be as bad as they were in the UK in 1969/70. However, in the 
following weeks protest action would escalate drastically, especially after protests in 
Hamilton the later that week.  
Hamilton: Springboks vs. Waikato  
With the conclusion of the match against Poverty Bay in Gisborne, the Springboks travelled 
to Hamilton where they would play Waikato on 25 July. Hamilton had been a source of 
concern for rugby administrators and supporters alike even before the tour had been firmly 
secured. Hamilton was a larger town than Gisborne, less rural, and more accessible from 
Auckland where HART and other protest organisations were based. Hamilton was known for 
its fanatical rugby supporters (more so than usual in New Zealand) and had taken an openly 
pro-tour stand, causing concern that there could be violent clashes between supporters and 
overly zealous protestors who might try to disrupt the match.   
Following the Gisborne match, there was an uneasy truce between police and protestors as 
both groups recovered and plotted their next move. Police now knew that protestors were 
willing to push the legal boundaries of protesting. However, for the protestors, their concerns 
were not so much about the police as it was about the thousands of rugby supporters who 
would attend the match. In the days leading up to the match, there was a tense atmosphere in 
Hamilton, particularly after the local protest leader, Geoff walker, made a public statement 
that the aim of protestors would be to end the tour in Hamilton.154  
A large demonstration was planned for Hamilton, particularly as this would be the first match 
to be broadcast directly to South African television, as well as to networks around the world. 
This would be the first time South Africans would see a live broadcast of an international 
rugby match, something the protestors knew. It was expected that a substantial number of 
viewers would tune in to the live broadcast of the match. For protestors, the fact that their 
actions would be broadcast into South African homes was like adding fuel to fire. It made 
them more determined than ever to disrupt the match and tour as it would certainly have a 
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resounding impact on South Africans to see the events taking place rather than having to read 
about them in the following day’s newspaper. The fact that South Africans could see what 
was unfolding in New Zealand from their own homes came as a rude awakening of the extent 
to which there existed anti-apartheid sentiments outside South Africa, even with an old ally 
like New Zealand. Paul Dobson elaborates on this and points out that: “the vehemence of the 
opposition shocked many South Africans who believed that rugby men really wanted to play 
with them”.155  
The match was highly anticipated one amongst those who supported the tour. In 1956, 
Waikato became one of only a handful of regional teams to beat the Springboks on a New 
Zealand tour. In 1981, Waikato held the Ranfurly-Shield, the supreme prize in New Zealand 
domestic rugby, and boasted ten All Blacks in their ranks.156 Expectations in Hamilton were 
running high that the Waikato team could record the same historic victory as their 
predecessors had done 25 years ago. This sparked a great deal of excitement around the 
match. 
The Hamilton protests were expected to be large, possibly some of the largest on the tour. 
Whereas South African newspapers promised their readers that protests would decline once 
New Zealanders were hit with rugby fever, the New Zealand protests groups had promised 
that it would take no longer than two weeks to scuttle the tour. On the morning of the match, 
thousands of protestors gathered in Hamilton town square chanting “Amandla” and 
brandishing anti-apartheid banners, ready to march to the rugby park and put a stop to the 
match between the Springboks and Waikato. In contrast, around 27,000 rugby fans were 
brimming with excitement at the prospect of watching Waikato beat the Springboks. The 
stage was set for a large clash, and not necessarily between the two rugby teams. 
Hamilton Rugby Park resembled something of a fort that day, with barbed wire fences having 
been erected around the field. Local farmers and businesses who were in possession of large 
vehicles had parked them around the stadium to act as a makeshift barrier. Police had 
assembled in large numbers, some of whom were in tracksuits and rugby boots to tackle 
anyone who made it onto the field. Although they had brought their riot gear along with 
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them, police were still wrestling with the idea that, as one police officer commented, wearing 
riot gear “was a bit to confrontational for New Zealand society.”157   
Minutes before the match was scheduled start both teams were informed that they needed to 
remain in their dressing rooms, as a large demonstration was on its way. Theuns Stofberg, 
who was selected as captain that day, recalls how the team was able to look through a small 
window at the back of their changing room and saw what they thought to be thousands of 
protestors approaching the ground.158 HART had labelled the protest at Hamilton as 
‘Operation Everest’ and focused exclusively on occupying the field and forcing the 
cancelation of the match.159 Around 200 HART members had also bought tickets to the 
match so that they help the protestors on the outside to get into the ground. 
The approaching mob was not deterred by the barricade of trucks, many of which were 
toppled over. The protestors ripped down the barbed wire fences, after which they stormed 
onto the field. Police officers began rugby tackling the protestors, but were soon swamped as 
nearly 400 protestors charged onto the field, locking arms in the middle of the field. At this 
point, the police were faced with a dangerous situation. If they could not remove the 
protestors from the field, the 27,000 livid rugby supporters surrounding the field would surely 
take it upon themselves to remove the protestors. Police had been ordered not to use their 
batons to remove the protestors from the field as the event was being broadcast around the 
world.160 For the moment, Hamilton Rugby Park had turned into a coliseum, with those 
sitting in the stands baying for the blood of those on the field. Police were left with few 
options. In an attempt to remove the illegal protestors, police began a mass arrest campaign 
as protestors were dragged one-by-one to the awaiting police vehicles, to which the crowd 
roared its approval.161 However, arresting 400 struggling protestors was a laborious process 
and soon there were lengthy queues of captives waiting alongside the police vans.162  
As the crowd became increasingly agitated a number of spectators leaped the barriers in an 
attempt to exact their own form of justice. As police feared that the more such instances 
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would occur as the lengthy arrest process went on, the decision was made to escort the mob 
off of the field who, likely sensing that the situation was growing increasingly volatile, were 
more willing to be escorted off. As the protestors were escorted from the stadium, they were 
pelted from all directions with anything that could be found, from stones to bottles, causing 
grievous injuries to those who were on the receiving end of the flying objects.   
As the protestors were leaving the field, an announcement was made over the public address 
system that requested that the spectators vacate the stadium as the match had been cancelled. 
The decision caused an outcry as it was thought that those who had occupied the field had 
forced the cancelation of the match. In fact, police had received information that a pilot in a 
small aircraft was threatening to crash into the main grandstand if the match was not 
cancelled.163 By trying to avoid a panic, the police withheld this information from the 
spectators attending the match. 
The cancelation of the match was, however, only the start of the problems, as 27,000 fuming 
rugby fans now took to the same streets where the ejected protestors still roamed. The hype 
of hoping to see the Waikato team defeat the Springboks now turned to rage. Many of the 
rugby supporters now lashed out at anyone who they thought had deprived them of a rugby 
match. Large fistfights broke out in the streets outside Hamilton Rugby Park as enraged 
supporters hunted down the protestors. The police simply did not have the numbers to contain 
the situation and consequently proved quite ineffective in curbing the violence.  
Having anticipated the possibility of violence erupting, a number of nurses aligned with the 
anti-tour campaign had volunteered to wait outside the ground to treat wounded protestors. 
One nurse recalls a situation where a young woman who had sustained a serious head injury 
at the hands of rugby fans was left bleeding in the street.164 While treating the woman, the 
nurse was kicked in the face several times by passing supporters. A van, which had been 
provided by one of the anti-tour members, was used to extract the two women from the midst 
of the violence. However, the van did not make it far before it became a target, as its 
windows were smashed and the woman with the head injury, now in a critical state, was 
dragged back out into the street as the vans back doors were ripped open.165  There were also 
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reports that around the country protest leaders, including John Minto, were attacked and 
assaulted in their homes.166 . 
In South Africa, those who had braved the early morning had witnessed the occupation of the 
field and subsequent cancelation of the game, but it was only in newspaper reports the 
following day that they learnt of what had unfolded outside the stadium. However, the reports 
provided by Die Burger were certainly with a sympathetic slant to the actions of the rugby 
supporters. The newspaper chose rather to report on the violence committed by the protestors, 
who had in fact been victims of far greater violence than they had themselves committed. Die 
Burger also reported extensively that a Communist presence was the driving force behind the 
protests at Hamilton. The newspapers front page on 27 July sported a large picture of 
protestors holding a banner reading “Communist Party: Apartheid Racism – weapon of 
Capitalism to divide and rule”.167 Readers were told that the victory for the protestors in 
forcing the match cancelation was also a victory for Communism.168 
 The role Communism and the CPNZ played in the events unfolding in New Zealand were 
grossly overstated in South Africa. However, it became a convenient outlet to justify why 
such events were occurring. In truth, though, it was not the longhaired Communist students 
from the surrounding universities that Die Burger reported were causing all the trouble. The 
protestors were ordinary New Zealanders who opposed apartheid, and were not anti-rugby as 
was so often reported. One would be hard pressed to see All Black Captain, Graham Mourie, 
who refused to play the Springboks during the tour out of moral conviction, as an anti-rugby 
Communist. John Howson, a New Zealand commentator at the Hamilton game, recalled that 
the protestors were not those he had been led to believe them to be: 
“I could see priests, ministers, moms and dads. I could see elderly ladies, young 
people. It was not the longhaired rioting protestors that the rugby folk thought 
were disrupting their tour. It was not intellectuals who had come rushing down 
from the universities to protest, it was the average New Zealander, people you 
would meet and talk with everyday…”169 
                                                            
166 “Belhamel tuis aangerand,” Die Burger, 27 July 1981, p. 1. 
167 “Daar is nog hoop vir boktoer,” Die Burger, 27 July 1981, p. 1. 
168 “Reaksie in NS laai op teen betogers,” Die Burger, 27 July 1981, p. 1. 
169 1981: A Country at War, Documentary, directed by Rachel Jean & Owen Hughes (2000, Auckland, Frame 
Up Films), VHS Video. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
75 
 
Information such as this, though, did not make it to South Africa where rugby enthusiasts 
were all too willing to accept that the tour was being disrupted by the unruly elements of New 
Zealand society. During the Cold War period, white South Africans, and for that matter much 
of the western world, had been indoctrinated with an apprehension over Communism, to the 
extent that it had become an irrational obstacle to reality. Thus, although Communists only 
made up a small part of those who were protesting against the tour, the demonstrations were 
dismissed in South Africa as a Communist inspire plot against the Springboks. To this day 
members of the Springbok squad still believe that those who protested against them in 1981 
were Communists, who were being paid to do so.170 
The events in Hamilton, however, plunged the future of the tour into jeopardy. Supporters 
from both countries debated on whether the tour would continue or not. The events in 
Hamilton had confirmed the potential dangers that the tour posed to New Zealand society. It 
was no longer a certainty that the tour would continue as the police, the government, and 
rugby administrators toyed with the idea of calling the tour off before further violence 
ensued. In the absence of Robert Muldoon - who was attending the royal wedding of Prince 
Charles and Diana in the UK - stand-in Prime Minister, Duncan McIntyre, made inquiries 
from New Zealand’s Attorney-General about the legality of withdrawing the Springboks’ 
visas.171  
The day after the Hamilton fiasco, the New Zealand Police Association convened to vote on 
whether it should be proposed that the tour be cancelled. Although the police did not have the 
final say over whether the tour was cancelled, they could propose to the government that the 
tour is called off as a matter of national safety. As it turned out, however, the police did not 
intend to vote to call the tour off. The police had been embarrassed by their inability to 
contain the situation in Hamilton and were desperate to regain respectability.172 In the eyes of 
the police, the events in Hamilton had transgressed lawful protesting (by both the pro- and 
anti-tour factions). Accordingly, the tour had become a matter of maintaining law and order 
in New Zealand. Ross Meurant, a member of the Red Squad, which became the Springboks’ 
bodyguards, captured the attitude of the police toward the continuation of the tour: 
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“We no longer saw the tour as a moral issue but a matter of law and order and 
believed it was imperative that the tour proceed so the police could reassert the 
rule of law. We also stressed the importance of the police being given the 
opportunity to redeem themselves…”173 
In a sense, then, it became imperative that the tour proceeded as police needed to reclaim 
credibility in the eyes of the public by proving that they could bring the volatile situation 
caused by the tour under control. There would be repercussions in New Zealand long after the 
tour was gone if the public felt that the police force were ineffectual in implementing law and 
order. Thus, as Meurant points out, the moral question over the tour now took a back seat as 
it became imperative to ensure the maintenance of law and order and prevent any further 
incidents from taking place. 
If the 1981 tour was a watershed moment in South African rugby, then the Hamilton match 
was a watershed moment within the tour. Suddenly, everything that was feared the tour might 
provoke came true in Hamilton as New Zealanders violently battled their fellow citizens. The 
incident became one of the most defining moments of the tour, and further polarised opinions 
on the tour. Any persons who had been uncertain over their stance on the tour before the 
Hamilton match likely found themselves choosing a side after the incident.   
It was decided that the tour would continue, as the government also stressed the need for the 
police to show that they could regain law and order. Muldoon gave police the final say in 
cancelling one-off matches, as they had done in Hamilton, but ultimately could still not 
cancel the tour. Muldoon insisted that the final decision on the tour would still rest with the 
NZRFU. Even if police lodged an appeal to cancel the tour, the appeal could be vetoed by the 
NZRFU if they decided to continue with the tour.174 To those who were watching the tour 
from around the world, it seemed that, following the decision to continue with the tour, it 
would take fatalities before cancelling the tour would be seriously considered.  
Although the tour was not called off, the tour changed from here on for the Springboks. 
Hamilton had proved that protestors (and rugby fans, something that seems to have gone 
awry in recollections over the tour) were willing to transgress legal boundaries in their 
activities, causing safety concerns for the teams involved. The Red Squad were now in the 
Springboks’ presence around the clock, as security around the team was tightened up. For 
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safety reasons, the team had most of its freedoms curtailed. They were prohibited from 
moving freely around the major centres in case they attracted unwanted attention. When 
larger than usual demonstrations were expected for a match, such as around the test matches 
or matches in volatile urban areas, the Springboks would not stay in hotels, but instead would 
sleep on mattresses in the stadiums where they were scheduled play.  
The events at Hamilton had changed the landscape of the tour. Now, police were permitted to 
use their riot control gear. They also trained in new and more aggressive formations and 
tactics. Although Muldoon had refused to dispatch the military (as this would make it seem 
like the country was losing control over the tour situation) he did permit the military to lend 
logistical assistance to the police who travelled with the tour.175 The decision to continue with 
the tour was heavily criticised by Bill Rowling and the Labour Party, who deplored the tour’s 
continuation in the face of growing civil disobedience and warned that a ‘bloodbath’ was 
imminent.176  
The Battle of Molesworth Street 
Although it seemed that the tour was very much in the balance, the events at Hamilton had 
provided the government with little choice, as the tour needed to continue. The government 
and police needed to prove that ‘mob rule’ could not prevail against law and order enforced 
by the police.177 Muldoon could not be seen to be losing control of the situation in the country 
after he had refused to intervene in the tour. However, the continuation of the tour also 
proved to the anti-tour movement that they would need to intensify their campaign if they 
were to have the tour called off. While the events at Hamilton were a shock to the system, it 
appeared that it would take something even more radical to have the tour called off.   
With the tour set to continue, the Springboks travelled to New Plymouth to play Taranaki. 
While the match was plagued by limited demonstrations, trouble was unfolding in 
Wellington. A large demonstration was arranged in Wellington for 29 July, with around 
2,000 protestors marching to the steps of the New Zealand parliament, also the home of the 
South African consulate. Police numbers in Wellington were limited, as large numbers of 
police had travelled with the Springboks to New Plymouth to ward off any demonstrations. 
Those police that remained in Wellington had not been trained in riot control tactics and for 
                                                            
175 “Daar is nog hoop vir boktoer,” Die Burger, 27 July 1981, p. 1. 
176 Ibid. 
177 R. Meurant: The Red Squad Story, p. 50. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
 
many, this would be the first time they encountered protestors. In order to swell police 
numbers, trainees from the nearby police college had been recruited to escort the 
demonstration. A barricade was set up by police in Molesworth Street, which led to the steps 
of parliament. Police were instructed to prevent protestors from reaching the upper gates of 
parliament and were permitted to use force if necessary. However, upon reaching the 
barricade the demonstration refused to stop as they tried to push through the police line.  
Up until this point in the tour, there had not been violence between police and protestors. 
However, as the demonstration refused to desist and continued shoving an interlocked police 
line down the street, it became inevitable that police take some form of action. The police that 
night were armed with short handle wooden batons which could only be used for clubbing (as 
opposed to the longer batons given to the riot police which were meant to avoid physical 
harm as they were used to shove a person away). After being shoved some distance down 
Molesworth Street, the rookie police officers started beating those who were in the front of 
the demonstration. Newspapers headlines the following day displayed pictures of a multitude 
of police batons raining down on the heads of protestors, many of whom were schoolchildren 
still in their uniforms. The clubbing had continued until the demonstration dispersed, as 
protestors fled into the city.   
Once again, a line had been crossed and the tour would not be the same hereafter. Protestors 
felt that their actions were peaceful and that violence had be used on them illegally, whereas 
police felt that they were losing control of a potentially dangerous situation and that 
protestors were not heeding their warnings. The event had the effect of intensifying the tour 
protests. Police and protestors now made themselves ‘combat ready’ when it came to matches 
or marches. While police donned their riot gear, protestors strapped pillows to themselves 
and wore protective headgear.  
Importantly, the events at Hamilton and Molesworth Street diverted attention from the rugby 
tour, as the issues now at hand extended beyond a difference in opinion over the morality of 
the tour. Questions over the right to protest, the rule of law, and maintaining law and order 
became the centre of attention. The tour and apartheid were briefly eclipsed, as New 
Zealanders dealt with a quandary on the governance of their own society. The tour had acted 
as a catalyst for the protests and had brought New Zealanders to a tipping point where 
violence had occurred. However, from here on the tour took on a different significance as it 
became a matter through which protesters, police, and the government alike tackled questions 
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pertaining to the moralities and governance of New Zealand society. The weekly tour 
encounters now became a proxy through which police and protestors battled to secure what 
they believed to be right. Perhaps this explains why, after the Hamilton and Molesworth 
Street affairs, tour related incidents escalated to the lengths it did, as the issue suddenly 
became something closer to home than opposition to apartheid and a ‘racist rugby tour’.  
In South Africa, the significance of the event was not grasped, as the Molesworth Street 
battle was only reported as having occurred among a whole host of other protests that had 
occurred that day.178 However, for those who had predicted that the tour protestors would be 
vanquished after the first week or so, it was a rude awakening as protests around New 
Zealand now became more frequent than ever. Concerns also arose that the demonstrations 
were being infiltrated by subversive elements in New Zealand society, which were coaxing 
the demonstrations into an ever more violent direction.  
In the meantime, Robert Muldoon had returned to New Zealand after being in the UK for the 
royal wedding of Charles and Diana. Muldoon immediately began investigating the 
possibility of a trade-off between the two tour factions, as the possibility was raised that the 
tour be shortened in return for peace. A meeting was set for Wellington where rugby 
administrators and protest leaders met face to face for the first time. The meeting was held at 
the New Zealand parliament buildings and was chaired by Muldoon. The talks, however, 
failed to reach any meaningful compromise, but the possibility was raised that the third test, 
the final match of the tour, would be cancelled if the rest of the tour were allowed to proceed 
in peace.179 In place of the third test, a day of peaceful anti-apartheid rallies would be 
observed around New Zealand. The anti-tour movement also requested that the New Zealand 
government henceforth firmly adhered to the Gleneagles Agreement on all sporting contact 
with South Africa.180 Although no decision could be reached on these possibilities, it seemed 
likely the follow-up talks would take place. 
For the Springboks, much of the tour was shrouded in uncertainty, as it seemed to continually 
be on the brink of being either called off or shortened. Both Theuns Stofberg and Devilliers 
Visser, Springbok loose-forward, recalled that many of the players were largely oblivious to 
or unmindful of what was happening in South African politics, and therefore grappled to 
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understand the purpose behind the demonstrations.181  As a group of young, they formed part 
of a historically elite group of South Africans to be able to come to New Zealand and 
challenge the All Blacks. As such, the politics behind the tour was not something which 
received much thought from the team, as they were busy with the experience of a lifetime, 
something very few South African rugby players would ever get the chance to be part of.  
Despite the relatively strict security surrounding the tour, the Springboks were not always 
confined to their hotels and were allowed a considerable amount of freedom, particularly 
when the team was playing in rural areas. There was a notable split in opposition to the tour 
between urban and rural areas. While urban areas generally housed the majority of protestors, 
rural areas were widely considered pro-tour. In these towns, the team was able to walk openly 
in the streets and go about their own business, something that was virtually impossible in 
some of the larger centres. In many of the rural towns, the rugby club would form a central 
part in the community’s social activities, making it unlikely that anyone would come out 
strongly against the tour, as they would be labelled as anti-rugby.  
The team rarely felt that they were in physical danger and in general seemed to find the 
protestors amusing. Stofberg recalls numerous incidents were the team would drop balloons 
filled with water onto the protestors gathered outside their hotels, the cause of much 
amusement and laughter.182 The camaraderie of the team was not affected by the 
circumstances under which the tour was played and, if anything, brought the team closer 
together as a unit as they would often have to spend much time in close proximity with one-
another when protests became a threat. As rugby players, they had come to New Zealand to 
prove their worth against the best in the world, something that kept their minds off what was 
unfolding around them. 
Test Match Rugby: The battles of Christchurch, Wellington, and Auckland 
By the time of the first test, the Springboks were still undefeated, having secured victory in 
all six of their matches thus far. Despite their exhaustive strategies, it seemed that the 
protestors were having no effect on how the Springboks were playing. The setting for the first 
test between the Springboks and the All Blacks was Christchurch, a city known to police to 
have a substantial anti-tour following, with more protestors set to arrive for the match. While 
in Christchurch, the All Blacks also became targets of anti-tour movement, as there were 
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numerous disruptions to their training sessions. A local rugby club stand was burned down by 
the protestors after the All Blacks had trained there and a stun-grenade was set off outside 
Lancaster Park, the test venue, giving rise to fears that the stadium could also be subjected to 
an arson attack.183 Prior to the test, HART had made it public that this would be the last test. 
Fearing the worst, hospitals in Christchurch appealed to the public not to seek treatment on 
the day of the test unless it was urgent, as doctors would be on standby for protest-related 
casualties.184 Around 3,000 police were reported to be travelling to Christchurch, the largest 
police gathering in New Zealand history.185       
The Springboks had been virtually smuggled into Christchurch and were forced to sleep in 
the Linwood Rugby Club as the hotels in Christchurch had refused to accommodate the team. 
There was even talk that, for safety reasons, the team could be housed in barracks on a 
military base outside of Christchurch.186 Despite exhaustive security measures for the match, 
a group of protestors leapt the barricades and scattered broken glass on the field shortly 
before kick-off. The field had to be thoroughly checked for any hazardous objects before the 
match was allowed to continue. Those protestors who were outside the stadium, were heavily 
padded and wore motorcycle helmets in anticipation of an altercation with the riot police. The 
Red Squad, who were increasingly targeted by violent protestors, were informed that the 
radical Christchurch protestors were willing to use explosives against them.187 The violent 
reputation of the Red Squad when dealing with protestors had served to intensify the battle 
against them. Ross Meurant’s recollection of the first test is a testimony to this: 
“…although none of the members were ever subject to a ‘successful’ firebomb 
attack, on many occasions members were hit with corrosive substances and 
acids…the coats were also found to absorb and diminish the effects of blows 
from rocks, bottles, iron bars and the like.”188  
As it happened, the Springboks lost the first test 14-9. The loss was put down to poor team 
selection, more so than the harsh circumstances surrounding the tour. Wynand Classen, tour 
Captain, had been left completely out of the side for the match due to difference with the 
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coach, Nelie Smith. However, other factors were also blamed for the loss. The Springboks 
had arrived at Lancaster Park six hours early to avoid the protestors and had to sit in the cold 
changing rooms waiting for the match. They had also been unable to acclimatise themselves 
to the Christchurch conditions in the days leading up to the test as they had only arrived in the 
city the day before the match for security reasons. 
The news of the test loss was taken with a pinch of salt in South Africa – the tour had been 
able to reach the first test match, something that many had thought would be unlikely after 
the events at Hamilton. The fact that the test had been played in the face of heavy resistance 
gave South Africans hope that the tour could run its course. Following the match, Ces Blazey 
pointed out that the police victory over the militant protestors was a more important victory 
than that which took place on the rugby pitch.189 The first test loss had also been anticipated, 
as historically the Springboks had never been able to win the first test on a New Zealand tour.  
Still, any loss to the All Blacks was a bitter pill to swallow. There had been hopes that a 
historical first test victory for the Springboks would be able to thumb its nose at those who 
wanted to isolate South African rugby, as well as to the protestors trying to scuttle the tour. 
The victory would have meant not only a great deal too South African rugby, but to the 
country in the face of international condemnation. The day before the test, Die Burger’s front 
page read “Bok-triumph will strike a blow for SA [Translated]”.190 The article emphasised 
how the knowledge that a victory would be a setback for South Africa’s enemies would spur 
on the Springboks.191 A victory for the Springboks would be an answer to what an angry 
reader of Die Burger termed the “haatsveldtog” (hate-campaign) against South Africa.192  
The Springboks were scheduled to play South Canterbury in Timaru on 19 August, just four 
days after the test, but the match was called off in order to give police a break. Instead, the 
Springboks travelled to the rural town of Greymouth where they would stay until their next 
fixture. While in Greymouth, some of the Springboks did their bit to defuse tensions as they 
met with supporters and tour objectors. In the process they were able to get a better 
understanding on why New Zealand had been plunged into chaos over South African politics.  
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With the conclusion of the first test, Muldoon requested another meeting between the two 
tour factions.193 However, Muldoon insisted that such a meeting would only be conducted 
once the tour was completed, which seemed to defeat the objective of trying to reach a 
compromise while the tour was still going. However, what this gesture illustrated was 
Muldoon’s awareness that the levels of civil disobedience had crossed a line that would not 
simply dissipate with the end of the series. The tour had become more than just an anti-
apartheid movement, as social issues within New Zealand had been exposed by the events 
accompanying the tour. Barely a month into the tour there were already deep divisions that 
had been sown within New Zealand society over the matter and, with just shy of 1,000 arrests 
having already been made, the tour issue would remain in the public eye for some time to 
come.   
The second test match was to be played in Wellington on 29 August. By April of 1981, the 
New Zealand capital had taken a formal decision that it would not welcome the Springboks to 
the city for the match and would not make any of its facilities available to the team. In an 
unequivocal statement by Wellington Councillor, Rosslyn Noonan, the city would deny the 
team the use of its facilities so that they would “experience what they mete out to black 
Africans every day of their lives”.194 In an attempt to stop the Wellington test, residents of 
Newton, the suburb surrounding the test venue, submitted a request to the Wellington city 
council to close all roads surrounding the stadium due to the impending violence and 
potential destruction of property. Effectively, this would mean that no one would be able to 
reach the stadium and cause the match to be cancelled.195 After having had their appeal 
turned down by the city council, the Newton residents filled an interdict with the New 
Zealand High Court to have the match called off on the grounds of public safety, but this too 
failed.196 A final attempt to have the match and tour called off was made when New Zealand 
Governor-General, David Beattie, contacted Robert Muldoon on behalf of “ten prominent 
citizens” to discuss the match cancelation. According to Beattie, New Zealand society was 
being seriously degraded by the actions resulting from the tour.197 However, this too failed to 
have the match called off. 
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The Wellington protests, as well as future protests, would likely have been aggravated by 
concurrent developments in South Africa. In mid-August, the South African Defence Force 
had made an excursion into Angola during what was called ‘Operation Protea’. The operation 
was aimed at destroying the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) 
headquarters and training base in the Cunene province.  SWAPO were fighting a guerrilla 
war in an attempt to gain independence for South-West Africa (now Namibia) from South 
Africa. The organisation had been given refuge in newly independent and Soviet-backed 
Angola. The operation received much media attention in New Zealand and was expected to 
further motivate the anti-tour movement. The New Zealand Labour Party, which had been 
closely linked with the anti-tour movement, implored the government to call off the tour at 
once. They argued this on the basis that New Zealand had boycotted the 1980 Moscow 
Olympics due to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and that therefore South Africa should 
be boycotted, starting with the already troublesome Springbok tour.198 Predictably, however, 
the government took no action against the tour and the Wellington test was free to proceed.  
It was expected that around 10,000 protestors would descend on Wellington for the match, 
the largest demonstration yet, outnumbering the available police on the day by three to one. 
The week leading up to the match had once again been disruptive for the Springbok team. 
Their final preparations were done away from Wellington due to the threat of disruptions, as 
well as being refused any training facilities by the Wellington City Council. There was 
speculation that the Springboks may need to travel to the test venue by helicopter to avoid the 
massive demonstration.199 When the Springboks arrived in Wellington, they were whisked 
away from the airport and taken straight to Athletic Park, the venue for the test, where they 
would stay for their short time in Wellington.  
After the loss in the first test, the Springboks were written off for victory in the second test by 
their own country’s media. It was feared that the Springboks had succumbed to the same fault 
made by the 1937 Springboks in New Zealand, when after a first test loss huge changes were 
rung to the team for the second test which resulted in an even greater loss in that match. 
However, against all expectations, the Springboks emerged victorious 24-12, stunning New 
Zealand and likely a large portion of South Africans. Even protest leader (and Communist, 
which Die Burger avidly pointed out) Allick Shaw could not hide his amazement that the 
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Springboks had won, as he admitted in a radio interview that he had thought the tour 
conditions would ensure a Springbok failure.200  
However, the failure of the protestors to put a stop to the match ensured beyond any doubt 
that the tour would now run its course. The Springbok victory meant that there would be a 
climatic final test match in Auckland in two weeks’ time, as the third test would be the 
decider in the series. Prior to the second test there had been talk in the meeting between the 
NZRFU and anti-tour movement that the third test would be called off and in its place a 
nationwide anti-apartheid protest would take place. However, with the Springboks and All 
Blacks tied at a test apiece and only the Auckland test remaining, it would have taken a brave 
man to call the tour off at this point. 
In essence, the third test now became the most important match of the tour, making it a 
certain target for the anti-tour movement. John Minto had publicly promised that the final test 
would see demonstrations like never before and that being the final match of the series 
protestors had nothing to lose. At the same time, though, police issued a warning to protestors 
that should they breach police lines their biggest problem would not be police violence, but 
the 50,000 rugby spectators wanting to see the climatic match.201 Police reiterated that 
although they believed they could control as many as 10,000 protestors, should these 
protestors try to disrupt the match the rugby fans would undoubtedly take matters into their 
own hands, rendering the police useless. Following weeks of tour related violence, it was 
nothing short of a miracle that there had not been fatalities. However, with the largest 
demonstration of the tour to come, this could easily change. There were rumours that, in an 
attempt to radicalise the demonstration, the protest movement had incorporated violent Maori 
gangs into their ranks. Bob Walton, Police Commissioner, labelled this as a blatant attempt to 
subvert law and order.202               
For the Springboks, the second test victory, as well as being undefeated in their regional 
encounters, gave the team the belief that they could in fact become only the second 
Springbok team to win a series in New Zealand. As was the case with the first test, a 
Springbok victory in the third test transcended rugby importance. The day before the test, Die 
Burger headlines read: “Springboks can build monument for SA rugby tomorrow 
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[Translated]”.203 The article elaborated that: “In a time where SA is being attacked on all 
fronts, a Springbok victory will mean a great deal not only to rugby and South African sport, 
but for the entire country”.204  
However, the article came with a sobering reality that, after what had unfolded in New 
Zealand over the past three months, the final test could well bring the curtain down on 
Springbok-All Black rugby. It would almost certainly be the final time that the Springboks 
played the All Blacks in “these times”, and perhaps the last time ever.205 It would also likely 
be the last international tour for the Springboks for some time to come. The tour had been 
closely monitored internationally and it was unlikely that, after witnessing the sort of chaos a 
touring Springbok team could attract, rugby nations would be extending an invitation to the 
Springboks anytime soon. The tour had caused so much damage in New Zealand that even 
those hardnosed supporters of the tour were forced to concede that there was irreparable 
damage that could shut the door to Springbok-All Black rugby. 
However, a victory for the Springboks would perhaps make further isolation from world 
rugby less certain, as they would be able to stake a claim as still being one of the premier 
rugby teams around the world. In this past, this had helped the Springboks to ward off the 
worst of the isolation. For the Springbok team, though, a victory in the final test would mean 
not only a series win in New Zealand, but also a personal victory against the protestors and 
those who had forced the tour to take place under such harsh conditions. To an extent, 
though, the Springboks had already beaten the protestors as they had only lost one of their 
thirteen matches and were still strong contenders to win the series. Among the objectives of 
the protest movement had been to give the Springboks such a torrid time that their rugby 
performances would be affected. However, the Springboks of 1981 had fared as well, if not 
better, than previous Springbok teams, who had not had to deal with protestors. The anti-tour 
movement had promised first that the Springboks would not make New Zealand, and then 
that the tour would not run its full course. Had the All Blacks won the second test, and 
thereby the series, the third test may have been called off to prevent any further damages 
resulting from protests. However, by winning the second test the Springboks had ensured a 
climatic final, both on and off the field. 
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In both South Africa and New Zealand, the final test has been etched into public memory. 
Two-thirds of the New Zealand police force had been deployed in Auckland and around the 
now fortress-like Eden Park, the venue for the test. What unfolded in the streets of Auckland 
should be considered a riot, rather than a protest. Although only around 2,000 protestors were 
present that day, it seemed that they were comprised of the more radical elements of the 
protest movement. Reflecting on the final test, a New Zealand journalist wrote:  
“Incidents around Auckland on Saturday, and particularly in the immediate 
vicinity of Eden Park, illustrated pretty plainly that the issues that supposedly 
sparked the anti-tour movement had been long forgotten...those front-line 
policemen who at times on Saturday were fighting for their lives against 
unbelievable aggression were defending more than a simple game of rugby. They 
were defending this country’s democracy.”206      
By the end of the day, 200 protestors were arrested for rioting and an estimated 45 people 
suffered from injuries, including numerous police officers.207 Although the rioters outside the 
stadium were once again unable to make it into the stadium to disrupt the match, the teams on 
the field faced a situation scarcely believable. In what is to this day commonly referred to as 
the ‘flour-bomb test’, the two teams on the field had to deal with a light aircraft making 
regular low swoops over the field and dropping anti-apartheid pamphlets, burning flairs, and 
parcels filled with flour onto the playing field and into the stands during the match. This is 
certainly one of the most bizarre incidents ever to befall an international rugby test match. 
Wynand Claassen, who captained the Springboks, recalls how during the first half of the 
match they were playing straight into the flight path of the plane, making concentration for 
the Springbok backline players particularly difficult. Claassen writes:  
“While the forwards were occupied with their heads down in the scrums…the 
backs had plenty of time to look around and they would have had to have been 
superhuman not to watch the plane make its runs over the field…I am sure this 
broke the concentration of our backs before half time and that the All Blacks 
suffered because of it in the long second half.”208 
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There was a tense moment when All Black prop, Gary Knight, was struck by a falling flour-
bomb. The event was enough for the Welsh referee, Clive Norling, to call together the two 
captains, Claassen and Andy Dalton, to suggest that the match be called off. In the end, 
however, it was not so much the plane as Norling who left a mark on the match. With the 
match being tied at 22-22 all and deep into extra time, Norling awarded a controversial 
penalty against the Springboks. Allan Hewson went on to break South African hearts as he 
proceeded to kick a penalty goal, thereby taking the score to 25-22 in favour of the All 
Blacks. Shortly afterwards the final whistle was blown with the All Blacks winning the final 
test and thereby the series.  
It is perhaps odd that during a tour in which so much revolved around those events off the 
field that it was an on field controversy that most aggrieved the Springboks and their South 
African supporters. The controversial match brought the curtain down on what is certainly 
one of the most infamous and bizarre international rugby tours to be undertaken. The 
Springboks had performed exceptionally well under some of the most difficult conditions 
known to a rugby team. The players had been vastly inexperienced when it came to dealing 
with protestors, but had not lost their composure and seemed to take the tour in their stride. 
Reflecting on the tour conditions Theuns Stofberg noted: “you accepted that this was your 
lot, and then got on with why you had come [to New Zealand]”.209   
Perhaps a further testament to the difficulties the tour had brought to New Zealand was when 
the Springbok team handed a mounted springbok head to the New Zealand police. 
Traditionally, the head was presented to the non-test side that had given the Springboks the 
best match. However, after the storm New Zealand police had weathered it seemed fitting 
that the head be presented to them. The fact that the tour had been able to run its course was 
put down to the work done by the police. Tributes to the New Zealand police began to pour in 
from all over South Africa. The South African travel agent, Hylton Ross, suggested that the 
police who had guarded the Springboks are invited to South Africa for an all-expenses-paid 
holiday. Furthermore, a number of cities and travel agencies around South Africa had offered 
to host the police officers and a Natal coastal town, Margate, even offered to make them 
honorary citizens for their troubles.210  
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The New Zealand police had made more than 1,900 arrests over the course of the tour and 
had withstood the worst of the violence to prevent the tour from being disrupted. Upon the 
Springboks’ departure from New Zealand on 13 September a collective sigh of relief went up 
around the country. However, the relief was premature as New Zealand was left in a state of 
disarray. As an article in Die Burger pointed out, “the Springbok tour caused New Zealand to 
lose its innocence [Translated]”.211  It was unlikely that New Zealand society would be able 
to console the divisions left by the tour for some time to come.212 The overwhelming levels of 
protest in New Zealand were attributed to the fact that the tour had raked open and provided a 
voice for issues on racism and poverty in New Zealand society, issues which would not 
subside with the conclusion of the tour.  
There was also the problem of mistrust of police for their hard-handed tactics and the fact that 
they were seen as a tool of the (pro-tour) government to supress the anti-apartheid 
demonstrators. Following the conclusion of the tour, there were numerous enquiries into the 
police activities after protestors submitted no less than 350 complaints.213 Six police officers 
were prosecuted, but unsuccessfully so and only two of the six were taken to court, where 
both cases were dismissed.214 As late as 1984, the New Zealand police were still grappling 
with hostilities towards them following the 1981 tour. Speaking on a violent clash between 
police and crowds at a music festival the New Zealand Minister of Police, Ann Hercus, 
attributed the incident to the lingering mistrust of and antagonism toward police brought 
about by the 1981 tour events.215  
Furthermore, New Zealand was saddled with a hefty bill for the tour. It had been estimated 
that the tour would cost around NZ$2.7 million, but by the time the Auckland test came 
round estimates had risen to NZ$15 million.216 By the time the tour was done Die Burger 
claimed that the tour had cost New Zealand around NZ$35 million (R25 million at that 
stage).217 The extra spending had largely been made up by the logistics of transporting and 
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housing police for the duration of the tour, damage caused by protests, and payments made to 
the Department of Defence for aiding the police.218  
New Zealand rugby also did not emerge unscathed from the tour. The Auckland Rugby 
Union reported that, along with most of New Zealand’s other major centres, there had been a 
notable decline in the popularity of the sport of amongst schoolboys in the years following 
1981.219 Many teachers and parents had removed themselves from coaching roles in protest 
over the tour, meaning some schools no longer had rugby as a sport.220 One rugby 
administrator noted that, following the tour, rugby could no longer be regarded as the 
preeminent sport in certain centres.221  
However, perhaps the immediate problem facing Robert Muldoon and New Zealand was the 
international backlash, particularly from the Commonwealth countries, for not having done 
enough to ‘discourage’ sporting contact with South Africa. The Commonwealth, and in 
particular its secretary general, Shridath Ramphal, felt the New Zealand government’s 
requests to the NZRFU to “reconsider”, “think again”, and to “weigh up the consequences” 
were less than vigorous attempts to discourage.222 It had already been decided that a 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting, scheduled to be held in Auckland shortly after 
the Springboks left, would be moved elsewhere as those present did not what to be seen 
supporting a country which had had dealings with a racist regime. On top of the threat of 
potential economic sanctions toward New Zealand from African Commonwealth members, 
there was also a good chance that New Zealand athletes would be banned from the 1982 
Brisbane Commonwealth Games and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games due to the fear 
that there could be mass boycotts if New Zealand were present. However, these threats were 
not carried out and New Zealand athletes were permitted to participate in both the 1982 
Commonwealth Games and the 1984 Summer Olympic Games. The only boycott which took 
place were during the 1984 Games was when the USSR announced it would not send its 
athletes to Los Angeles in retaliation to the USA boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympic 
Games.   
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In South Africa, there was outrage over the controversial penalty.223 However, the consensus 
of the tour remained that it had been a Communist inspired plot to disrupt the tour and had 
cost the Springboks the series. An angry letter published in Die Burger lamented the fact that 
the Springboks, “who offered up so much to normalise South African sport [Translated]”, had 
encountered protests which were “[Russian inspired] terrorism but in a different form 
[Translated].”224 According to the letter, Russia sat behind much of the world’s terrorism and 
sought to exploit unrest and violence around the world for its own gains. Writing on the fear 
of white South Africans towards Communism, Hermann Giliomee has noted that: 
“In 1969 a survey revealed that only two per cent of whites saw the rapid growth 
in numbers of the coloured people and black as a danger to the political system; 
the overwhelming majority regarded the greatest threat as stemming from 
‘Communist influence, Communist-inspired guerrilla movements and 
Communism in Black South Africa’.”225 
It would be highly unlikely that by 1981 white fear of Communism had decreased from 1969, 
particularly as there had been an increase in the Communist presence in southern Africa. 
Thus, the afore mentioned letter written to Die Burger can be regarded as a reflection of the 
general attitude amongst white South Africans towards Communism at the time, particularly 
as the letter appeared alongside numerous other Communist related articles, such as “Red 
campaign against solidarity” and “Marxist is great enemy of SA: Minister”.226  With the 
discovery in the 1970s of Russian and Cuban troops in neighbouring Southern African states, 
white fears over Communist expansion increased. By playing on these fears virtually any 
incident could be attributed to the spectre of Communism.  
Conclusion 
In so much as it can be called a rugby tour, the 1981 tour of New Zealand has gone down in 
the annals of international rugby contests as a spectacle of note. The Springboks of 1969/70 
and 1971 had faced large scale demonstrations in the United Kingdom and Australia 
respectively, but what unfolded in New Zealand from July to September of 1981 would never 
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be paralleled. Johan Claassen, who had been on the 1969/70 Springbok ‘demo’ tour of the 
UK, described the UK tour as a lammetjie (lamb) in comparison to the 1981 New Zealand 
tour.227 Despite the abnormal tour conditions, the Springboks faired exceptionally well, 
having been unbeaten in each of their regional encounters and only losing the test series due 
to some questionable refereeing decisions.  
However, what the Springboks left in their wake was a country divided. New Zealanders 
were left with questions not only regarding future dealings with South Africa, but on their 
own political and social reality. The tour had become a vehicle through which many New 
Zealanders displayed their anger at the inequalities that existed in their own country. 
Questions on unequal land distribution, racial disparity, and poverty were amongst the issues 
which had helped fuel the protests. Questions over governance were also raised as the 
governing National Party had refused to condemn the rugby tour by a racist nation and, even 
after the tour was completed, persisted in defending their decision. If the Springboks had 
toured a country which did not have its own racial difficulties, the protests may well have 
been scaled down from what took place in New Zealand during the tour.  
For white South Africans the events on the tour had come as a shock. Although much of the 
protestors during the tour were dismissed as Communist inspired troublemakers, John 
Nauright has argued that viewing events such as the Hamilton fiasco live on television must 
have been a rude awakening to white South Africans over the depth of the animosity felt 
towards their country.228 For much of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the South African 
government had vigorously opposed allowing television in South Africa as they feared it 
would ultimately promote racial contact, the very thing apartheid sought to prevent.229 With 
the historic first live broadcasts of a rugby tour South Africans witnessed their hallowed 
rugby team being smuggled around New Zealand and being forced to play behind barbed-
wire fences in order to avoid being swamped by protestors who despised the Springboks and 
South Africa. The South African newspaper, Sunday Times, even reported that the 
Springboks had returned from New Zealand with enlightened views on race and started to 
question the need for many of the apartheid laws.230 The Rand Daily Mail went further and 
labelled the events in New Zealand as evidence of the steadily mounting pressure on the 
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South African government to implement major political and socio-economic change.231 
Where the Rand Daily Mail differed from other newspapers was in its interpretation of the 
tour events. While Die Burger conveyed to its readers that the tour events had been produced 
largely by outside interference (such as the ‘communist-inspire plot’ the paper frequently 
reported on), the Rand Daily Mail regarded the tour events as hostility toward what the 
apartheid regime was doing to black South Africans. Quoting John Smith, President of the 
England Rugby Football Union, the Rand Daily Mail report that: “…South Africans must 
realise that the only way they can bring themselves together in the amity of world sport is by 
altering a system which decides by the colour of a man’s skin whether he is a decent chap or 
not. It’s not acceptable”.232 This was a point very few of South Africa’s dominant newspapers 
were willing to concede by the early 1980s. 
Whereas the effects the tour had on New Zealand were immediately apparent, for South 
Africa the consequences were drawn out over the 1980s as South African rugby for the first 
time experienced true isolation. Ultimately, South Africans would realise that, despite the fact 
that the New Zealand protestors having failed in stopping the tour, they succeeded in 
something much greater: South Africa’s complete isolation from the rugby world. What 
many would realise in hindsight was that, in fact, the New Zealand protestors had won. 
The 1980s became a lonely time for South African rugby, as they would face only one of 
their traditional IRB rivals over the next 11 years. The visuals of the New Zealand tour had 
sufficiently scared anyone who considered extending an invitation to the Springboks. 
Furthermore, with the strengthening of the Gleneagles Agreement in 1982 it became even 
more difficult to justify touring to South Africa.  
The South African Rugby Board was also late in responding to the international trends. 
During the 1970s South African rugby had been led to believe that if rugby was made 
multiracial the sporting boycott would allow the Springboks back into international 
competition. However when the Springboks arrive in New Zealand in 1981 with a supposed 
‘multiracial team’ they were greeted by anti-apartheid, anti-racist protests which were not 
concerned with multiracial sport, but instead with a multiracial society. This remained the 
objective of the boycott for the rest of 1980s, but the SARB were late to respond to this as 
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they based all their attempts at readmission to the international arena on the fact that they had 
been able to legally remove apartheid from South African rugby. The SARB did not 
understand that only once apartheid was removed would they be capable of playing 























Swapping Kiwi’s for Eagles: The Springboks in the United States 
of America 
“In America we were scared. At least in New Zealand you could see the 
protestors, but in America they just used bombs”.233 
The United States leg of the Springboks’ 1981 tour has largely slipped under the radar of the 
anti-apartheid sporting boycott literature. Whereas the Springboks’ tour of New Zealand 
became an internationally contentious issue, discussions on the US leg of the tour have been 
minimal. The New Zealand leg of the tour has been etched into South African rugby memory 
for the bizarre events that took place in New Zealand. However, it seems to have been 
forgotten that the US leg also delivered severe anti-apartheid protests against the Springboks. 
It has taken 35 years since the conclusion of the US leg of the tour for the first piece of 
comprehensive work to produced on the topic. In his book, “No Rugby with Racists!” Anti-
apartheid activism and the 1981 Springbok tour of the United States (2016), Derek Catsam 
discusses how the Springboks’ three-match tour of the US became a platform from which 
anti-apartheid activists could mobilize against South African sport and the apartheid regime. 
What Catsam’s work illustrates best is that in the greater scheme of things the US protests 
were most valuable in nurturing anti-apartheid awareness in their own country.  
However, the protest action against the Springboks while in the USA was of less significance 
to the average South African than those protests in New Zealand. The reason for this was, 
quite simply, that New Zealand and South Africa shared an infinitely closer rugby bond than 
South Africa shared with the USA. As Danie Craven noted some years later, “without the All 
Blacks it is just not rugby.”234 The rugby history shared between South Africa and New 
Zealand meant it was much more significant to white South Africans when New Zealanders 
started protesting against maintaining rugby ties with South Africa.  
For this dissertation then, the US leg presents a potential problem: the protests quite simply 
did not carry the same weight as those in New Zealand and were of less concern to South 
Africans due to the fact that the USA was not one of their country’s traditional rugby rivals. 
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Despite the obstinate attitude of many South Africans toward why the New Zealand protests 
had unfolded, it plagued their consciences that the Springbok tour had plunged New Zealand 
into disarray and had likely ended a long history of civil rivalry between the two nations. 
However, losing the USA as a rugby ally over South Africa’s apartheid policies was simply 
not comparable to the loss of New Zealand as a rugby ally. The US tour served the purpose of 
awakening anti-apartheid sentiment in America towards South African sport, but drew little 
interest amongst the same South Africans who had fanatically followed the New Zealand 
tour. Possibly the best testimony to South Africans’ disinterest in the USA part of the tour is 
to compare the regularity with which Die Burger reported on the two legs. While the 
newspaper regularly produced as many as eleven articles per edition on the New Zealand 
tour, the USA tour was lucky if it received more than a single mention per edition. Even in 
The Cape Times, which did not report as enthusiastically on the tour as Die Burger did, there 
is a large discrepancy between the number of stories on the New Zealand leg and those on the 
US leg.  
While this dissertation argues that the 1981 Springbok tour facilitated South African rugby’s 
isolation in the 1980s, that isolation would have likely taken place regardless of whether the 
Springboks toured the USA. With regard to the effect that the overall tour had on South 
African rugby, the USA demonstrations were rather ancillary to the demonstrations that took 
place in New Zealand. In essence then, the Springbok tour of the USA had very little effect 
on contributing to South African rugby’s isolation in the 1980s. Therefore, while this chapter 
will discuss the protests that developed around the Springboks in the USA, it is also 
necessary to discuss whether there was, perhaps, an ulterior political motive behind the USA 
tour.  
A Brewing Storm  
By 1980, the SARB and USA rugby officials had started conferring over a potential tour by a 
South African side to the USA. However, it was deemed that the prevailing circumstances in 
the USA would likely preclude the possibility of a tour. In 1980 the USA experienced some 
of the worst racial unrest since the civil rights movements of the 1960s, particularly in 
Miami, Chattanooga, and Orlando where fatal ‘race riots’ were taking place. With these riots 
taking place, US officials deemed it unlikely that a South African team would be granted 
visas due to fears of seeming insensitive to both the racial issues in the US and South 
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Africa.235 However, had there not been racial unrest it was still unlikely that a South African 
team would have been allowed into the USA as President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, had 
been highly critical of apartheid. However, with the USA presidential elections around the 
corner and the likelihood of the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, being elected, US 
rugby officials were optimistic that 1981 would be conducive to a Springbok tour.236 A tour 
was duly arranged for 1981 as the Springboks were scheduled fly home from New Zealand 
via the US. It was decided that the Springboks would undertake a short tour of no more than 
three matches, including one test against the USA Eagles. For many South Africans the tour 
was an anti-climax following the gripping rugby tour of New Zealand. The lack of coverage 
in South African newspapers seemed to confirm the indifference toward the tour in South 
Africa.  
However, while all eyes were on the Springboks in New Zealand, there was a storm building 
in the United States. The sporting boycott had become one of the chief forms of opposition to 
apartheid - a way to deliver a blow to Afrikaner nationalism. With regard to demonstrating 
opposition to apartheid through sport sanctions, the United States was comparably late to the 
fray. This was for one very simple reason: South Africa and the United States did not have 
many overlapping major sporting codes. With exception to the Olympic sports, the USA did 
not have any sports that South Africa took part in on a large scale and similarly the major 
South African sports like rugby and cricket were virtually non-existent in America. Whereas 
numerous European, Australasian, and South American countries had significant sporting ties 
with South Africa – particularly rugby ties – and, therefore, could implement sporting 
sanctions against the Republic, the 1981 tour was one of the first opportunities for the US 
anti-apartheid organisations to launch meaningful opposition to apartheid.  
For the SARB and US rugby, the door to test match rugby was opened by the election of 
Ronald Reagan as US president. The Republican Reagan had adopted a policy of closer 
working with Pretoria and, along with Margaret Thatcher, came to be known as one of the 
protectors of the South African government.  For anti-apartheid groups in the US, the 1981 
tour provided not only a chance to vocalise their opposition to apartheid but also opposition 
to the rekindling of friendliness between the USA and South Africa that came with the 
election of Reagan. However, it was not only anti-apartheid groups who opposed the tour, as 
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many of the Carter-era politicians felt that for moral reasons the Springboks should not be 
invited. Furthermore, with the announcement of the tour the American Olympic Committee 
began entertaining the possibility of boycotts at the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los 
Angeles. The IOC had expressed its concern that numerous Eastern Block, African, and 
Commonwealth nations were likely to boycott the 1984 Games should the Springboks tour 
the USA. This would be the third successive Olympic Games where there were boycotts over 
a matter relating to the Springboks. Despite the fact that rugby was not considered as one of 
America’s major sports, the Springbok tour received extensive media coverage around the 
country, particularly with regard to how it could affect the 1984 Olympic Games. However, 
early in 1981 the US consulate in South Africa confirmed that visas would be given to the 
Springboks to tour the US, but only if their tour of New Zealand lasted its full duration.237 
Reporting on the US’s decision to grant visas to the Springboks, the Rand Daily Mail noted: 
“South African rugby will no longer be shut in a ghetto in the name of anti-apartheid 
philosophical principles.”238  
Despite the USA’s relatively late arrival to the anti-apartheid sport campaign, several anti-
apartheid organisations existed. The American Coordinating Committee for Equality and 
Society (ACCESS) was the USA’s equivalent of HART and had played a major role in 
having the South African team expelled from the 1978 Davis Cup tennis tournament. For 
ACCESS and its cohorts, the 1981 Springbok tour was their best chance to exert some 
pressure on South African sport, as the cream of South African athletes would soon be within 
arm’s reach. Richard Lapchick, ACCESS spokesperson, informed US rugby officials that 
large-scale protests would be conducted by his organisation in New York, Chicago, and 
Albany, the three cities where the Springboks would be playing. ACCESS would also make a 
formal request to each of the city councils - as had been done by HART in New Zealand – to 
withhold all facilities from the touring Springboks.239 Furthermore, ACCESS warned the 
White House of further alienating the USA’s black population if the government was seen to 
be allowing representatives of a racist regime on the USA’s sports fields. This was reinforced 
by the ‘National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People’ (NAACP), a 
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prominent civil rights organisation. The organisation criticised the Reagan Administration’s 
decision to grant visas to the Springboks as an insult to the 26 million black Americans.240  
Reagan’s refusal to intervene in the tour, even though the tour jeopardised the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympics, was regarded by anti-apartheid organisations as further evidence of the 
softer line the US government was taking towards the Botha government.241 In addition to the 
threats made by ACCESS to disrupt the tour, more than thirty black, civil rights, religious, 
and political groups had appealed to Dick Moneymaker, a US Rugby official, to withdraw the 
invitation to the Springboks or else they would take action.242  The decision to permit the 
Springboks to tour the US also drew significant international criticism, predominantly by 
those same countries that were at New Zealand’s throat over the tour. However, as the US 
was not a member of the Commonwealth it could not be held to abide by the Gleneagles 
Agreement. Reagan’s decision that the government not intervene in the business of 
autonomous sporting bodies could not be condemned in the same light as the decision taken 
by Robert Muldoon, who, by permitting the Springboks to tour New Zealand, had 
contravened the Gleneagles Agreement.   
Playing a Dangerous Game: The Springboks in the USA  
On route to New Zealand, the Springboks got their first taste of USA tour protestors as a 
small group of protestors awaited them at New York’s JFK International Airport. The group 
greeted the Springboks with chants of “Boere, gaan huistoe [Boers, go home]” before 
breaking into chants of “Sport yes, apartheid no; rugby with South Africa has to go”.243 The 
Springboks would return to the USA two gruelling months later to play three matches against 
US sides before heading back to South Africa. The Springboks would first play the Midwest 
Rugby Union in Chicago, after which they faced the Eastern Rugby Union in Albany, and 
concluded the tour with a test match against the USA Eagles, also in Albany.    
Whether the SARB would have agreed to the US tour knowing what would unfold in New 
Zealand is questionable. Following the New Zealand tour the US trip was already somewhat 
of an anti-climax for rugby fans. On top of this, reports were that the protest action would 
likely be as bad as those in New Zealand were. The US protest movements had been spurred 
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on by the vigorous US media coverage of what was unfolding in New Zealand. The militant 
civil rights activist, Jesse Jackson, and his organisation, People United to Save Humanity 
(PUSH), vowed to cripple the tour with massive demonstrations.  
In general, however, the Springboks had an easier time in the USA than they did in New 
Zealand. Being in a country where rugby was a little known sport had its benefits. The team 
was able to roam the streets freely without fear of being recognised or confronted, and were 
even able to attend a baseball match at the Chicago Cubs’ stadium. Despite the mass 
coverage of the events in New Zealand by the US media, the Springboks still regularly came 
across people who had no idea who the Springboks were, what rugby was, or knew anything 
about South Africa.244  
The first match of the tour was played on 19 September against the Midwest RU. The venue 
for the match was kept a secret to deter any plans made by demonstrators to disrupt the 
match. Even the Springboks were not told where the match was going to be played and only 
discovered the venue upon arrival, a public park in Racine, on the shores of Lake 
Michigan.245 The field had no pavilion and the few spectators in attendance simply stood 
around the edge of the field. Springbok captain, Wynand Claassen, having not been selected 
to play in the match recalls how he and several of the other non-playing Springboks had to 
climb a tree in order to have a good vantage point to watch the match.246 In order to prohibit 
any demonstrations, the Midwest RU had announced several different locations where the 
match might be played. Tyke Nollman, who had organised the match, had established a ‘hot-
line’ which rugby fans could dial to establish where the match would be played. The only 
incident occurred when six protestors walked onto the field, one of whom was brandishing a 
baseball bat, but were quickly removed by the police stationed at the field.247  
The Springboks extended their unbeaten run over regional sides as they defeated the Midwest 
RU 46-12. Around 500 spectators, many of whom had been drawn simply out of curiosity 
over the large gathering in a public place, attended the match. Despite the easy access to the 
field, only 15 protestors made it there, all of whom fell silent once they realised their backup 
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was not arriving and they were substantially outnumbered.248  Jackson and company had 
threatened that they knew where the field was and that they would amass around 1,000 
protestors to stop the match, but this did not materialise.249 After the hordes of protestors that 
plagued most of the matches in New Zealand, the absence of protestors for the Midwest 
match came as a relief for both rugby sides. Johan Claassen even went as far to tell US media 
that their protestors were amateur in comparison to those militant protestors they had 
encountered in New Zealand.250    
The Springboks next travelled to Albany in New York State to play the Eastern All Stars. 
Prior to the match against the Midwest, there had been numerous calls by anti-apartheid 
groups for Albany Mayor, Erastus Corning, to prohibit the Springboks from playing in 
Albany. Corning, however, refused to do so as he argued that it would impede on the 
constitutional rights of US sportsmen.251 However, New York state governor, Hugh Carey, 
who banned the Springboks from playing in Albany, overturned Corning’s ruling. Carey 
justified his reasoning by saying that the match posed the possibility for mass protests and 
potentially violent clashes by those “friend and foe” of the apartheid South Africa.252 
According to Carey, he had information that a band of Ku Klux Klan, a militant anti-black 
organisation known for its violent methods and naturally supporters of apartheid, were 
travelling from Connecticut to confront the anti-apartheid groups.253 Carey’s apprehension is 
understandable when considering the presence of militant civil rights activists and a fanatical 
anti-black organisation, making the likelihood for violence on the streets of Albany a very 
real possibility, which could well lead to a renewal of the 1980 race riots. 
Governor Carey’s ban meant the Springboks would not be able to use the Bleecker Stadium 
in Albany where they were set to play the Eastern All Stars. However, the Eastern Rugby 
Union, who organised the tour, was quick to take the matter to the US High Court. Tom 
Selfridge, President of the Eastern Rugby Union, argued that if Carey was concerned over 
potential violence he needed to see to it that sufficient police were present to prohibit this 
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from happening.254 In addition to Carey’s ban on the Springboks, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, one of those organisations campaigning against the Springbok tour, 
submitted a request to the High Court that Carey’s decision be upheld, as well as be extended 
to the Springboks’ remaining matches in the US.255 
It took up until the day of the second match for the High Court to deliver its judgement. 
Judge Howard Munson ruled against the ban by Governor Carey in favour of the Eastern 
Rugby Union, thus allowing the use of Albany’s Bleecker Stadium.256 Munson ruled that, 
although there was the possibility of violent disruptions if the match went ahead, it would be 
a constitutional violation if the match were to be called off. Munson concludes that it was 
Carey’s responsibility to ensure that law and order be maintained without depriving the 
sportsmen of their right to play.257  
Although the match was now legally allowed to proceed, it was not out of the woods yet. 
While Munson was delivering his judgment, hordes of screaming protestors outside the 
courthouse were busy passing around pamphlets highlighting the plans on how to disrupt the 
match that evening. Rumours had made into the Springbok camp that the anti-tour 
organisation, Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour (START), had amassed 10,000 protestors, 
larger than any protest in New Zealand, and intended on travelling to Albany to disrupt the 
match.258 The seriousness of these threats was driven home later that day when a bomb was 
set off inside the offices of the Eastern Rugby Union, causing extensive damage. Although 
the explosion did not cause any injuries, it did have the effect of an increase in security 
around the Springboks. Quintus van Rooyen, a journalist for Die Burger who had travelled 
with the Springboks to New Zealand and the USA, reported that the Springboks had never 
before on the tour experienced the sort of protection they received in the USA, which is quite 
a statement to make when considering the strict security measures around the team in New 
Zealand.259  
For many of the Springbok players, the US demonstrators were a much greater cause for 
concern than those in New Zealand for one simple reason: in New Zealand you could see the 
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protestors, whereas in the US you could not.260 Wynand Claassen recalls the feeling amongst 
the Springboks at the time: “This was one thing that really scared the Springboks – bomb 
blasts. Demonstrators you can at least see, but a bomb or assassin (there was talk of one of us 
being shot) was a different story.”261 The covert workings and renowned militancy of the US 
protestors became and additional source of psychological stress for many of the Springboks. 
There was an overall feeling that the US protestors were willing to harm the Springboks, and 
consequently sparked the tightening up of security around the team. 
In the hours before the match at the Bleecker Stadium, the Springboks were explained the 
extent of their new security measures. For safety, the team would only be taken to the field at 
the last moment, and so the players were instructed to do all their preparations at the hotel 
where they were staying. Here they changed into their match clothes and were given a 
functions room in the hotel where they could do all their warm-up drills. Shortly before the 
kick-off, the team was instructed to put on street clothes over their rugby gear so as not to 
draw attention and were driven in three high-powered microbuses to the stadium. Once there, 
the team were driven to an alternate entrance opposite the main entrance and ran from the 
busses onto the field where their opposition was already waiting. Wynand Claassen recalls 
the extensive security measures at the Bleecker Stadium: 
“The US police seemed less concerned than their New Zealand counterparts 
about avoiding a confrontation, and their numbers included marksmen armed 
with rifles and State Troopers carrying batons which looked like oversized 
baseball bats.”262 
Fortunately for both teams, the only real problem they experienced was the torrential rain 
which bucketed down for much of the game. As had become the custom during the tour, even 
in New Zealand, the number of protestors that turned up at the match were only a fraction of 
what had been threatened would be amassed. Fewer than 2000 (of the 10,000 promised) made 
it to the match and barely got a glimpse of the Springboks as they marched in circles and 
chanted outside the stadium. Once the muddy match finished, which the Springboks won 41-
0, the team was whisked off back to their hotel without even getting a chance to shake the 
hands of their opposition. The following day there were reports of scattered incidents of 
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violence around Albany, but in general the match that was set to explode off the field never 
so much as even lit the fuse.  
Numerous reasons were given for why there had not been the expected turnout of protest 
action. Torrential rain, lack of transport from New York, heavily armed police, and the court 
ruling in favour of the match seemed to take the sting out of the tail of those set on disrupting 
the match.263 The only source of concern was a second bomb that was set off in the 
Evansville All White RFC clubhouse in Indiana, more than a thousand kilometres from where 
the Springboks were. It was speculated that the bomb was set off there because the team had 
wanted to play the Springboks and had offered to host the Springboks for the Midwest match 
should things not work out in Chicago. 
The increasing use of bombs by the anti-tour movement caused a radical change in security 
measures for the final match of the tour, the test between the Springboks and the USA Eagles. 
The match seemed to be building up to be a replay of the final test in Auckland, with US anti-
apartheid groups vowing to throw everything at disrupting the final match. The possibility of 
violent demonstrations and the threat of explosives led New York City mayor, Ed Koch, to 
ban the Springboks from playing the test in New York. Once again, Tom Selfridge began a 
battle with politicians to allow the match, but this time it was to no avail. The inability to play 
in New York and the increasing dilemma of match security led rugby administrators to make 
a drastic decision. 
The test between the Springboks and the USA Eagles was scheduled to be played on 25 
September and, as perusal with the US tour, the venue was kept a secret from the public, 
media, and players. However, the secrecy surrounding the test was stepped up in light of the 
recent bomb attacks. On the morning of 24 September, Johan Claassen and Nelie Smith met 
with Selfridge and the Eagles management to discuss the match. As it had become difficult to 
guarantee the safety of either team, it was decided that in order to prevent any disruptions to 
the match and keep players out of harm’s way, the match would be played later that 
afternoon, and not the following day as had been scheduled. It was decided that no media or 
spectators would be alerted to the change. Not even USA Rugby Football Union President, 
David Chambers, who was travelling to this historic first match between the US Eagles and 
the Springboks, would be alerted to the change.  
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With the test team already having been selected, all those who were not selected were told 
that they would be going on an outing to a nearby baseball museum. When they returned to 
their hotel, they discovered that the test had already been played. Rob Louw, who had not 
been selected to play, recalls how upon arrival at the hotel he and the rest of the team not 
selected to play were greeted by a television news report (the media were only informed of 
the score after) that the test had been played.264 Edrich Krantz, also not selected to play in the 
test, was one of the few spectators fortunate enough to witness the secret test. Krantz had 
been sent out by the management to buy some gifts for the US management and, upon 
returning to the hotel, stumbled upon the test team busy doing their pre-match preparations. 
“Come with us, we are quickly going to play the test” were the words which greeted Krantz 
at the hotel, who was subsequently asked to write the match report for Die Burger as none of 
the South African media had been informed of the change.265 Dan Retief, a South African 
journalist who had accompanied the team to New Zealand and the USA, recalls how he was 
sitting in a pub near the Springboks’ hotel when an American journalist walked in and 
announced that the test had been played. There was a dash to contact anyone who may have 
attended the matched.  
In his book, For the Love of Rugby, Rob Louw writes that in 100 years’ time the third test 
between the All Blacks and the Springboks in 1981 will be remembered as the strangest test 
match ever played.266 If in 100 years’ time, the secret test between the Springboks and the US 
Eagles is still remembered, it can certainly be afforded a similar status. As it happened, those 
Springboks who were not selected to play in the test and had been taken to the baseball 
museum had acted as an unsuspecting decoy to draw anyone watching the hotel after them. 
The remaining test players were instructed to be dressed in their match gear and then put on 
civilian clothes over their jerseys. Sometime after the others had left to the museum, the team 
was piled four by four into minibuses and instructed to lie flat so that they could not be seen. 
They were driven for half an hour to the house of Tom Selfridge, where they waited and did 
their final preparations until shortly before the kick-off time. The team were then driven into 
a rural area until they reached the Owl Creek polo field in Glenville, New York. The team 
was greeted by 250 State Troopers, most of who were concealed in the bushes, and a 
spattering of locals who had happened to be at the field. After warming up in horse paddocks, 
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the team was introduced to their field – a polo field with a two-meter drop from end to end. 
As the teams arrived on the field, the goalposts were still being erected by the Eagles’ 
substitutes. A record low crowd of 35, most of whom were substitutes, State Troopers, or 
friends of the field’s owner, watched the match. It remains the smallest crowd ever to attend 
an official Springbok test match.267 With the Springboks playing uphill and against the wind 
in the first half, the score line was a narrow 6-4 to the Springboks at halftime. The second 
half proved a different matter as the Springboks cantered downhill to win the final match of 
the tour 38-7.  
The manner in which the test had been played proved to be a sour point for many, particularly 
for those Springboks who had been unsuspectingly used as a decoy. They felt that the 
management and the test team had not regarded them as trust worthy enough to inform them 
that the test would be played earlier. Even Wynand Claassen, who had captained the team 
against the Eagles, lamented the fact that, after all the team had been through in New Zealand 
and the US, the team as a whole had not been able to be together for the final match of the 
tour.268 Rob Louw, a member of the decoy team, recalled the tensions that existed after the 
match. Eventually tensions boiled over and a scuffle broke out between a few of the 
Springboks at a cocktail evening held for the two teams.269   
The news of the secret test was also not well received in South Africa. Many felt that it was 
an indignity that the cream of world rugby would be forced to play test match rugby under 
such circumstances. Former Springbok, Tommy Bedford, labelled the match as ridiculous 
and lamented the fact that such a match could be considered a test match.270 Similarly, 
Afrikaans radio commentator, Gerhard Viviers, who had been with the Springboks on the 
troublesome 1969/70 tour of the UK, labelled the match a farce and bemoaned the fact that 
the match had been given test match status.271  
Despite the discontent by many over the way the match had taken place, the tactic had 
worked as for the first time on the 1981 tour there was not a protestor in sight.272 Although 
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Tom Selfridge was in hot water over the manner in which the match had taken place, his 
actions had facilitated the first official test between South Africa and the USA, which may 
not have been possible had the test been played on the scheduled day and protestors had a 
chance to make it to the match. The minimal status of rugby in the USA also contributed to 
the fact that matches could be played in secrecy and, as was the case with the Springbok 
matches against the Eastern All Stars and the US Eagles, could be arranged or changed 
without much difficulty. In comparison to New Zealand, US rugby officials did not have to 
worry about thousands of match tickets that had been sold months in advance or television 
crews intending to broadcast the match live. The fact that matches did not draw that much 
attention in the US meant they could be chopped and changed on short notice, without 
causing too many disturbances.  
For many South Africans, the bizarre spectacle they had witness over the past three months in 
New Zealand and the USA led to a moment of realisation: unless there was drastic change in 
South Africa, this would be the future of South African rugby. If the Springboks did manage 
to obtain tours, they would encounter severe demonstrations wherever they travelled. Even if 
the team claimed to be chosen on merit and despite the fact that rugby was arguably one of 
the frontrunners in breaking down South Africa’s racial barriers, unless South Africa’s racial 
practices were removed there was little hope of its rugby returning to normal. The Springboks 
had travelled to rugby-crazed New Zealand, a place where South African rugby was held in 
high regard, and had experienced severe demonstrations against their presence. Then they had 
travelled to a country where a rugby culture was virtually non-existent, but were still forced 
to hide from dangerous protestors.  
The fact that rugby was leading the way in racial integration would never be enough for anti-
apartheid bodies until the South African government dismantled its racial policies. It would 
never be enough that Errol Tobias could don the Springbok jersey if he could not share in the 
rights and freedoms of his white compatriots. What the sporting boycott now demanded, and 
which was probably best exemplified by the protests during the 1981 tour, was that the 
removal of apartheid would be the bare minimum before sport would be allowed back into 
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Keeping Sport and Politics Separate? South African-United States Relations around the 
1981 Tour  
For the South African and world rugby communities, the Springbok tour of the US was of 
little importance. It had been an anti-climax following the gripping tour of New Zealand and 
left many of the players questioning why it had been necessary to come to the US. The SARB 
had been opposed to the Springboks touring the US straight after a strenuous New Zealand 
tour. As international tours go, the tour was arranged quietly hastily with the final invitation 
to the “Spring Bucks” only being received by the SARB in January of 1981 (international 
tours were normally arranged well over a year in advance).273 It was speculated that the tour 
had taken place to take some of the international pressure off New Zealand. However, it is 
more likely that South African rugby had attempted to broaden the scope of their available 
rugby rivals during the isolation-era. This certainly seems plausible, as while the Springboks 
were touring the US it became publicly known that a sum of $50,000 had been paid by the 
SARB to the Eastern Rugby Union, who had hosted the Springboks. Furthermore, it emerged 
that Louis Luyt, President of the Transvaal Rugby Football Union and business magnate, had 
also given $25,000 to the USARFU as a gift.  
The news of the funds had anti-apartheid groups up in arms as they regarded the money as a 
bribe to allow the Springboks to tour. Once the Springboks found out about the payments, 
they were left feeling somewhat embarrassed, as it seemed that the tour had been bought.274 
Although the money was not a bribe – the $50,000 was meant to cover the Springboks’ living 
and travel arrangements in the US and the $25,000 was to be used to develop US rugby – it 
did ensure a friendly line of communication between US and SA rugby bodies. Thus, the 
funds were perhaps a way of laying the groundwork for future tours between the two nations, 
or at least for as long as a Republican sat in the Oval Office. However, if these funds did in 
fact serve to facilitate friendliness between the two rugby boards, it did not serve either 
country particularly well, as South Africa and the US would only next play one another in an 
official test well after apartheid was removed in South Africa.  
The question remains, however, on whether there existed an ulterior motive regarding the 
Springboks’ tour of the US. From a rugby perspective, the tour certainly made little sense, 
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and thus it should be considered whether rugby was the sole purpose of the tour. The tour had 
taken place under the auspices that a tour by the Springboks would help to develop US rugby 
by providing it with exposure to top flight international rugby. However, it should be 
considered that perhaps the tour had been a means not only to further South Africa’s rugby 
ties with the US, but also to rekindle its political ties with the US after the hostile Jimmy 
Carter era. South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s was facing what it regarded as a ‘total 
onslaught’ against the country, including a growing Communist presence in Southern Africa. 
With the NP embracing what Nelson Mandela labelled “the most hide-bound of Cold War 
ideology”, it is not farfetched to conceive that following the election of the Republican 
Reagan, a chance presented itself to the South African government to rekindle its ties with the 
USA.275   
South Africa’s political landscape in 1981 was dominated by a single event: an increase of 
14% on the defence budget spending, bringing the figure to around R2.6 billion, R847 
million more than the year before.276 The Cape Times described the increase as a “siege 
budget”, an increase that seemed to suggest that South Africa was on near wartime footing.277 
The drastic increase was largely to do with the increasing Communist presence in the 
southern African independence struggles. From the mid-1970s, there had been a decline in 
what the South African government regarded as white-ruled ‘buffer states’ – South-West 
Africa (Namibia), Zimbabwe, and Portuguese Mozambique – which bordered South Africa.  
Mozambique became the first of these states to lose its white rule after the fascist dictatorship 
in Lisbon was overthrown and ended Portuguese colonialism. Mozambique gained its 
independence in 1975 with the socialist Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 
dominating the new political dispensation. The new developments in Mozambique also 
provided a passage through which the exiled Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 
guerrillas, who were fighting a liberation war against Ian Smith’s white minority regime in 
Rhodesia, could gain further access to the territory. When Smith’s regime was successfully 
toppled, the South African government suddenly found itself with two liberated black, 
Russian supported regimes on its doorstep, as well as substantial Russian and Cuban 
influences in Angola. With this, attention shifted to the liberation battle SWAPO was fighting 
against South Africa in South-West Africa. For the South African government, what was 
                                                            
275 N. R. Mandela: The Long Walk to Freedom, p. 641. 
276 “A Siege Budget,” Cape Times, 13 August 1981, p. 1. 
277 Ibid.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
 
busy unfolding in southern Africa was, to quote Minster of Defence, Magnus Malan, 
“communist inspired, communist planned, and communist supported.”278 “Virtually the only 
activity that exists in those countries is the training of terrorists which are on their way to the 
Republic of South Africa” was Malan’s prognosis of what was happening in these southern 
Africa states.279  
Speaking to the Volksraad (House of Assembly) in 1981, Malan elaborated that southern 
Africa’s changing political landscape was part of the domino theory that US President, 
Dwight Eisenhower, had first warned the world about in the 1950’s. The theory suggested 
that if one state fell to Communism, it would virtually ensure that the neighbouring states 
would follow suit unless there was an intervention.280 In their pursuit of “communist world 
domination”, Malan believed that the Soviet Union and is cohorts regarded southern Africa as 
a key point.  Southern Africa had wealth in minerals and was a strategic position to gain 
control over the Cape sea-route, as well as an important territory for expansion into Africa.281 
Therefore, South Africa needed to prepare for the coming onslaught if it wanted to fend off 
future Communist advances on the country. 
However, the ‘total onslaught’ against South Africa came not only from outside the country, 
but internally as well, as white South African rule faced an internal crisis as blacks’ demand 
for political rights gained momentum. The fatal Soweto uprising had rejuvenated support for 
the ANC and led it to become more militant.282 The South African government regarded the 
ANC as a terrorist organisation set on violently overthrowing white rule in South Africa. 
With its socialist ideology and support from Soviet Russia, the ANC were a revolutionary 
force in the eyes of the South African government. Malan described the objectives of the 
ANC as follows: “This terrorist organisation is not set on peaceful evolutionary development, 
but on bringing about change through a revolutionary takeover of the state.”283 Malan tried to 
drive home the point that in the history of revolutionary takeovers, violent tactics were 
always used as a means to achieve an end.  
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The events that unfolded during the Soweto uprising had led to renewed revolutionary 
enthusiasm amongst insurgents attempting to topple white rule in South Africa and had 
galvanized resurgent black resistance to the Republic. The event had shown the Afrikaner 
government to be vulnerable, as even schoolchildren were now challenging the white regime. 
This vulnerability was further amplified by the fact that South Africa had lost most of its 
western allies. Speaking in the House of Assembly in 1982, a Progressive Federal Party 
(PFP) member noted that South Africa would struggle against Soviet expansionism largely 
because it no longer had its western allies, which had deserted South Africa due to the NP’s 
apartheid policy.284 In particular, the USA under Jimmy Carter had taken a much harder line 
toward South Africa Richard Nixon or Robert Ford. The Carter Administration had informed 
the South African government that the US sought majority rule and a ‘one man, one vote’ 
system in South Africa, effectively saying apartheid had to go. Although Carter did not place 
any significant pressure on South Africa – such as by apply economic sanctions that may well 
have twisted the arm of Pretoria – the hostility of the US government towards apartheid 
effectively meant the regime was isolated from US aid during a time when communist 
influence was growing in southern Africa. 
It is here where the 1981 Springbok tour of the US comes into play. The tour was played in 
1981 for one specific reason: Jimmy Carter would no longer be president. Instead, the 
Republican, Ronald Reagan, would be president by the time the Springboks arrived in the 
US. This is not to say that a Republican president would support apartheid. It did, however, 
based on Carters two predecessors, Nixon and Ford, both from the Republican Party and both 
having failed to act against apartheid, give hope to the South African government that a softer 
line would be taken toward their country by the US. Even the official opposition in South 
Africa, the PFP, believed that the election of Reagan as president would have positive 
consequences for South Africa and open new diplomatic and political lines between the two 
countries.285  
As it turned out, this speculation was spot on, particularly with regard to Reagan’s stance on 
South Africa’s occupation of South-West Africa. Whereas Carter had declared that the 
Republic’s occupation of South-West Africa as illegal, Reagan declared that South Africa did 
not need to leave Namibia until Cuban forces left Angola, for which he received a great deal 
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if international criticism.286 Despite Reagan being internationally derided as a protector of 
apartheid, he stuck to his guns over the matter. Some years later, Pik Botha, South African 
Foreign Affairs Minister, had the following to say on Reagan’s position on the South-West 
Africa matter: “During the seven years in which Pres. Reagan has governed, this standpoint 
has formed a shield against sanctions and no sanctions were imposed against this country 
because of the South-West Africa issue.”287 Reagan’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ 
with South Africa empathised not only with the suffering of South African blacks, but also 
with the political dilemma of whites.288 
South Africa needed to rekindle an old friendship with the US in the face of growing hostility 
towards the Republic in Southern Africa. In a time where the South African government 
believed a Communist threat to be knocking on the Republic’s front door, a rugby tour to the 
US is unlikely to have gone unnoticed as an opportunity to extend a hand of friendship to the 
US. Particularly as this tour was conducted under the auspices of using South Africa’s rugby 
supremacy to benefit and improve the sport in the US. White South Africa believed itself to 
be facing a Communist-inspire onslaught against which it stood alone. However, an ally such 
as the US would certainly add some fortification to South Africa’s vulnerable position.  
Thus, perhaps the rugby tour of the US must be considered as a tactic to get the ball rolling 
between the US and South African governments. Although it is difficult to find definitive 
proof for such a claim, it must be considered that a nation with the sort of Communist-
paranoia that South Africa was in during the 1970s and 1980s would use every and any 
opportunity to rekindle the lost bond that existed between the Republic and one of the world 
super-powers. Writing on white South Africa’s overwhelming fear of communism, Herman 
Giliomee provides the following statistics: 
“[In 1971] a survey of white elite found that only 9 per cent saw the rise of ‘black 
nationalism’ as a threat compared to 73 per cent who believed that international 
communism represented the ‘greatest threat to the security of South Africa and 
the successful realisation of the policy of separate development’.”289 
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Speaking at the House of Assembly in 1982, an NP member implored Prime Minister Botha 
that the only way South Africa would be able to cope with the impending battle against 
Communism and the USSR was to restore its friendship with the West, of which the US had 
traditionally been the most outspoken against Communism.290 Instead of South Africa asking 
the US for protection, a rugby tour, sending over the pride of South African sport, could be 
seen as an initial gesture of mutual benefits should the two countries resume a closer working 
with one-another. It must be granted, however, that South Africa helping develop US rugby 
seemed like a poor trade-off for protection from the Soviet Union.  However, it was a start, a 
token gesture to signify the possibility of reciprocal benefits should the US ally itself with 
South Africa.  
It must also be considered that, as a PFP member pointed out during a sitting of the House of 
Assembly in 1981, the US would only be able to justify its softer line toward South Africa if 
there was proof of meaningful change in the social and political structure of South African 
society.291 By 1981, rugby in South Africa was regarded as the frontrunner in breaking down 
discriminatory racial barriers and was setting a tone for others to follow. Perhaps then, the 
1981 tour to the US must be considered a moment where a ‘representative’ South African 
team could parade some of the changes that had been achieved in the country. By sending the 
first merit selected Springbok team with the first black Springbok in it to the US, South 
Africa could demonstrate that it was on the right path with regard to change, thereby 
hopefully encouraging a sense of confidence in the country. As illustrated earlier in this 
thesis, the 1981 tours (Ireland, New Zealand, and the USA) were meant to be a public 
campaign during which rugby could illustrate to the world the progress being made in South 
Africa in removing discriminatory practices. A confidential SARB document stated that: 
“…we have been given grace in that we can still prove to the world during the Irish and New 
Zealand [and US] tours that we are on the right road as far as public opinion and ourselves 
are concerned.”292 
With this in mind, it is plausible to consider that the Springbok tour to the US also served as a 
campaign to assure the US that South Africa’s future was on the right track, and that here was 
evidence of it in the form of the first ‘racially mixed’ Springbok side. A ‘mixed’ rugby side 
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could be regarded as a major step in the right direction for South Africa as the sport had long 
held the reputation as the sacred game of the Afrikaner.  
Other than Douglas Reid, an American businessman, who urged the SARB to take the lead in 
bringing the nations of America and South Africa together through a rugby tour, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the US tour held the sort of significance that is theorised above. 
Undoubtedly, South Africa and the US under Reagan had their respective interests in 
maintaining contact with one-another, but whether it was a rugby tour that contributed to 
facilitating such contact is open to interpretation. However, Reid’s enthusiasm seems to 
suggest that he believed rugby could facilitate a closer connection between South African and 
the USA and was a way to ward off the Communist threat in southern Africa. Reid also wrote 
frantically to Richard Nixon, requesting that Nixon needed to have a word with his 
Republican successor, Ronald Reagan, to rekindle the US’s relationship with South Africa 
before the Soviet Union were able to exert their influence over the territory.293 However, as 
Reid was neither a rugby nor government official, it is difficult to see his opinion on rugby 
between South Africa and the US as proof that the tour acted as a political foray to rekindle 
lost US and South African ties.  
At this stage, however, it should be acknowledged that due to space, time, and narrative 
constraints this thesis could not delve deeper into this question. This thesis does not propose 
to have provided any form of answer to the question, but merely to state the plausibility of the 
1981 USA tour being of political significance based on information obtained from various 
sources. To provide any meaningful discussion on whether the 1981 tour acted as a political 
foray to the USA, a separate self-standing study devoted to this question is required. A 
perusal of the South African Foreign Affairs Archive would certainly shed greater light on 
this matter. However, for the purpose of this thesis the potential political motive behind the 
1981 USA tour is only worth mentioning as it falls outside the parameters of what this thesis 
has set out to argue.    
Conclusion 
Had South African rugby authorities known what would unfold in New Zealand in 1981, it is 
unlikely that they would have agreed to the US leg of the tour. The Springboks themselves 
could not understand the purpose of the tour as it was somewhat of an anti-climax following a 
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riveting series in New Zealand. The tour was largely ignored in South Africa by the same 
media who had brought the country even the finest details of what was happening in New 
Zealand. The tour did, however, lead to a historic first test between the Springboks and the 
US Eagles, but under some of the strangest conditions ever to befall a rugby tour, even in 
comparison to what unfolded in New Zealand. Rugby’s minimal status in the US, however, 
worked in favour of facilitating the tour as fixtures could be chopped and changed at a 
moment’s notice without any major difficulties (such as thousands of spectators who had 
bought tickets months in advance such as in New Zealand).  
The major damage to South Africa’s international rugby future had been done in New 
Zealand, damage that would have come about regardless of whether the US tour had taken 
place. Thus, the US tour mainly served to reinforce the speculation that future tours would be 
plagued by violent demonstrations unless South Africa implemented drastic changes to its 
racial policies. However, despite the relative insignificance of the rugby aspect of the tour, it 
must be considered that the tour acted also as a political foray through which the South 
African government could begin to bridge the gap that had developed between the Republic 
and the USA over the previous decade.  With the South African government believing it was 
facing a Communist crisis developing on country’s borders, it became imperative that South 
Africa attempt to re-establish its western allies if the country were to thwart the perceived 
oncoming threat.  
It should be considered that a rugby tour to the US was a way of illustrating the progress 
South Africa had made in terms of starting to break down racial barriers, with rugby taking 
the lead in sending over a racial mixed team selected on merit. Such progress could be used 
by the US (as it was in New Zealand) to justify closer working with South Africa in the face 
of international condemnation. However, as mentioned, this thesis will not delve deeper into 
this question other than to acknowledge - based on the political climate in both South Africa 
and the US at the time - the plausibility of a rugby tour being used as a diplomatic foray by 









The Onset of Isolation: South African Rugby from 1981-1988 
“Did we do the right thing for sport and for rugby? We have decided it was the 
right thing to do!” 294 
The Springboks returned to South Africa as national heroes. They had prevailed in 
exceptionally difficult circumstances, having lost only two matches across the two tours. The 
South Africans had proven that despite the relative isolation since the 1970s, South African 
rugby could still hold its own against the best in the world. Many a South African would have 
speculated that, had the New Zealand tour not taken place under the conditions it had, the 
Springboks may well have come back with a series win. The team arrived in Johannesburg to 
a hero’s welcome as some 2000 peoples ushered them in. At the team’s arrival, an overtly 
optimistic Craven assured the media that the tour had been a resounding success and that 
South Africans would see the American and New Zealand teams on their fields in the not too 
distant future.295  
Craven was full of praise for those New Zealanders who had stood by the tour, claiming that 
more countries could learn from these strongmen. However, Craven had speculated that there 
was a very real chance that this could have been the Springboks’ last tour to New Zealand. 
Yet in his traditionally combative way, Craven commented about those who had opposed the 
tour: “We showed the world who they are dealing with…we must fight [our enemies] 
wherever we find them.”296 Yet what Craven did not seem to grasp was that this insensitive 
‘tour-at-all-costs’ mentality had likely not only prevented them from touring New Zealand in 
future, but would in fact confine the Springboks within South Africa’s borders for the next 
decade.  
The New Zealand and USA tours had been able to run their course, but the effects thereof 
would only manifest themselves in the years to come, effects that Craven could not 
immediately foresee. The anti-tour activists in New Zealand and the US had not been able to 
curb the tours as they had planned, but what they did succeed in doing was giving rugby 
nations around the world a healthy dose of the chaos a touring Springbok team could attract, 
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whether this was in the smallest or largest of rugby playing nations. Although it was not 
immediately apparent, what these activists had succeeded in doing was forcing the 
Springboks into rugby isolation, something that the sporting boycott had struggled to achieve 
over the previous two decades. 
This chapter will illustrate how the 1981 tour contributed to South Africa’s rugby isolation in 
the 1980s, as well as the initiatives the SARB implemented to try to offset this isolation. 
These initiatives were usually short-lived, ineffective, and generally left the SARB in a 
worse-off position than before. The 1981 tour caused ripples in the rugby world, which over 
the course of several years would leave the SARB with few friends and staring complete 
isolation in the face. The ripples caused by the 1981 tour were even further aggravated by the 
political situation in South Africa. Not only was the SARB being forced to combat the effects 
of the 1981 tour, but also these effects were being aggravated by the South African 
government’s reluctance to dismantle apartheid.  
Thus, in order to grasp the situation faced by South African rugby in the 1980s, it is 
necessary to have a basic understanding of the complex political upheavals South Africa went 
through during this period. Consequently, much of what took place on the political front in 
the 1980s dictated the severity of the isolation felt by South African rugby, generally leaving 
the SARB rudderless in finding a solution. The following section thus entails a brief 
discussion on the complex politics of 1980s South Africa.       
Reform, Right-wingers, and Revolutionaries: South African Politics in the 1980s  
South African entered the 1980s inauspiciously. The rugby tour of New Zealand and the USA 
had shocked many white South Africans as to the degree of animosity that existed towards 
their country, even from an old ally like New Zealand. Writing about that time, Paul Dobson 
noted that: 
“The vehemence of the opposition shocked many South Africans who believed 
that rugby men really wanted to play with them; and that their ‘kith and kin’ 
overseas were really on the side of the Springboks and did not blame them for the 
nasty policies of the Nationalist government.”297   
In this extract, Dobson captures the mentality of South African rugby: rugby should not be 
viewed on the same continuum as the politics of the National Party.  Politics was regarded as 
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having no business in rugby, yet occasionally the two would overlap. In the 1970s, opponents 
of apartheid South African had demanded a complete removal of racial segregation in sport 
before the country could return to international competition. Since the late 1970s, Craven had 
done much to facilitate the development of rugby in underdeveloped areas, as the SARB 
hosted clinics for players, coaches, and referees in order to upgrade the sport, for which 
Craven received much international praise. In June 1975, the fielding of a racially mixed 
South African side against the French at Newland in Cape Town also seemed to suggest that 
non-racial rugby in South Africa was becoming a reality. In 1978, the amalgamation of three 
of the four rugby bodies in South Africa (SARB, SARA, and SARFF amalgamated to form 
SARB – SARU refused to join until apartheid was removed entirely) seemed to suggest that 
apartheid had been removed from South African rugby.  
The South African government had also, although somewhat grudgingly, removed certain 
legislation which was seen to constrain multiracial rugby. In essence then, all legal 
boundaries were removed from preventing players of different races playing together. 
Although racially mixed rugby was legally a reality from 1977, whether it took place in 
practice was a different matter entirely. This concession by the government largely 
manifested itself in the top echelons of South African rugby, with provincial and later 
national sides fielding racially mixed teams. Lower down the ladder this was not the case. 
Rugby clubs still held full discretion over whom they permitted as members, and racial 
mixing in schools was virtually non-existent. By permitting racially mixed sport, the 
government had made a shrewd assumption that apartheid was so engrained in South African 
society by the 1970s that racially mixed sport was unlikely to occur on any large scale. 
Removing legislation which had been engrained in every facet of South African society for 
almost 30 years (by the time multiracial sport was allowed) and was based on exploiting the 
separateness of the races would not mean that people were going to run into one-another’s 
arms if the legislation preventing them from doing so was removed. It was also unlikely that 
traditionally white clubs or teams would suddenly be flooded with players of colour (and 
vice-versa). Because clubs could no longer legally turn away a prospective member due to 
the colour of their skin, other measures were devised in order to prevent players of colour 
joining the club. Cases were recorded of black players attempting to join white clubs who 
were turned away due to a supposed 6-year waiting list. While racially mixed sport was now 
legal, apartheid was too engrained in society for there to be any serious threat of racial 
mixing.  
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However, despite the reality over multiracial sport in South Africa, it seemed that rugby had 
fulfilled the criteria for the country’s full return to international rugby. Apartheid had been 
removed in the sport, just as had been stipulated by the sporting boycott. With the start of the 
1980s, it seemed as if South Africa would in fact return to international rugby. The British 
and Irish Lions (1980), France (1980, only for one match), South American Jaguars (1980), 
Ireland (1981), New Zealand (1981), and the USA (1981) were set to play South Africa. With 
this packed schedule, it certainly seemed that South African rugby had good reason to feel 
optimistic about its future.   
The 1980s, however, came with a number of problems. The 1981 New Zealand tour had 
shaken the rugby establishment of not only South Africa, but also rugby bodies around the 
world. The good work done by the SARB in the 1970s to implement non-racial rugby had 
made little impact on the ferocity with which New Zealanders had protested the South 
Africans’ presence. This can largely be put down to the fact that by the time the Springboks 
toured in 1981 the calls in New Zealand were no longer for the removal of apartheid in sport 
or for merit team selection (as it had been in the 1970s), but for the complete removal of 
apartheid in South African society.  
Organisations such as SACOS in South African and SANROC in England had done an 
excellent job of publicising the fact that once sport was done, white South Africans and black 
South Africans returned to lives which were strictly governed by the colour of their skin. 
They highlighted the fact that non-racial sport could not be tantamount to equality until the 
society within which it existed was equal. This ‘eighty-minute equality’ could not be seen as 
a break from apartheid as players who had shared a field, and perhaps a drink after the match, 
would then return to their completely segregated lifestyles once the sport had concluded. 
SACOS’ slogan in the 1980s of ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’ captured the nature 
of what was being protested in New Zealand and the USA. Ultimately, there could not be 
equality in any sphere of life while the society itself was unequal. In essence, for there to be 
equal sport, there needed to be an equal society.  
New Zealand in 1981 was perhaps the first major event that drew attention to this new line of 
fire toward South African rugby. Journalists on the tour bombarded the Springbok team 
management with questions over whether it was more important for Errol Tobias to don the 
green jersey than it was for him to have voting rights. From 1981 onwards, the call for the 
scrapping of apartheid slowly began to disseminate internationally until, just as non-racial 
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rugby had in the 1970s, it became the central criterion for South Africa’s re-entry into 
international rugby. The concession by the South African government to allow multiracial 
rugby had shown the outside world – just like it had with the Maori question in 1967 – that 
pressure on sport, particularly on rugby, was an effective way of forcing the hand of the 
apartheid government. However, the government in the 1980s stunted this progress. 
Scrapping apartheid for the sake of resuming international sport was a bridge too far for P.W. 
Botha and his government. 
By the early 1980s, both the SARB and the government argued that South African sport 
should be readmitted to international competition because sport was now multiracial. In 1982 
the SARB was requested by French rugby boss, Albert Farrasse (who had long been a friend 
of South African rugby but even now he was finding it difficult to justify sustained contact 
with South Africa following the 1981 tour induced international backlash), to provide a full 
report on the “Legislation Relating to Sport in South Africa.”298 The request was passed on to 
Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of National Education (whose profile included sport), who eagerly 
responded to Farrasse: “it is the declared policy of the Government that sport in South Africa 
should be completely autonomous.”299  
Therefore, all legislation in South Africa that had a restricting influence on multiracial sport 
had been duly amended. This included amendments to the Liquor Act300, Group Areas Act301, 
and the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act302. Viljoen ended his report to Farrasse with 
the guarantee that this legislation had been brought about to “grant equal opportunities to all 
population groups and to eliminate any discrimination that may have existed in sport.”303  
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These measures implemented by the government did genuinely seem to represent the removal 
of apartheid within sport, something that international onlookers took as encouraging signs 
for the future of South Africa. However, the international community would have to wait 
until deep into the 1980s before it came to the realisation that the South African government 
had no intention of breakdown apartheid, but instead was intent on reforming it in a manner 
that could be construed as its removal.  
“Adapt or Die”: Maintaining White Power in the 1980s 
With the coming of P.W. Botha as Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa in 1978 (in 
1984 the position was changed to President) Afrikaner nationalism came to be split between 
two distinctive tracts: the reform-minded politics of the Cape based Botha; and the 
conservative politics of Andries Treurnicht, leader of the Transvaal NP. Botha stressed that 
Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid could no longer continue along its current path and that 
there would need to be adaptation to the current system in order to see its survival (commonly 
known as the ‘Total Strategy’ to counter the Total Onslaught against the republic). On the 
other hand, the verkrampte (conservative) Treurnicht stressed that there should be no 
deviation from the sacred policies of Verwoerdian-era Afrikaner Nationalism and apartheid. 
However, by the early 1980s, particularly following the 1981 general election, it appeared 
that Afrikaner nationalism would be torn into yet a third direction. The reform-minded Botha 
had scared many Afrikaners: between 1979 and 1981, an estimated decline of 23% in 
earnings had hit the public sector which, in addition to the planned cut in employment in the 
state bureaucracy, played on the fears of whites that further reforms could erode their niche of 
power and privilege.304 Fortunately, for the Afrikaner far right, who still advocated the firm 
apartheid measures Botha was willing to discard, it scared these whites straight into their 
arms. Following the 1981 general election, the Herstige National Party (a group of former NP 
members which had broken away in the late 1960s largely due to Vorster’s willingness to 
allow Maori players to play against white South Africans), under Albert Hertzog, as well as a 
number of other far-right organisations, received a substantial chunk of the traditionally NP 
vote. Reports showed that the far right had won 38% of the Afrikaner vote and that the NP’s 
share of the vote had fallen from 65% in 1977, to 53% in 1981, the largest downturn in NP 
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popularity since it came to power in 1948.305 Equally concerning was the flourishing of 
smaller far right organisations, some of which were openly pro-Nazi, such as the extremist 
right-wing organisation, the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement).306 For a country that was trying to show the world that it was on a commendable 
path, the substantial growth of such far right movements, all of which advocated either 
radicalising of apartheid or at least maintaining it, could have disastrous consequences.  
Following a further split in the NP in 1982 when the verkrampte Treurnicht was essentially 
forced out (Treurnicht went on to form the Conservative Party, or CP, which drew a number 
of smaller far-right organisations into its ranks), the October of 1982 polls revealed that only 
42% of Afrikaners now aligned themselves with the NP.307 By 1987, the CP had become the 
official opposition to the NP.  An important social spilt had taken place with the tearing apart 
of the NP: those who had chosen to align themselves with the far right and conservative 
factions were mostly from the lower ranks of Afrikaner society – small farmer, state 
bureaucrats, Afrikaner workers still insisting on a colour bar, and rural areas.308 Whereas the 
NP now came to espouse middle-class values and was supported by some of the major 
conglomerates who were in need of Botha’s reforms to facilitate business.309  
Now, Botha’s NP, partly under pressure from their new business allies and no longer having 
to contend with the obstinate Treurnicht, pushed ahead with the planned reforms. The NP 
now no longer espoused the Verwoerdian notion of ‘separate development’ but instead 
pushed ahead with what it called ‘healthy power-sharing and joint decision making’.310 The 
outcome of this was a new constitutional dispensation and the tri-cameral parliament, voted 
for in the 1983 whites-only referendum. The new parliament essentially entailed a power-
sharing program between white, coloureds, and Indians, which would be implemented from 
1984 onwards.  
For the NP, things were now looking up: the success of the 1983 referendum had won them 
back a substantial portion of their lost votes, and things would only get better. In 1984 Botha 
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left many an onlooker in disbelief as he signed the Nkomati Accord, a non-aggressive pact 
with Samora Machel, president of the Leninist-Marxist Mozambique, as well as made 
conciliatory moves toward Kennith Kaunda of Zambia and peace moves in South-West 
Africa (Namibia). These new developments seemingly unlocked the door to international 
acceptance for South Africa as for the first time it looked like real moves had been made 
towards a future without apartheid. Writing about these developments, Dan O’Meara 
concludes: “the casual observer could be forgiven the conclusion that South Africa was 
indeed on the cusp of a new historic settlement.”311    
However, barely a year later the exuberance of these developments had turned to ash. 
Underlining Botha’s reforms was the central notion of maintaining the existing power bloc. 
One of the core objectives behind Botha’s reforms had been to stem the mounting 
revolutionary demands for social transformation by black South Africans since the early 
1980s. For three-quarters of the South African population, Botha’s reforms had changed 
nothing. Six years after being elected to the Premiership in 1978, Botha’s reforms still 
subjected blacks to regular pass raids, denied them any political rights, stripped them of their 
South African citizenship, and dumped them in the arid Bantustans. Black South Africans 
could be forgiven for asking what had changed under the much-trumpeted Botha reforms.  
By June 1986, the country was placed under a suffocating state of emergency and near 
military rule existed. The realisation that these reforms were little more than blatant attempts 
at retaining power in white hands enraged blacks and led to renewed vigour for the 
revolutionary struggle against white domination. In 1985, the exiled ANC called for a 
campaign to make South Africa ungovernable during which the state’s administrative control 
over black areas would be destroyed. During this period, around 35,000 troops were deployed 
in the townships. Thousands of protestors were detained and nearly 2,000 people were killed 
in political violence.312 
The NP and government now fell into the trap of conceding reform from a position of 
weakness, as they were seen to buckle under pressure. The revolutionary opponents of the 
state came to see that the government was floundering and was willing to implement a degree 
of change with every spell of unrest. The unrest also revealed that, in fact, the state did not 
have any long-term plan to stem the unfolding revolution and in general seemed rudderless. 
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Hastily formulated reform plans to put the revolution to bed gave the impression that “the 
architects no longer seemed to know what they intended to build.”313 Each round of ill-fated 
reforms further compounded the notion that Botha was not prepared to surrender apartheid, 
further fuelling the rage of black South Africans and further discrediting and isolating the 
white regime. 
Things certainly did not improve with Botha’s infamous ‘Rubicon’ speech. At the 1985 Natal 
NP congress in Durban, expectations had been that Botha would announce the release of 
Nelson Mandela. Instead, Botha delivered a speech that further reinforced the notion that 
white power would not abdicate.314 In the wake of the Rubicon followed an enormous flight 
in foreign capital, as well as the onset of economic and other sanctions.  
It seemed that on the political front the wheels had started to come off for the Botha 
government. In 1986, the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) visited South Africa as a final 
attempt to ward of a civil war. Among the members of the group was Margaret Thatcher, one 
of South Africa’s two remaining international protectors (the other being Ronald Reagan). 
However, the report released by the EPG far from shielded the Botha regime as it 
recommended that strong international sanctions were to be applied to South Africa. It 
concluded that “[South Africa’s] programme of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to 
give it a less inhuman face…its quest is power-sharing, but without surrendering overall 
white control.”315 The Reagan Administration now banned all new investment and loans to 
the South African government, while the Commonwealth agreed that, despite Margaret 
Thatcher’s refusal to take steps against the Nationalist government, all agricultural and 
manufacturing imports from South Africa would be banned.316 
With the armed struggle within South Africa intensifying and its international allies fast 
abandoning it, the NP government now looked to a different strategy. From 1986 onward, 
South Africa became a near military state, as the SADF sought to stem the revolutionary 
situation in the townships.317 Botha now threw his weight in behind the SADF as a new 
crackdown on dissidents took place. Mass censorship of this unparalleled crackdown 
prevented damaging images from making it into the outside world. Botha argued that the only 
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way reform could continue was if there existed absolute law and order, with the first 
objective being to “command, coerce and eliminate the revolutionaries.”318 This new security 
strategy also took on the form of militarily destabilising neighbouring states where the ANC 
had been exiled, in hopes that this would bring about the elimination of the ANC and its 
support networks. 
By the time of P.W Botha’s stroke in 1989, national power-sharing structures had advanced 
no more than they had by the time of the declaration of the state of emergency, some thirty-
one months earlier.319 By 1987, large tracts of Afrikaner society had grown disillusioned with 
the Nation Party, giving considerable support to the CP and other far right parties.320 The 
somewhat floundering state had failed to make any headway with the basic political issue that 
had been confronting the country since the early 1980s. 
Practicing Propaganda: Selling South African Rugby to the World 
For much of the 1980s the South African government was faced with a state of crises. Threats 
came from the growing communist presence in Southern Africa, the Afrikaner far right, and 
the revolutionaries in the townships which sought to overthrow the existing order. The SADF 
contended that the revolutionary situation in the townships was as much of a threat, if not 
bigger, than the total onslaught faced by the country from outside its borders. The Nationalist 
government found itself in the midst of a battle for the heart of Afrikanerdom and the 
maintenance of white-privilege.   
Given the magnitude of events that faced the South African government, it is unlikely that 
much attention would be given to the woes of South African rugby. For much of the 1980s 
South African rugby was left to fend for itself in the face of growing international pressure to 
have apartheid removed, something that rugby had no control over. The 1981 tour would 
leave South African rugby as sealed-off as a faulty nuclear reactor, something the Board 
could not have anticipated by the conclusion of the tour. However, there was speculation that 
the 1981 tour would have repercussions and that the Board would need to act if it wanted to 
stem the worst of these.  
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Perhaps, above all else, the 1981 tour had turned the Springboks into security risk. Those who 
had witnessed the televised visuals of New Zealand police and demonstrators clashing in the 
streets around rugby stadiums would have been aware that such violence would not be 
limited to New Zealand. Anti-apartheid sentiments existed virtually around the world, 
meaning there were very few places, if any, where the Springboks could go and not attract 
demonstrations. The 1981 tour had been the Springboks’ first major international tour since 
the first round of ‘demo tours’ in the UK in 1969/70 and Australia in 1971. The tour proved 
that anti-apartheid sentiment had not died down with the implementation of multiracial sport 
(only white players were eligible for Springboks selection during the first round of demo 
tours) and, if anything, the ferocity of anti-apartheid demonstrations had increased as pressure 
on sport had proven to be able to force the government to implement change. With the 
increased security threat, a touring Springbok side posed it was unlikely that anyone would 
be in a hurry to extend a tour invitation.  
Furthermore, the Brisbane Code of Conduct (1982) had made touring to South Africa more 
difficult with the strengthening of the Gleneagles Agreement. In the 1970s, rugby playing 
nations had evaded the problem of touring Springboks sides attracting demonstrations by 
touring to South Africa where demonstrations did not take place. Thus, while the Springboks 
did not tour anywhere for most of the 1970s, they still played a healthy dose of test match 
rugby as their traditional rivals travelled to South Africa. While the Gleneagles Agreement in 
1977 had initially seemed to prevent Commonwealth members from playing against South 
Africa, the 1981 tour of New Zealand, whereby Muldoon had found a loophole in the 
agreement which did not force him to intervene in the tour, promoted the need to tighten up 
the agreement. This came in the form of the Brisbane Code of Conduct, which now 
practically forced Commonwealth governments to intervene in sport contact between their 
sporting bodies and South Africa. The Code also now implemented a system of punishment 
for those nations who transgressed the agreement (usually in the form of some or other 
sanction or even expulsion from the Commonwealth), something which the Gleneagles 
Agreement had initially not done. Notably both England and New Zealand abstained from 
signing the Code, and by 1984 the England rugby team toured South Africa, and in 1985 the 
NZRFU attempted to arrange a tour to South Africa. The fact that the Gleneagles Agreement 
and Brisbane Code of Conduct were now strictly enforced deprived South African rugby of 
many of its rugby ties, as a substantial number of its traditional rivals were Commonwealth 
nations.     
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For those nations who did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Gleneagles Agreement there 
was the general sporting boycott against South African sport that they needed to abide by. By 
the start of the 1980s, the boycott had altered its objectives and demanded that apartheid be 
removed from South African society before South African athletes could compete on the 
international stage again. South African Rugby had found itself somewhat helpless in the face 
of these new demands. The SARB could only influence its own sphere by removing apartheid 
from the sport – which it had done to the best of its abilities – but was in no way capable of 
removing apartheid from the rest of the South African society. Even if Johan Claassen had 
agreed with New Zealand journalists in 1981 that it was more important for Errol Tobias to 
have voting rights than to wear the Springbok jersey, there was not much that he or Craven 
could do about the matter. With the lack of genuine change in 1980s South African society, 
the government drove an increasing wedge in between South African rugby and international 
competition, a wedge which the SARB had less and less control over.  
The 1981 New Zealand tour came to be the epicentre around which questions on whether 
athletes could be held responsible for the policies of their government revolved. Those who 
supported the 1981 tour, both in New Zealand and abroad, intrinsically supported the notion 
that sport and politics should be not be allowed to overlap. However, the tour polarised 
opinions to such an extent that supporting the tour was regarded by the opponents of 
apartheid as tantamount to supporting one of the struts of white power in South Africa. In 
New Zealand, support for the tour certainly did not equate to support for apartheid, but 
merely that athletes and spectators alike should be free to partake in that which they enjoyed 
without being punished for a political problem that they could not influence. 
With the conclusion of the tour, Craven and the SARB thought they had potentially found an 
answer to solve their worries over future political interference inhibiting the Springboks. The 
tour had led to the formation of three organisations, Freedom in Sport, Stop Politics in Rugby, 
and Free Nation New Zealand, all three of which were generated due to what they perceived 
as the injustice of political interference in the 1981 tour. They had been infuriated by the way 
the tour was turned into a political matter, thereby leading to demonstrations which were 
essentially in response to a political problem. With the completion of the tour, the three 
organisations took up the mantle of trying to limit political interferences in sporting matters. 
For the SARB, these organisations were appealing as South Africa’s rugby problems were 
largely put down to the fact that they were being punished for apartheid, a problem the Board 
saw being created by politicians and which could only be solved by politicians. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
128 
 
These organisations regarded the 1981 New Zealand tour as evidence that politics had begun 
to play too large a role in rugby. Fundamentally, all three organisations regarded apartheid as 
a political problem, and therefore it was up to South Africa’s politicians to find a solution. 
They ultimately believed that sport should be free to continue as normal, particularly as 
sports such as rugby had been able to remove apartheid from the game. While these 
organisations proclaimed their function to be the removal of political intrusions into sport in 
general, all three worked closely with the SARB following the 1981 tour, as they regarded 
South African rugby to be suffering most from political involvement in sport.     
Freedom in Sport 
Speaking at a meeting with members of the SARB and other South African sporting codes, 
Freedom in Sport (FIS) founder, Tommie Campbell (a professional golfer turned politician), 
explained that what FIS did. Campbell noted that the organisation had come about due to his 
“deep frustration of reading media all over the world of what appears to be one sided only, 
and the feeling that something must be done.”321 For Campbell, the purpose of his 
organisation was clear: the media, protestors and politicians had crossed a line and were now 
encroaching on the freedoms of individuals to pursue their own sporting interests and the 
freedom to choose who to compete against.322 Speaking on the purpose of his organisation, 
Campbell went further and stated that: 
“We believe sport should be removed from the political arena, it should not be 
selected [or] subjected to selective political and moral dictates. Freedom in Sport 
means the individuals choice to play or not to play in any country and against a 
team of sporting individuals.”323 
According to Campbell and FIS, South African sport was being used as a political football by 
governments around the world who were hesitant to take any decisive steps toward apartheid. 
Numerous countries were willing to sacrifice amateur sport (professional athletes, such as 
golfers and tennis players, were to a large extent permitted to continue competing around the 
world) with South Africa but still maintained a degree of trade with the country or were 
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unwilling to implement economic sanctions which could have made real change in South 
Africa.  
Campbell used examples of Irish butter that was still imported on a large scale in South 
Africa, while the Canadians and even many of South Africa’s most strident African critics 
still served South Africa wines at their dinner tables and restaurants.324 Campbell lamented 
the selective hostility that many countries around the world seemed to be implementing 
against South Africa. Foreign governments were willing to sacrifice sporting ties with South 
Africa, as this would not cost the country in question nearly as much as it would to 
implement, for instance, a trade embargo with South Africa. These double standards by the 
politicians, which saw the demise of free and democratic sport, were for Campbell the driving 
force behind why an organisation like FIS was needed.  Campbell and his colleagues had 
seen the events building up to and during the 1981, tour as evidence that South African rugby 
(and sport in general) was being held hostage to political demands the SARB could not hope 
to have the answers for.       
While Campbell claimed that FIS represented the interests of athletes around the world, the 
organisation paid special attention to South African sport, and in particular South African 
rugby in the aftermath of the 1981 tour. South African rugby was seen by Campbell to be 
suffering the most at the hands of political interference in sport, as evidenced by the 
disastrous tour. This was a valid point made by Campbell and was echoed by Paul Dobson in 
1987 when he noted that: “sportsmen have felt disappointment because of the actions of 
politicians, but nobody has been as affected as the South Africans.”325 In order to counter the 
repercussions of the 1981 tour Campbell recommended that a “highly active and visible 
branch of FIS in South Africa” be established.326  
Campbell devised elaborate and costly plans for this branch, as well as a complex 
sponsorship system through which 200 prominent South African businesses would be asked 
to donate a minimum of R5000.00 per annum for three years, as well as donate a percentage 
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of the retail product that they manufactured.327 This did not materialise as it turned out few 
people outside of the amateur sporting establishment shared in Campbell’s costly vigour. It 
was also not possible for South African sporting bodies to sponsor FIS, as this would 
discredit the organisation as one that had been bought by South African sport to work for 
readmission on its behalf. Throughout the duration of the organisations existence funding 
remained problematic and as a result severely limited the extent to which it could promote 
South African sport. 
From its base in Dublin, the organisation turned into something of a public relations 
operation on behalf of South African rugby, trying as best it could to counter the negative 
publicity emanating from the UK, New Zealand, and Australia following the tour. The 
relationship between the SARB and FIS did not bode well for the claimed impartial stance of 
the organisation and soon began to draw the ire of anti-apartheid organisations. Nevertheless, 
these relations between FIS and the SARB continued and by 1984, the two had entered into 
an unofficial contract through which FIS and Campbell would act as an international public 
relations consultant to the SARB in an attempt to regain South Africa’s entrance into world 
rugby.328 
Campbell now essentially worked for the SARB to ensure that rugby tours came to South 
Africa. Locking down tours by Wales (1982), Australia (1983), France (1983), England 
(1984), New Zealand (1985), and the British and Irish Lions (1986) became the top priority 
for Campbell. However, of the six tours FIS worked towards only England came in 1984, 
which in truth had much more to do with the sympathetic Thatcher government and coincided 
with the first of P.W. Botha’s reforms than it had to do with Campbell correcting the negative 
image of South African rugby. Wales, Australia, France and the Lions had cancelled their 
tours due to political pressure, while the All Blacks were prevented from touring South 
Africa after a court ruled that it was not in the best interests of New Zealand rugby.  
The fact that these tours were cancelled highlighted a major problem that Campbell and the 
SARB faced. While tours could be arranged, sporting bodies ultimately required the consent 
of their country’s government before a tour could take place. After witnessing the violent 
demonstrations in New Zealand in 1981, overseas governments were even less likely to give 
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consent to their sporting bodies to engage with South African sport, predominantly over fears 
that they too would become victims of such demonstrations. By allowing the 1981 tour to 
proceed, thereby contravening the sporting boycott and the Gleneagles Agreement, New 
Zealand would face a measure of international sanctions (such as having their athletes barred 
from sporting events). This served to deter overseas governments from allowing their 
sporting bodies to play against South Africans, as they feared that they too would be 
internationally condemned if they were seen to be participating against South Africa.  
For Commonwealth nations fears over sanctions from engaging with South African sport 
were further compounded by the 1982 Brisbane Code of Conduct, which strengthened the 
Gleneagles Agreement and imposed punishment for transgressions. The fact that South 
African rugby after the 1981 tour came to be regarded as a security risk meant that foreign 
governments were unlikely to be willing to engage with South African sport. Thus, the reality 
for Campbell and for Craven remained that, regardless of how favourable international rugby 
bodies were towards South African tours, unless the government of the day took a softer line 
towards South African sport, rugby tours would be highly unlikely.329 
The 1983 International Rugby Media Congress 
Perhaps, though, the biggest problem faced by Craven was seeing past his own preconceived 
notions of what apartheid entailed. Craven saw apartheid as a set of laws that led to social and 
economic discriminatory practices and that therefore if these laws were remove, apartheid 
would be removed. He did not see removing apartheid as entailing universal franchise, 
majority rule and a new political dispensation.330 Thus, Craven believed that once the social 
laws preventing mixed-race rugby were removed, it would equate to the removal of 
apartheid, and thus rugby should be allowed to return to normal. However, the reality 
remained that the removal of laws did not remedy the disparities that existed in South African 
rugby. By 1982, the Human Science Research Council still ranked the shortage of rugby 
facilities as the second highest shortcoming amongst South Africa’s coloured and black 
sporting population.331 
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It was this imperfect grasp of what was needed in South Africa that affected Craven’s ability 
to understand the linkage between rugby and politics and why it was that rugby was being 
boycotted. However, Craven remained certain that the hostilities which existed toward South 
African rugby abroad were bred out of the fact the foreign governments and media were 
ignorant to the changes which had been implemented in South African rugby. Thus, Craven 
reasoned, if the world could be sufficiently informed of the extent to which the SARB had 
removed apartheid from rugby, governments abroad would no longer be able to justify why 
South African rugby should not return to normal. 
This reasoning led to the 1983 International Rugby Media Congress (IRMC). The Congress 
was arranged by Campbell, and was hosted by the SARB in Cape Town. Journalists and 
media personnel from around the world were invited to come to South Africa and see for 
themselves the progress that racially integrated rugby had made. The Congress was certainly 
a reflection of the anxieties of South African rugby with regard to their international future. 
Craven was known for not having a high regard for the press, and yet here he was attempting 
to win the world’s media to his side (perhaps upon the instance of Campbell).332 The negative 
publicity brought on by the 1981 tour had not subsided with the tours conclusion and 
continued to plague the SARB, threatening to scuttle any prospect of touring sides in the 
future.  
The SARB believed that the Congress could potentially save South African rugby from 
isolation as those who were propagating a misguided view of South African rugby would be 
able to come and see for themselves just how integrated the game had become.333 For Craven 
and Campbell the Congress provided the ideal chance to correct the uniformed opinions of 
the international media. Writing on the need for the Congress Craven stated that: 
“…we were prepared to face the facts as they existed in 1983 – not 1973 or 1976 
or 1979. It was obvious to us that rugby and many of the other sports played in 
our country had become the hostage of anti-South Africa policies. Added to this, 
the fact that large sections of the media were unaware of the changes that had and 
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were taking place, we decided to afford them the opportunity of seeing for 
themselves the true position.”334 
The Congress drew 55 media personnel from seventeen countries, all nations that had rugby 
links with South Africa. Campbell, who was acknowledged as “consultant and adviser to the 
SARB on the Congress”, did much of the organising. Lord Chalfont (Alun Gwynne Jones), 
British politician and international President of FIS since 1981, opened the event.335 Although 
both Campbell and Jones claimed to be participating in the Congress on their own accord, not 
as part of FIS, it is highly unlikely that their presence would not have been considered as an 
FIS initiative. Furthermore, in a newspaper article the following year, Lord Chalfont, in his 
capacity as FIS president, referred to the success of “our” conference (the IRMC).336 
Delegates at the conference were criss-crossed around South Africa in order to show them 
how integrated South African rugby had become. However, the Congress did draw criticism 
that the journalists were only shown what the SARB wanted them to see.337 Rodney Bryant 
from Television New Zealand, who turned down an invitation to attend the Congress, 
lamented the fact that those journalists who attended the Congress centred their work on 
rugby and were not intent on looking at those social issues that influenced the whole picture 
in South Africa.338 “My interest in the South African situation goes beyond how many black 
men and how many white men now kick a football together around Ellis Park on a Saturday 
and it certainly does not include attending rugby coaching clinics, an ostrich farm, boat trips, 
barbecues, golf and visits to a winery” Bryant wrote to the Editor of the Christchurch 
Press.339  
Officials of the non-white rugby fraternities that made up the SARB also addressed the 
delegates attending the Congress. This included Cutherbert Loriston (President of the 
SARFF), Dougie Dyers (SARFF selector and official), Curnick Mdyesha (President of 
SARA), and Abie Williams (Secretary of the SARFF and assistant manager on the 1981 
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Springbok Tour). Perhaps to be expected, they all painted an image of progress in South 
African rugby, took a strong stance against SACOS, and assured the attending journalists that 
South Africa could still “knock the hell out of [teams]” who toured South Africa.340 
Amongst the journalists who attended the conference, the majority gave positive feedback 
upon return to their respective countries. John Taylor, a former Welsh rugby player who had 
played in South Africa in 1968, wrote that “although in some ways apartheid is as firmly 
entrenched as ever, the attitude is changing, and sport can take much of the credit.”341  Jim 
Woodward from Australia wrote in the Sunday Telegraph (Sydney): “change was the key 
word during the Congress, and there appears to be large and refreshing doses of that 
optimistic ingredient at the sporting level – credit where credit is due.”342 
The Congress, however, received virtually as much negative press as it did positive, 
particularly resulting from the lack of rugby integration at school level which incensed 
numerous of the attending journalists. It seemed that while at senior level progress was being 
made, that lack of integration at school was simply breeding separationist attitudes among the 
players of tomorrow. Still, the organiser’s remained adamant that the Congress had been a 
success and that the SARB would reap the harvest from the seeds that the IRMC had 
planted.343  
Following the conclusion of the Congress, reports were distributed around the world in order 
to publicise the positive reactions by those who had attended the event. The booklet teemed 
with democratic speak on the rights of sportsmen. Somewhat predictably this drew ire around 
the world as it was questioned how South African sports-administrators could demand 
democratic rights for their athletes when their government denied rights to the millions of 
black inhabitants of the country. Furthermore, Craven’s comment in the booklets foreword 
that “It is not a crime to be born a South African” elicited a strong reaction from many 
quarters that it was practically a crime to be born a black South African.344 While this may be 
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an overstatement of the case, it does capture the difficult nature of the IRMC campaign. By 
requesting that sport be treated on a democratic basis it seemed to the outside world that the 
interest of South African sportsmen were being placed above the interests of millions of 
degraded blacks who were stripped of any democratic rights.  
The Congress was meant to show world media how integrated South African rugby had 
become. It was hoped by Craven and co that the media would leave the Congress and would 
correct the misguided hostilities that existed toward South African rugby in the outside world, 
thereby laying the foundations for readmission to international rugby. However, trying to 
show the world that apartheid was removed in rugby had become out-dated. The outside 
world was no longer willing to accept apartheid-free and merit selected teams while the rest 
of the society was still governed along racial lines. Ultimately, the IRMC did not yield the 
results that either Campbell or the SARB had wanted. As Paul Dobson noted about the 
Congress, “the rewards were well hidden if they existed at all.”345  
Dobson’s comment should be extended to the SARB’s partnership with Freedom in Sport. 
The organisation yielded little benefit to the SARB and by the end of the three-year contract 
between the Board and Campbell, neither he nor his organisation had been able to change the 
fortunes of South African rugby. By 1985 Campbell was still scrambling to set up an 
‘international media division’ in South Africa meant to rectify the lack of reward for the 
progress made in South African rugby – which had been the whole reason behind hosting the 
IRMC.346  Over the duration of its involvement with the SARB, FIS had attracted equal 
measures of negative and positive publicity. The initiatives set up by Campbell and FIS came 
to be seen as being ignorant to the struggle of black South Africans as the FIS campaigns 
attempted to circumvent a boycott that ultimately sought to remove apartheid. While these 
initiatives may have had more successful in the 1970s when multiracial sport was the 
objective of the sporting boycott, by the 1980s most of the world had accepted that apartheid 
needed to be fought through any means possible, including sport. 
By 1986 the relationship between the Board and FIS had somewhat petered out. Ultimately, 
until South Africa made radical changes to its political landscape, there was little that 
Campbell and his organisation could hope to achieve by way of offsetting South African 
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rugby’s isolation. The onset of isolation following the 1981 tour could only be solved if the 
greater political situation in South Africa was solved, something which Craven and the SARB 
were late to react to, and something which Campbell did not seem to grasp.  
Freedom in Sport was formed out of Campbell’s concern that the politically motivated 
protests that disrupted the Springboks’ tour of New Zealand and the USA were a sign that 
politics were becoming too entrenched in sport. Campbell likely emulated what many sports 
administrators around the world felt at the time, that sport and politics should be kept 
separate. However, the reality was that in South Africa, sport and politics were intertwined – 
one only had to look at the disparities between the distribution of sporting facilities to white 
and black athletes to see how white privileges were extended to sport. Thus, there could not 
be normality in sport until there was normality in South African society as a whole.  
However, Craven and Campbell were naïve in this respect, as they believed that the removal 
of apartheid laws would mean that there was equality in sport. Freedom in Sport and the 
International Rugby Media Congress were initiatives pursued by the SARB in order to offset 
any repercussions that could come about because of the 1981 tour. Clearly, Craven felt that 
the 1981 tour had been of enough significance that the SARB would need additional aid in 
trying to prevent isolation. However, trying to market South African rugby as non-racial 
could not have the desired effect of preventing rugby isolation purely because true non-racial 
rugby was no longer regarded as being able to exist in a society where everything else was 
stratified along racial lines.     
Stop Politics in Rugby and Free Nation New Zealand 
Campbell’s Freedom in Sport was not the only organisation of the sort to develop because of 
the tour, as within New Zealand several such bodies emerged around 1981. Much like the 
way HART acted as an umbrella organisation for numerous anti-tour groups, Stop Politics in 
Sport (SPIR) acted to form a unified front in favour of the tour when it became apparent that 
the tour was under threat from anti-tour groups. The organisation consisted predominantly of 
New Zealand based rugby administrators, coaches, and former rugby players. SPIR was 
meant to be a resistance movement to the likes of HART, but had relatively little success in 
mobilising support the way HART had done during the tour. Ultimately, SPIR had little 
impact and the tour and mainly sought to publish pro-tour material in the few remaining New 
Zealand newspapers that were not against the tour.    
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In the months following the tour’s conclusion, SPIR aligned itself with Tommie Campbell’s 
newly formed Freedom in Sport movement. While SPIR continued to exist, it sprouted a new 
branch called Free Nation New Zealand, or FRENZ, which labelled itself as the New Zealand 
office of Freedom in Sport. 347 Writing to Ces Blazey, NZRFU Chairman, in 1982 FRENZ 
Chairperson, Yvonne Wilcox, stated that organisations such as FRENZ and FIS had been 
products of the 1981 tour and the “stifling of freedoms of sports people.”348 For FRENZ and 
SPIR, the events during the 1981 tour had eroded the rights of spectators and participants 
alike, which needed to be prevented from taking place during future sporting events.  
FRENZ came to regard its purpose as “upholding the right of the individual to have freedom 
of choice about where a person wishes to pursue a sporting interest, and against whom and to 
promote non-political and non-racial sport worldwide.”349 As was outline earlier, the 1981 
tour came to be the crux around which questions on whether sport and politics could be seen 
a separate revolved. For those who opposed the tour, South African sport and apartheid were 
inextricably linked, making the Springboks a representative side of a racist regime and should 
therefore be boycotted to achieve the greater goal of eradicating apartheid. However, those 
who supported the tour believed that sport and politics did not, or should not, overlap and that 
therefore if rugby in South Africa had removed the apartheid laws from the game it should be 
allowed to continue as normal. As an affiliate of the Freedom in Sport ideology FRENZ 
firmly maintained that apartheid was a political problem that should not intervene in sport.350   
As with FIS, FRENZ assumed a close working with the SARB and within a month of the 
conclusion of the tour had written to the Board outlining its campaign for 1982 and onwards. 
Their campaign sought to educate New Zealanders, particularly the youth, on the potential of 
maintaining contact with South Africa, both sporting wise and economic related.351 
Furthermore, it sought to “breakdown the defensive barriers which governments and people 
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set up when one mentions South Africa” and was “determine to play its part in the 
strengthening of [New Zealand] ties with South Africa.”352  
However, FRENZ fell into the same trap as FIS with regard to attempting grandiose and 
elaborate plans that proved difficult to implement with limited funding available. On top of 
this, creating a pro-South Africa rugby attitude in New Zealand so soon after the tour would 
be no easy task. FRENZ would have to vie against the New Zealand based anti-tour/apartheid 
organisations which were supported by the New Zealand media (not to mention liberal 
governments around the world, NGO’s, human rights groups, the UN and most of Africa) 
which gave substantial publicity to anti-apartheid campaigns set on bringing about the 
isolation of South Africa.353 Perhaps an irony of the matter was that FRENZ consisted largely 
of rugby administrators and former players who were pro-tour, yet one of the largest areas to 
suffer from the tour was New Zealand rugby. The Springbok tour had badly damaged the 
image of rugby in New Zealand, leading some to speculate that within a few years, rugby 
would no longer be the celebrated sport in New Zealand it once was. 
In the years following the 1981 tour, in an attempt to foster a favourable attitude toward 
South Africa in New Zealand, both SPIR and FRENZ became patently pro-South African, 
insisting that those who refused to compete with it were discriminating against South African 
rugby. The organisations adopted a somewhat unusual line of argumentation as they sighted 
statistics by Freedom House (an American human rights organisation) that only 19% of the 
world’s population enjoyed full human rights, and thus argued that South Africa (and by 
extension South African sport) should not be singled out for what it was doing to the black 
population.354 In writing to the England Rugby Football Union in 1984, SPIR chairperson, 
Elizabeth Sutherland, contended that: 
“What is abnormal about South African society? That her black people have 
overall, the highest standard of housing, education and welfare on the African 
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continent; that her black people live in relative peace with at least some degree of 
legal protection and franchise.”355  
Statements like these gave SPIR, and by extension FRENZ, a reputation for being somewhat 
politically conservative. The above extract seems to be suggesting that the disenfranchised 
South African blacks were relatively well off in comparison to the rest of Africa. Essentially, 
what FRENZ was propagating was that basic amenities outweighed human rights. This was 
similar to a plan the South African government came up with in the latter half of the 1980s, 
whereby they attempted to undercut the revolutionary tide developing in the townships by 
offering blacks better social conditions.356 As one SADF general put it, “if you want their 
support you can buy it.”357  
In addition to this, FRENZ regularly publicly criticised one of apartheid’s most vocal 
opponents, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which it regarded as grossly 
hypocritical and one of the primary propagandists against South Africa. The regular public 
condemnation by FRENZ of the AOU earned criticism from then New Zealand Prime 
Minister, Robert Muldoon, who himself had come under significant pressure from the OAU 
(many of the OAU members were also Commonwealth members) after the tour over New 
Zealand’s future sporting contact with South Africa.358 
Between FRENZ and SPIR, numerous fact-finding missions to South Africa were 
orchestrated and in 1983, they attempted to recruit New Zealand journalists to attend the 
International Rugby Media Congress. In 1982, members of SPIR and FRENZ undertook a 
joint venture as they travelled to South Africa on a fact-finding mission. Upon their return, 
they insisted that there existed no case for denying South Africa its rightful place in world 
sport.359 Both organisations made claims that South African sport needed to see that there 
was some reward in continuing to foster non-racial sport or else initiatives to further integrate 
sport, and by extension society, would stultify. The organisations thus reasoned that the post-
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1981 isolation that South African sport faced would undermine the progress made in racially 
integrated sport. Writing to Robert Muldoon on the proposed 1985 All Black tour of South 
Africa, FRENZ urged him that not touring the Republic would set back racial integration by 
20 years.360   
Perhaps though, the biggest problem faced by SPIR and FRENZ was their lack of capital, 
something that hampered both organisations throughout the 1980s. The two organisations had 
sought to capitalise on the rifts left by the tour in New Zealand and had assumed that they 
could guarantee support from at least the half of New Zealand that had supported the tour. 
While there may have been significant support in New Zealand for the separation of sport and 
politics, SPIR and FRENZ soon found out what their Freedom in Sport compatriots had 
learnt early on: that moral support for a cause did not translate into funding. Norman 
McKenzie, FRENZ Chairman in 1984, regularly wrote to Craven and Steve Strydom 
(President of the Orange Free State Rugby Union and SARB executive) requesting funding 
from a South African benefactor, particularly as the proposed 1985 All Black tour of South 
Africa drew nearer. In the past, it had been difficult for the pro-tour administrators to devote 
significant time to their cause as they all worked full time jobs, making their SPIR/FRENZ 
activities part-time endeavours.  
The fact that McKenzie could not find a financial sponsor in New Zealand for their cause also 
seems to demonstrate that perhaps, following the 1981 tour, supporting a pro-South Africa 
initiative in New Zealand was frowned upon. It seemed that McKenzie had overestimated the 
extent to which pro-tour sentiments had survived in New Zealand. Thus, McKenzie was left 
with few alternatives but to request funding from South Africa. As South Africa in the 1980s 
had perhaps a greater stake in maintaining rugby ties with New Zealand than vice-versa, there 
was a greater chance of finding a benefactor in South Africa. McKenzie requested that the 
SARB assist him in finding South African businesses to sponsor FRENZ to the tune of 
NZ$100,000 or more in order to launch an extensive pro-tour campaign.361 However, no such 
sponsorship materialised and consequently very limited work towards the 1985 tour could be 
done by SPIR and FRENZ. Without the necessary funding, it seemed unlikely that neither 
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SPIR or FRENZ could present a significant front against the mounting anti-tour campaign in 
New Zealand. 
Ultimately, the relationship between SPIR/FRENZ and the SARB yielded little fruit. As with 
FIS, the two New Zealand organisations could not bring about much change in the fortunes of 
the SARB. All three organisations set out relatively elaborate plans to set up office from 
which they would orchestrate pro-South African campaigns. Instead, they mostly ended up 
waging ‘tabloid-style’ battles in the media against those they perceived to be undermining 
sporting freedom, or acted as public relations campaigns on behalf of the SARB. 
Realistically, neither of these organisations could have hoped to achieve much success. They 
represented a comparatively small interest group: mostly radical or naïve sportsmen and 
organisations who could not grasp the concept that sport and society in South Africa were 
interlinked. Sport could not take place in a vacuum and was therefore as much influenced by 
the prevailing social and political conditions as any other facet of society. Ultimately, FIS, 
SPIR, and FRENZ were swimming against the current that much of the world was beginning 
to advocate in the 1980s: that apartheid must be fought through any means possible, 
including on sporting grounds. Much as all three organisations attempted to assert themselves 
as credible, they were coming up against an anti-apartheid movement that was much stronger 
than they seemed to realise.  
Furthermore, these organisations operated predominantly between 1982 and 1985, which, as 
was illustrated earlier, coincides with a period of (perceived) positive transformation in South 
Africa (the tri-cameral parliament; Nkomati Accord; Botha’s reforms). Thus, any measure of 
success achieved by these organisations could likely be put down to the slightly more 
optimistic image emanating from South Africa during this period. It also became apparent 
that any negative incident coming from South Africa could undo any forward momentum 
gained by these organisations. An example of this was when in 1987, a single black 
schoolboy was refused entry to a school athletics event, resulting in major international 
criticism.362 Although 1987 was somewhat past the period during which the SARB was 
involved with these organisations, the incident does illustrate how a single event could lead to 
an international outcry against South Africa.  
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These organisations were also not immune to the politics of their own countries. Possibly the 
biggest blow delivered to the work of SPIR and FRENZ was the change in New Zealand 
government when the Nationalist Muldoon lost the 1984 national election to David Lang of 
the Labour Party. Traditionally, the National Party had refused to intervene in sporting affairs 
(such as by allowing the All Blacks to tour South Africa in 1970, 1976, and the refusing to 
intervene in the 1981 tour) which was good for organisations like FRENZ and SPIR. The 
Labour Party was, however, more willing to intervene in sport if it felt that a political matter 
was at stake (as it did when it refused to send the All Blacks to South Africa in 1973 due to 
apartheid). The Labour Party had been vociferously anti-tour in 1981 and had seen the tour as 
driving the country to the verge of anarchy.363 In an attempt to combat the tour, the party had 
even made some of their facilities available to HART from which to organise their national 
anti-tour campaign. With the Labour Party at the helm, it seemed likely that the All Blacks 
and the Springboks would not be seeing much of one-another, regardless of any work done 
by SPIR and FRENZ.    
The support by the SARB for all three these organisations illustrates the growing anxieties by 
the Board. It seemed Craven no longer felt comfortable relying purely on his friends in the 
IRB to help with touring, as had been the case in the 1960s and 1970s. His involvement with 
FRENZ, SPIR, and FIS and the hosting of the IRMC seems to illustrate that Craven felt that 
the post-1981 rugby world needed some additional enticing to retain ties with the SARB. 
Craven could not see it at the time, but the SARB’s involvement with these organisations 
likely did the Board’s reputation even further harm. SPIR, FRENZ, and FIS came to be seen 
as propagandists of South African rugby, working on behalf of the SARB. The Board’s 
involvement with these organisations only reinforced the notion that Craven’s Springboks 
would attempt to tour at all costs (Craven was also quoted on numerous occasions as saying 
that they would do it all again in reference to the 1981 tour). The Board’s involvements with 
these organisations exposed the SARB to be desperate for tours. The SARB came to be 
regarded as willing to use underhand methods to ensure tours took place, a notion that was 
reinforced in later years by the 1986 Cavaliers tour and the 1987 South Sea Barbarians tours, 
which will be discussed  at a later stage.  
Freedom in Sport, Stop Politics in Rugby, and Free Nation New Zealand were all products of 
the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand. Those who formed the organisations had been 
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supporters of the tour and abhorred the fact that apartheid, a political matter that had been 
removed from South African rugby, was the motive behind the disruptions during the tour. In 
essence, all three organisations came into existences due to their common desire of 
preventing a similar tour from taking place. While these organisations were not pro-apartheid, 
they certainly were pro-South African rugby and believed that the South African rugby 
players were being discriminated against by being isolated for what was fundamentally a 
political problem. This ideology made these organisations appealing to the SARB in the 
aftermath of the 1981 tour, as it seemed the Board had some inclination that the tour would 
have repercussions.  
Essentially these organisations projected themselves as the watchdogs of sportsmen’s rights; 
rights that they believed were being eroded by political interference in sporting matters. 
While these organisations centred their campaigns on the fact that the SARB had removed 
apartheid from rugby, they seemed unable to grasp the fact that in a racially stratified society 
like South Africa sport could not be equal until the social conditions from which participants 
came were equal. The fact that these organisations came to be seen as swimming against the 
current of boycotting apartheid made them seem somewhat conservative, and thus their 
relationship with the SARB was deemed further evidence that the SARB was not willing to 
reject apartheid.  
“Without the All Blacks, it’s just not rugby”: The 1985 All Black Tour 
The future of South African rugby was uncertain following the 1981 tour. It had looked like 
the 1980s would bring some relief to the relative rugby isolation of the 1970s, but the 1981 
tour proved that this would not be so easy to accomplish while South Africa remained a 
highly stratified society. With the conclusion of the 1981 tour Craven speculated that it could 
have been the Springboks’ last tour of New Zealand, but did not rule out the possibility of 
future All Black teams touring South Africa.364 Craven still had friends in the IRB, which he 
hoped would serve to help in bringing teams to South Africa. However, Craven could not 
have known that not only would New Zealand desert South Africa in the 1980s, but so too the 
rest of world rugby. The international castigation of New Zealand following the tour was 
enough to put any country off from inviting the Springboks to tour. The international 
audience had been given a healthy dose of the sort of mayhem sporting contact with South 
Africa could attract. In the eyes of international governments, a touring Springbok side now 
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became an “economic and symbolic liability” and policing costs alone became prohibitive, 
resulted in the cancelation of some series altogether.365 As with the 1981 tour where 
“violence burst uncontrollably from the space-and-time frame of the game”, it seemed that 
the Springboks would no longer be able to tour abroad without attracting potentially violent 
anti-apartheid demonstrations.366 The sight of the rifts carved into New Zealand society by 
the 1981 tour gave rise to the notion that no further tours could be mounted safely, 
contributing significantly to South African rugby’s post-1981 isolation.367  
Although the 1981 tour was not the first ‘demo’ tour, it was certainly the tour with the most 
lasting repercussions. In 1969/70, the Springboks had toured the UK on what was the first 
demonstration riddled tour, followed by a tour of Australia in 1971 during which much of the 
same happened. However, despite the events during these tours, the Springboks were still 
very much part of the international rugby scene. Although for the duration of the 1970s the 
Springboks only went on two outbound tours (Australia in 1971 and South America in 1980), 
between 1971 and 1981 the Springboks played no less than eleven touring sides (which was 
still less than during the pre-boycott era but certainly did not suggest that South African 
rugby was isolated). These tours included the likes of traditional rivals the British and Irish 
Lions (1974, 1980), New Zealand (1976), England (1972), France (1971, 1975, 1980), Italy 
(1973), and Ireland (1981). However, between the conclusion of the 1981 tour and 1991, the 
Springboks played four touring teams, three of which were ‘rebel tours’ (the South American 
Jaguars, New Zealand Cavaliers, and South Sea Barbarians). Rebel tours became a feature of 
South African sport in the mid-1980s whereby international teams, usually under a different 
name, continued to tour the Republic despite the sporting boycott and despite the disapproval 
of their governments. In the case of the rugby rebel tours, the teams travelled to South Africa 
without the consent from the IRB or their own unions. 
By the end of the 1981 tour, it appeared unlikely that a South African rugby team would ever 
set foot on New Zealand soil again. Thus, if the two teams wished to continue playing each 
other it would have to be in South Africa in the safety of the white suburbs and cities. The 
1981 tour had barely concluded when the first mention was made of the possibility of the All 
Blacks touring South Africa in 1985. With the 1981 tour still fresh in the memory, many New 
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Zealanders (and likely a fair few South Africans too) could scarcely believe that after the 
divisiveness caused by the tour, a follow-up tour was already being contemplated. Such a tour 
seemed even more extraordinary when considering that in the same year it was first 
mentioned, 1982, the Brisbane Code of Conduct had been implement to strengthen the 
Gleneagles Agreement, making it even more difficult for Commonwealth nations to justify 
sporting contact with South Africa. However, as 1985 drew nearer it seemed that the NZRFU 
would indeed attempt to arrange an All Black tour to South Africa. 
However, the tour would be reliant on whether the England RFU followed through on their 
decision to tour South Africa in 1984. Recognising that if England toured in 1984 it would 
make justification for the All Blacks touring in 1985 much simpler, both pro- and anti-tour 
bodies leaped into action. FIS, SPIR, FRENZ, former All Blacks, the SARB and the NZRFU 
all wrote to the England RFU, conservative British politicians, and even Margret Thatcher in 
an effort to ensure that the tour went ahead. On the other end of the scale SANROC and 
numerous black African nations made it clear that they had the potential to muster enough 
votes to have England expelled from the Commonwealth and Olympic Games if the tour 
proceeded. Potentially problematic for England too was that following the strengthening of 
the Gleneagles Agreement in 1982 England could be expelled from the Commonwealth for 
not doing everything possible to prevent sporting contact with South Africa.368 Despite the 
criticism and numerous threats of repercussions, the England RFU stuck to their guns, 
arguing that their duty was to rugby players and not politicians. Consequently, in 1984 the 
England national rugby team returned to South Africa after a 12-year absence.  
The England tour came and went in South Africa without causing much of a stir. The tour 
consisted of two tests and five regular matches, with the Springboks claiming victory in both 
tests. The tour temporarily quenched the thirst of South Africans for top-flight international 
rugby, but it was hoped that it had also laid the groundwork for a tour by the team South 
Africans truly wanted to see, the All Blacks. It seemed likely that the All Blacks would go to 
South Africa as the NZRFU started making the necessary arrangements. However, it was not 
long before the wounds of 1981 began to open up in New Zealand. 
The 1981 tour had left rifts in New Zealand society which could prove an unsurpassable 
barrier to the tour proceeding. The 1981 anti-tour campaign had been the largest civil 
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disobedience campaign in New Zealand history and police reports suggested that things 
would pick up where they left off should the 1985 tour go ahead, something that even SPIR 
and FRENZ conceded as a possibility.369 The 1981 tour had placed intolerable strain on New 
Zealand society and, according to The New Zealand Herald, had left the country with racial, 
social, and economic problems.370  
These problems included the heightening of racial tensions (on top of tensions caused by 
Maori land claims in the 1970s and 1980s) as those who had supported the tour were 
considered supporters of the white supremacy regime in South Africa. Furthermore, those 
who opposed the tour labelled the Nationalist government (which had traditionally been a 
focus for racist sentiments in New Zealand) as an apartheid sympathiser for its unwillingness 
to intervene in the tour.371 While in office, Muldoon’s willingness to stir up anti-Maori 
feeling for electoral purposes placed even further strain on New Zealand’s purported 
egalitarian society.372 With the conclusion of the 1981 tour, New Zealand was left with a 
bitterly divided society: those who supported the tour were regarded as supporters of the 
white South African regime, while those who opposed the tour were labelled as anti-rugby, 
communist troublemakers who had disrupted the tour for their own nefarious ends.  
Economically, New Zealand was saddled with a hefty bill for the tour that covered property 
damage during riots, overtime payments to police, as well as the logistical costs incurred by 
the military support provided to the police. Speaking to the Dominion in 1984 on the potential 
1985 tour, Ann Hercus, New Zealand Minister of Police, lamented that “the cost is too high – 
and I am not talking about the millions of dollars such a tour would again cost the 
taxpayers.”373 The social problems faced by New Zealanders following the 1981 tour were 
still very much part of their society by the time the 1985 tour question came about. The social 
divisions cast by the 1981 tour combined with what the Auckland Star regarded as “New 
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Zealand’s own simmer racial tensions” led to the concerns that anti-tour protests could once 
again become superheated.374  
The 1981 tour had left a legacy of animosity in New Zealand, as there was mistrust towards 
the police and government, as well as within communities split over the tour matter. The New 
Zealand Minister of Police attributed violence and unrest towards police in the build-up to the 
1985 tour to the antagonism that still existed toward police following the 1981 tour 
violence.375 With the conclusion of the 1981 tour numerous police officers had resigned and 
it seemed that the 1985 tour would see the same take place as numerous threats of resignation 
by police were reported even before the tour was set to happen.376 “Another tour would be 
too high in human and social terms,” wrote Bob Moodie, Secretary of the Police Association, 
in the Auckland Star in December 1984.377 The tour had also defined clear lines within New 
Zealand politics regarding contact with the Springboks. The ruling National Party had proved 
to be less willing to take definitive steps to intervene in sporting matters than the Labour 
Party. With an election to be held the year before the tour, there was considerable uncertainty 
with regard to which side the government would come down on should the NZRFU accept 
the invitation to tour South Africa.   
While pro-tour organisations like SPIR and FRENZ were still scrambling for funds and 
supporters to mount a pro-tour offensive, HART already had a significant following and 
infrastructure in place (dating back to the 1981 tour) from which to run their ‘Stop the 85 
Tour’ campaign. The pro-tour faction was dealt an early blow when in 1984 the Auckland 
Rugby Union (ARU), New Zealand’s largest rugby union and one that had been an adamant 
supporter of the 1981 tour, announced that it would not support the 1985 tour. The decision 
provoked debate within New Zealand rugby quarters regarding the tour, as it appeared that 
there would not be the unanimous support for the 1985 tour as there had been for the 1981 
tour. Shortly after the ARU’s decision, the unions of North Harbour, Poverty Bay, Otago, 
Taranaki, and Waikato announced their opposition to the tour, meaning a substantial portion 
of New Zealand rugby did not support the tour. Their reasons for opposing the tour were 
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mostly the same. The 1981 tour had exacerbated an already marked decline in rugby 
popularity in New Zealand. If the 1985 tour took place with similar events as in 1981, the 
sport would likely not recover. John McDougall, a former advisor to the NZRFU believed 
that the controversy around South African tours endangered the game of rugby and that rugby 
administrators were so wound up in serving the game that they could not see the damage a 
trip to South Africa would cause.378  There had been substantial losses in young players and 
coaches following the 1981 tour and those unions who opposed the tour feared further losses 
would take place should the 1985 tour go ahead. These fears were also outlined in the ARU’s 
formal statement regarding their opposition to the tour: 
“We believe that if the tour proceeds we will see a trend which emerged during 
1981 of a falloff in support from parents and teachers, and therefore a consequent 
falloff in boys playing rugby. Since 1981 active support has remained at earlier 
levels. For too long rugby administrators have taken the traditionally complacent 
view that rugby will always remain the pre-eminent sport. This can no longer be 
assumed.”379 
Therefore, if the tour proceeded it would harm the objective of rugby unions to promote the 
game in New Zealand and therefore they could not support it, the ARU told The New Zealand 
Herald.380 Already there were threats from secondary schools around New Zealand that they 
would scrap the game, while numerous coaches showed their intent to boycott rugby should 
the 1985 tour proceed.381 It would be hard to conceive that New Zealand would benefit from 
thirty All Blacks rugby around South African fields, particularly after the problems 1981 had 
brought for the country both internationally and domestically.  
The prospect of the tour also drew criticism from other quarters, particularly from New 
Zealand’s other sporting codes. Following the 1981 tour New Zealand athletes across all 
disciplines had found themselves to be virtually as reviled internationally as their South 
African counterparts. New Zealand athletes were punished as their government was regarded 
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as a supporter of apartheid by allowing the Springboks to tour in 1981. Various attempts were 
made to have New Zealand athletes expelled from the 1982 Commonwealth Games and the 
1984 Olympic Games. Although this did not take place, it was not farfetched to conceive that 
if the 1985 tour went ahead New Zealand sportsmen could well find themselves on the wrong 
end of a sporting boycott. There had already been murmurs from African nations that they 
would boycott the 1990 Commonwealth Games in Auckland should the 1985 tour go 
ahead.382  
Writing to Danie Craven in early 1985, Norman McKenzie informed him that polls revealed 
that 42% of New Zealanders were against the tour.383 However, according to McKenzie (the 
source of this information is unclear, but it is unlikely that such a source existed) at least half 
of these people did so out of fear (of a 1981 repeat), while only 20% of the total opposition 
did so for political reasons and where mostly anti-rugby more than anything.384 It seemed 
though that fear was probable cause enough to oppose the tour, as even FRENZ chairperson, 
Yvonne Wilcox, resigned from the organisation because she could not tolerate a repeat of the 
death threats and harassment she had faced in 1981 while working for SPIR.385 The statistics 
presented by McKenzie meant little and were likely something he had pulled out of a hat in 
order to convince Craven that there was not significant opposition in New Zealand to the 
tour. McKenzie was most likely trying to convince Craven that if FRENZ acted now, in 
essence received funding, the majority of New Zealanders could still be won over onto the 
side of the tour.386 
However, there seemed to be a significant change in the attitude among New Zealanders 
toward the prospects of the tour. This must be put down to their experience of the 1981 tour. 
The opposition to the tour from rugby quarters was something unheard of and likely lead to 
speculation among New Zealanders that if rugby unions were opposing the tour it would most 
likely be wise not to tour. The election of the Labour Party to office in the 1984 could also be 
indicative of widespread opposition to the tour. While there is little evidence to suggest that 
1985 tour was used as an election topic by the Labour Party, the New Zealand electorate 
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could not have failed to recognise that the Labour Party had traditionally opposed sporting 
contact with South Africa and had already once before (in 1973) forced the NZRFU to call 
off a tour to South Africa.  In his capacity as Foreign Affairs Minister under the old guard, 
new Prime Minister, David Lange, had seen to it the New Zealand co-sponsored a United 
Nations resolution on international action against apartheid, which would “leave no-one in 
any doubt about New Zealand’s rejection of racism.”387 Speaking to a New Zealand 
newspaper, Lange contended that: “Our resolution condemns apartheid and the repression 
inside South Africa and attacks on neighbouring countries which aim to keep apartheid in 
place.”388 Shortly after coming to office, Lange announced that he was determined to sever 
all diplomatic ties with South Africa.389 Lange made it public that he believed that should the 
NZRFU reject the invitation to tour South Africa it would kick away one of the struts of 
apartheid.390  
However, the new Labour government did not go to the frightening lengths expected by SPIR 
and FRENZ to intervene in the tour. While touring New Zealand on a campaign to encourage 
stopping the 1985 tour, General Joseph Garba, Chairman of the United Nations Special 
Committee against Apartheid, said that while there were encouraging signs, the New Zealand 
government could do a little more to prevent the tour than it was currently doing.391 In a 
meeting between the Prime Minister Lange and Ces Blazey of the NZRFU, Lange requested 
that the NZRFU not send the All Blacks to South Africa in 1985, but that if they did except 
the SARB’s invitation the government could not stop the tour. This was virtually the same 
message the Nationalist Muldoon had given Blazey in 1981, leaving much to be desired from 
the vaunted ‘anti-tour’ Labour government in 1985. 
For much of 1985 then, it looked like the tour would take place. Neither HART nor the 
Labour government had been able to persuade the NZRFU to decline the invitation form the 
SARB. Even following a warning by Oliver Thambo, President of the ANC, that New 
Zealand rugby authorities would bear responsibility for the “adverse consequences” if the 
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tour went ahead, seemingly hinting that the tour would be disrupted, the NZRFU continued 
with their plans to tour South Africa.392 Despite the fact that the United Democratic Front, an 
anti-apartheid umbrella organisation in South Africa, had written to Ces Blazey informing 
him that they intended to disrupt the tour, the NZRFU decided to send the All Black to South 
Africa in mid-1985.393  
The tour was conducted under the auspices that rugby should be free from political 
intervention, but at the same time, that contact with South African rugby would build bridges 
for further racial integration as receiving tours would be an incentive for South Africa to 
continue integrating. However, at the last minute the tour was prevented from taking place. 
Two rugby-playing Auckland lawyers had lodged an appeal in the High Court against the 
NZRFU’s decision to send the All Blacks to South Africa. They argued that by touring, the 
NZRFU would be acting outside of their constitutive rules that require it to promote, foster 
and benefit the game of rugby in New Zealand.394 The court issued an injunction against the 
NZRFU to stop the tour only two days before the All Blacks were set to depart for South 
Africa. Speaking in court the presiding judge noted that: 
“In its bearing on the image, standing, and future of rugby as a national sport the 
tour decision is probably at least as important, if not more important than any 
other in the history of the game in New Zealand.”395 
While the court proceedings are not available in South Africa for inspection, it is probable to 
conceive that the lawyers sighted the earlier mention evidence of the 1981 induced decline in 
rugby popularity in New Zealand as evidence for why the 1985 tour should not take place. In 
the build up to the 1985 tour, there were already signs that rugby in New Zealand would 
suffer because of it.396 Thus, it is highly likely that parallels were drawn between the drop off 
in rugby popularity following the 1981 tour (which certainly had not promoted, fostered, or 
benefitted the game) and the likelihood that the same would occur if the 1985 tour proceeded.  
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The tour cancelation was likely one of the biggest blows dealt to South African rugby in the 
sporting boycott era. Bitter as the disappointment was of Wales, France, and the British and 
Irish Lions cancelling tours, it was incomparable to the disappointment of white South Africa 
when news broke that the All Blacks would not tour. Craven recalled that he had witnessed 
grown men openly cry when the news broke of the cancelation, such was the disappointment 
for white South Africa.397 The tour would have been a chance to prove not only to world 
rugby, but also to itself that South African rugby should still be taken seriously and that they 
could still contend with the best in the world.  
White South Africans, and particularly Craven, felt that they had deserved the tour. The tour 
was seen in South Africa as reward for the hard work put in by the SARB to deracialize the 
game. Craven had hosted hundreds of clinics, which had breathed life into the game in 
underprivileged communities around South Africa, while the selection of two black 
Springboks, Errol Tobias and Avril Williams, to play against England had suggested to the 
world that rugby was continuing its racial integration. In his capacity as a rugby-man, there 
was not much more that Craven could do to facilitate tours for South African rugby. The 
ripples of the 1981 tour had caught up with the SARB and with South Africa entering an 
increasingly turbulent time politically, it seemed unlikely that much international rugby 
would be taking place for the foreseeable future.   
It is safe to say that 1985 was a difficult year for white South Africans. The much-lauded 
Botha reforms, which had brought a measure of relief from international pressure, had been 
shown to be a sham, resulting in the clamming up of international sympathies. Even South 
Africa’s two international protectors, Thatcher and Reagan, were having an increasingly 
difficult time justifying their softer line towards the Republic when the government was 
giving them little ammunition to use. Furthermore, the townships had been plunged into 
violent rebellion under the ANC’s civil disobedience campaign, which was threatening to 
culminate in all-out civil war. With the cancelation of the All Black tour, one of the few 
things that provided white South Africans with a fleeting escape from the social and political 
upheavals their country was facing was removed. In his autobiography, former Transvaal 
RFU and SARFU Chairman, Louis Luyt, writes that the cancelling of tours “was one area 
where you could really hurt many privileged white South Africans who were still reasonably 
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comfortable despite economic sanctions.”398 While David Lange’s comment that the tour’s 
cancelation would kick away one of the struts of apartheid was perhaps an exaggeration, the 
cancelation certainly did add to the increasing despair felt by many white South Africans 
toward the prevailing political dispensation. David Black and John Nauright have noted that 
the 1981 tour and its aftermath fuelled a deepening sense of cultural isolation, which, over 
time, eroded white South Africa’s resolve to resist political changes.399 The 1985 tour 
cancelation, on top of cancelations by Australia, France, and Wales, certainly could not have 
failed to fuel the speculation that rugby isolation would be the future while South Africa 
remained a racially stratified society. 
With the 1985 tour being called off, the Springboks embarked on a consolation tour around 
South Africa, something many believed even further devalued the already low Springbok 
jersey. The Springboks played some of the stronger provincial sides, as well as the South 
African Barbarians, for which they received test caps. With international tours becoming 
scarce, increasing value was placed on South Africa’s domestic contests, particularly the 
Currie Cup. The Currie Cup entailed the SARB’s largest rugby unions playing one-another. 
Traditional rivalries such as Northern Transvaal versus Western Province essentially took on 
the importance of the absent test match rugby. Craven, perhaps trying to put on a brave face 
for the public, was adamant that the quality of the domestic competition would keep South 
African rugby competitive with the likes of the best around the world.400 However, this was a 
pipedream: the sport had already deteriorated because of the lack of regular and rigorous 
international competition and would continue to do so until it made a full return to the 
international arena. The semi-isolation of the 1970s had been replaced by the full onset of 
isolation in the 1980s. It would be fanciful at best to assume that under its current situation 
South African rugby would be able to match the quality of top-flight international rugby. 
The cancelation of 1985 tour was perhaps the first time that the SARB truly felt the 
ramifications of the 1981 tour. The 1981 tour had played a large part on turning New 
Zealanders against the 1985 tour and had most likely been integral in the court case that had 
ultimately led to the cancelation of the tour. For white South Africans, the cancelation was 
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calamitous and, as David Black and John Nauright point out, likely weakened their resolve to 
resist future political changes as the cancelation only further played on the anxieties of being 
isolated. For rugby, the cancelation had repercussions as the continued lack of exposure to 
top-flight international rugby limited the extent to which South African rugby could develop 
and improve. Ultimately then, the 1985 tour cancelation heralded the onset of South Africa’s 
rugby isolation. To a significant extent, this isolation could be put down to the ripples caused 
by the 1981 tour.      
The Birth of the Rebel Tours: The 1986 Cavaliers Tour of South Africa 
It was under these difficult circumstances that the 1986 Cavaliers tour of South Africa took 
place. To the outside world, the team touring South Africa was known as the Cavaliers, but to 
South Africans they were known simply as the All Blacks. The team that came to South 
Africa was, bar two players, the full All Black side that was meant to tour the Republic in 
1985. The players had slipped out of New Zealand without informing the NZRFU, the IRB, 
or their own government of the tour and, once news broke of the tour, claimed to have come 
to South Africa as individuals and as a private, non-representative side. To South Africans 
though they were the All Blacks, and any doubts to this were removed when the team insisted 
in doing a Haka before the final test against the Springboks.    
The brains behind the operation had been Transvaal rugby President, Louis Luyt. While 
numerous sources claim that the SARB was wholly unaware of the tour being planned, in his 
autobiography Luyt paints a somewhat different picture. Luyt writes about a confidential 
meeting held by the SARB executive on 18 July 1985 regarding the tour, a meeting Luyt 
himself did not attend. However, he does publish in his autobiography the minutes of the 
secret meeting, which had been given to him by Craven. The SARB could not be seen to be 
extending invitations to individual players and thus a private institution brought the team to 
South Africa. This private institution turned out to be a joint sponsorship of the tour by 
Yellow Pages (who were the official sponsor), a telephone directory company, and Volkskas, 
a South African bank. The SARB was to assume full authority over the tour once the team 
arrived. If the tour caused any problems, it would be taken over by the private institutions.401 
Luyt claims to have offered to invite the New Zealand players on behalf of the Transvaal 
Rugby Football Union, as the SARB could not be seen to be involved in the organising of the 
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tour.402  Luyt and Robert Denton, managing director of Ellis Park rugby stadium, had flown 
to Hong Kong to hash out the final arrangements with Ian Kirkpatrick (tour manager), Colin 
Meads (Coach), and Andy Dalton, who would captain the side in South Africa.403 
The Cavaliers arrived in April 1986, playing twelve matches, including four test matches, of 
which they lost three. The tour had a punishing schedule for the Cavaliers during which they 
would regularly play as many as three matches a week for four weeks. The Cavaliers were 
treated much the same way as the Springbok were in New Zealand in 1981, as they were 
under constant police surveillance and protection. There were concerns that the tour could be 
violently disrupted, as ‘terror attacks’ had increased since the initiation of the ANC’s civil 
disobedience campaign in 1985.404 However, there were few incidents of opposition to the 
tour. The only significant incident was in Cape Town, where township school pupils burnt a 
mound of Yellow Pages directories.405 
However, the tour did bring the SARB into the firing line of the IRB. Once news of the tour 
broke the IRB requested that the Cavaliers be sent home immediately, but the SARB refused. 
Craven’s answer to the IRB’s request was definitive: “To stop this trip would be such a deep 
disgrace that no man in his right mind would ever do such an injustice to South Africa”.406 
Furthermore, there had been speculation that the Cavaliers players had been paid up to 
US$120,000 to tour, which was strictly against the IRB’s amateurism regulations. Although 
there has been little proof to suggest that such payment was made, Luyt writes that he could 
believe such rumours.407 Furthermore, Albert Grundlingh has outline that with the 1987 
South Sea Barbarians rebel tour of South Africa there were clear signs of money exchanging 
hands for the players to tour.408 Thus, it would not be too farfetched to conceive that the 
Cavaliers were compensated for their services.  
 For much of white South Africa the tour had been worthwhile. The tour had fed the 
country’s rugby lust and had proven that Springbok rugby was still in the upper echelons of 
world rugby as they had beaten a full All Black side. Luyt described the tour as a chance for 
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South African rugby to break out of the straight jacket it found itself in.409 Craven went even 
further. Speaking to the Argus in late 1986 Craven stated: “I go so far to say that it saved 
South African rugby, providing as it did an opportunity for our Springboks to prove they are 
still up there with the world’s best.”410 Paul Dobson also comments that the tour “did in fact 
save South African rugby from the slough of despond into which it had been dropped in 
1985.”411  
However, Craven conceded that the tour had gotten the SARB into hot water. It had soured 
the Board’s relationship with the IRB to the extent that Craven considered withdrawing the 
SARB from the IRB. The Cavaliers tour had also alienated their long-time allies, the 
NZRFU, who were also reprimanded by both their government and the IRB for the tour, 
despite their lack of involvement in it. The SARB was considered to have jeopardised the 
amateurism of the NZRFU’s players, which could likely lead to bans from the IRB only a 
year before the first Rugby World Cup. For their transgression, the New Zealand players 
faced the possibility of lifetime bans from the game. However, most players were only 
suspended for one match. If there were any lingering doubts about whether South Africa 
would be playing in the following years historic first Rugby World Cup, those doubts had 
been thoroughly dispelled by the Cavaliers tour. 
The Cavaliers tour was perhaps the ultimate expression of just how isolated South African 
rugby had started to feel in the 1980s. Having to resort to underhanded tactics to bring out 
these rebel tours revealed the Board to be desperate, something the sporting boycott took as a 
sign of their success. These rebel tours were short lived and usually proved counterproductive 
to the SARB. In many ways, South African rugby was worse off after them. Craven’s friends 
in the IRB had aided the SARB in staving off the worst of the isolation in the 1970s, however 
these rebel tours only resulted in alienating the two boards from one-another as the IRB felt 
their role as international governing body was being undermined by such tours. The tour 
prompted the IRB to change some of their disciplinary laws to outlaw any further rebel 
tours.412 The SARB was forced to apologies to the IRB and give a solemn undertaking that no 
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further rebel tours would take place, to which Craven agreed. Barely a year later, though, 
another rebel tour had landed in South Africa.  
The team known as the South Sea Barbarians was made up of Pacific Islanders (mostly 
Western Samoans, but also some Fijians and Tongans). The tour provided the SARB with 
quite a predicament. Had they sent the ‘non-white’ tourists home it may well have been used 
against the Board as evidence that it remained a racist body. However, had the tour 
continued, it would lead to further condemnation by the IRB for again hosting a rebel tour. 
To try to escape any persecution, the SARB cancelled all the tests the Barbarians were set to 
play against the Springboks, thereby avoiding giving the tour full international status.413 
Despite this, the tour was regarded by the IRB as another rebel tour, and following the 
changes implemented by the IRB, they now had the power to expel the SARB for hosting the 
tour.414 Ultimately, the SARB was not expelled, but the rebel tours left them in a position 
where there was little benefit to be found in remaining a member of the IRB. A newspaper 
reported that following the two rebel tours even some of the more conservative rugby unions 
around the world were having second thoughts about maintaining ties with the SARB.415  
These rebel tours provided significant problems to the future rugby contests involving South 
Africa. When in 1987 the England RFU wrote to Craven informing him that they were 
considering lifting the ban on contact with South Africa, they insisted that Craven first had to 
provide them with a statement on whether unauthorised fees had been paid to the Cavaliers 
by the TRFU. The SARB also needed to take legal steps to prevent such tours taking place 
again before England would consider lifting the ban.416 Writing to the South Africa Embassy 
in London in December 1986, Craven requested that the embassy emphasize that the 
Cavaliers tour was a mistake when dealing with the press.417  An invitation sent from the 
SARB to the Wallabies (Australia’s national rugby team) to tour in 1988 was also turned 
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down largely due to the controversy surrounding the two rebel tours, as well as the concern 
that Australian players would be paid to tour.418 
However, the problems cause by the Cavaliers tour extended beyond national tours. When in 
1986 a Cape Town social team known as the Hedgehogs (which SANROC insisted was the 
University of Cape Town’s rugby side) toured to England, they were treated like a touring 
Springbok side. Controversy raged about the touring side as English players refused to play 
them out of moral conviction, coaches threatened to resign should their club play the tourists, 
and threats were made that matches would be violently disrupted, ultimately resulting in the 
cancelation of several matches. The objections to the Hedgehogs’ tour were put down to 
lingering hostilities in the rugby world towards South Africa over the Cavaliers tour.419  
The 1985 All Black tour cancelation and subsequent rebel tours marked the final stage in 
South African rugby’s post-1981 isolation. The next time the Springboks and the All Blacks 
would meet was in 1992, at which point South Africa’s political landscape had dramatically 
changed as apartheid was on the way out. In his desperation to stave off isolation, Craven’s 
hand had been forced, culminating in initiatives such as the costly rebel tours. These rebel 
tours, particularly the one by the Cavaliers, had cost the SARB and South African rugby as 
much as the 1981 tour had with regard to their international rejection. By hosting the 
Cavaliers tour, Craven had managed to do something that the sporting boycott could not 
achieve in nearly 20 years: to drive a wedge between South Africa – New Zealand rugby.         
The Cavaliers tour may have revived South African Rugby, but Craven could not have failed 
to understand that this revival would be short-lived unless there was a steady stream of 
international competition. The SARB also faced the new challenge of lucrative contracts 
being offered to their players by northern hemisphere clubs. Coinciding with the cancelation 
of the 1985 All Black tour was a flight in local talent to overseas clubs, possibly further 
illustrating the fact that the Springbok jersey no longer carried the same appeal it once had 
when the Springboks were the top team in world rugby.  
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The 1981 tour certainly caused the growing isolation of South African rugby in the 1980s. 
The tour had been a prominent factor in the cancelation of the 1985 All Black tour. Fears had 
arisen in New Zealand that their society would be plunged into the same state of chaos as in 
1981 and that rugby’s popularity would suffer in the way it had following the 1981 tour. The 
1985 tour cancelation in turn led to the birth of the Cavaliers tour, as Craven and the SARB 
were desperate for top flight international rugby to return to South Africa. Ultimately, though, 
the tour caused irreparable damage to the image of the SARB, despite bringing on some 
renewed, but brief vigour for the game in South Africa. With the Cavaliers tour, two of South 
African rugby’s strongest proponents had been turned away, the IRB and the NZRFU. Both 
had contributed significantly to keeping South African rugby away from the grip of isolation 
from the start of the sporting boycott.  
Opposition to apartheid had ultimately caused the 1981 tour events, and it seemed that only a 
solution to apartheid that would provide a solution for South African rugby. Had the 1981 
tour proceeded peacefully it is probable that future tours would have been more likely to take 
place. However, the attention the tour received around the world coincided with and most 
likely aided the international spotlight turning onto South Africa. South African rugby found 
its hands bound for most of the 1980s, as it could do little to stop the isolation. Those 
strategies it did follow, like the rebel tours, were done out of a position of desperation and 
ultimately left the Board in a worse-off position in the long term. South African rugby would 
now be forced, yet again, to explore new avenues to make it acceptable to world rugby.   
Exploring New Ventures: The SARB and its ‘African Initiative’ 
While the South African government faced a ‘total onslaught’ against it in the 1980s, it 
seemed the country’s rugby was facing a total onslaught of its own. By hosting the rebel tours 
South African rugby had turned away the last of its few remaining international allies. The 
once prized Springbok jersey was rapidly losing its appeal to South African players as the 
prospect of future tours seemed evermore unlikely. Those who did not wish to play Currie 
Cup for the remainder of their careers departed for the northern hemisphere where they joined 
professional club sides.420 Following the post-1981 isolation of rugby, South Africa’s top 
players started deserting the country to broaden their own horizons, meaning the quality of 
domestic rugby on offer in South Africa was waning. The Currie Cup would not be able to 
                                                            
420 SARB Archive, Collection A14: Bemarking van Rugby, Box A14.1: Manuskripte. Die Agentskap vir 
Reklame en Bemarking, “Suid-Afrikaanse Rugby – Waarheen?,” 13 March 1986.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
160 
 
maintain a high quality of play, as the tournament was rapidly losing its appeal to players and 
spectators alike. The SARB found itself in a situation where white South Africa’s once prized 
sport was starting to wane in popularity. If rugby’s current position in South Africa prevailed, 
the game could no longer be the preeminent sport it once was among white South Africans.  
Even before the Cavaliers tour, the SARB had approached several marketing companies to 
draw up plans on how rugby popularity in South Africa could be maintained. The Board 
made a budget of R200,000 available to the marketing agency which could best address the 
problems South African rugby was facing. The fact that rugby in South Africa now needed to 
market the game to the population is in itself a comment on the situation the game had come 
to find itself in. One of the major problems faced by the SARB was drop-off in supporters 
attending live matches. Not even the 1985 Currie Cup final between Western Province and 
Northern Transvaal, traditionally one of the most anticipated contests on the domestic rugby 
calendar, was able to draw a capacity crowd at Newlands stadium.421 The SARB and its 
unions were financially dependent on the gate fees collected at live matches. Thus, a decline 
in attendance meant a decline in revenue for the SARB, which in turn curbed the SARB’s 
abilities to finance tours, upgrade rugby facilities, and host coaching clinics.  
Rugby was no longer the volksfees (national festival) it once was to Afrikaners and unless 
immediate action was taken the game would struggle to survive. The decline in quality of 
domestic rugby had meant spectators were less inclined to make a costly and time-consuming 
family trip to stadiums when they could watch the match live on television. According to one 
marketing agency, an interest in the game had also not been fostered among the youth as they 
had been given precious little opportunities to witness the Springboks run out against top-
notch international competition.422 For many schoolchildren, rugby was no longer the 
obvious choice as their sport, particularly as games like cricket (traditionally played by 
English South Africans) were becoming ever more popular amongst Afrikaners.423 Unless the 
youth received the necessary stimulus, an agency advised, these future stars of South African 
rugby would focus their inherent rugby talents on other sports that promised better reward for 
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their efforts.424 These marketing agencies also sought to play on the nostalgia of the older 
generations to return South African rugby to its former glory days by “putting back into 
rugby some of what you got out of it.”425 The quality of the game needed to return to the time 
where rugby came to represent the symbolic strength and unity of the Afrikaner nation, both 
domestically and internationally. 
These agencies, however, sighted South Africa’s international rugby isolation as the primary 
factor resulting in the drop-off in player and spectator numbers.426 Until this could be 
rectified, the Board would face an uphill battle trying to keep the game prominent. According 
to The Agency for Advertising and Marketing, one of the companies approached by the 
SARB, the lack of international competition led directly to the lack of quality in the South 
African game, which in turn resulted in a lack of interest in the game and a gradual decline in 
the status of the green and gold jersey.427 Furthermore, the agency outlined that in a changing 
South Africa, rugby was still very much regarded as the Afrikaner’s sport with racial 
overtones making it less appealing both internationally and domestically.428 Another factor 
sighted by this agency, which is perhaps something for a further self-standing study, was the 
negative effect that television had on rugby popularity, as it gave a wider audience greater 
exposure to other sports.429  
However, the SARB would be able to achieve little success in rejuvenating the game if tours 
were the chief manner of doing so. The global spotlight had trained itself on apartheid, 
making tours a scarce commodity, as teams faced an international backlash if they broke the 
sporting boycott and made contact with South Africa. Craven found himself in an immensely 
difficult position. Over the course of several years, the Board had not been able to improve its 
increasingly isolated position and those tactics it did employ only further cut it off from the 
outside world. By 1988, South African rugby players no longer believed Craven’s promises 
of tours and unashamedly left the country to play rugby for money in Europe.430 Although the 
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Cavaliers tour had briefly breathed some life into South African rugby, the repercussions had 
made further touring (by teams who were not ‘rebel tours’) highly unlikely.  
The success of the first Rugby World Cup in 1987 had also thrown into question the future 
significance of tours. As one journalist noted:  
“In popular terms rugby has moved on from the time when its highest expression 
was the tour in which one International Board country crossed the equator to play 
another. In future it will be a World Cup in which dozens of countries are 
involved.”431  
It seemed that with the new age the rugby world was entering into, South Africa would be left 
behind. The battle for the best in the world would no longer be decided in climatic test series 
involving the All Blacks or the Springboks, but would instead be decided by the new format 
from which South Africa looked to be excluded. The marketing agencies had not been able to 
achieve much success primarily as that which they identified as rugby’s biggest problem 
(international isolation) was something that had for some time been outside of the SARB’s 
control, something which Craven had initially not realised. Two years after the marketing 
agencies were first approached, there was still a significant flight of rugby talent from South 
African shores and domestic matches were still poorly attended. Craven was forced to 
concede that the standard of play could not remain high while its ceiling was so low.432   
Perhaps it was being forced into a corner yet again that made Craven adopt an entirely new 
strategy. Craven had always been adamant that sport and politics should be separate, but 
came to realise that while South African rugby was governed along racial lines this was 
unlikely to happen. In the 1970s, he had tackled the issue of depoliticising South African 
rugby by trying to remove apartheid from the game. This had culminated in the 1978 
amalgamation of South Africa’s three racially based rugby bodies into the South African 
Rugby Board. From there on, he insisted that South African rugby should no longer be 
punished internationally for the politics of the NP government. However, the 1981 tour and 
the subsequent difficulties faced by the SARB came as a sobering reality that it no longer 
mattered if sport was deracialized while the rest of the society was not. 
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From 1987 onward, Craven adopted a new stance, one which was highly critical of the 
Nationalist government and apartheid. It is unlikely that Craven suddenly underwent a deep 
paradigm shift in this period (by 1990 Craven was still adamant that the government should 
not give everyone an equal vote), but instead came to realise that as long as apartheid was in 
place South African rugby would be a pariah to its international counterparts. Craven now 
made a point of coming out strongly against the government, calling for immediate reform 
before the country tumbled over the cliff it was heading for. He singled out the Group Areas 
Act and the hurt it caused as white South Africa’s greatest sin, but qualified his statement by 
saying that the separation of the races was a natural evolutionary process and did not need 
legislation to enforce it.433 Still, the law needed to be repealed and white South Africa needed 
to apologise to its black brethren for the hurt they had caused. 
Craven had a long history of doing battle with the government, starting in 1965 when Prime 
Minister Verwoerd banned Maoris from touring South Africa with the All Blacks. Craven 
had largely kept these fights to the rugby field, but his comments had gradually become more 
general in condemning the government for apartheid.434 Perhaps the point which most clearly 
marks the start of Craven’s new endeavour was when he released a ‘new year’s message’ on 
4 January 1987, the first time he had done anything of the sort. In his message, Craven called 
for scrapping all apartheid laws and that the government should be pressured into making 
further changes more rapidly.435 The message provoked outrage, particularly amongst 
conservative circles, as Craven’s address seemed to indicate that one of the traditional 
bastions of white power was now siding with those who opposed apartheid. 
From here on Craven made no secret of his intentions. In both international and domestic 
media, Craven was quoted as saying that South African rugby (and sport in general) needed 
to fight the government to do away with any forms of discrimination.436 Craven urged South 
Africans to rise above party politics and forget group interests, as South Africa’s survival was 
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paramount. However, his statements were not only limited to the government, but also 
referred to those rugby bodies that had not made full attempts to deracialize the game. He 
was well aware that rural unions had been much slower to implement rugby integration and 
singled out the Boland Union for their reluctance to incorporate coloured players (something 
even Springbok Errol Tobias struggled with during his time at the Boland Union).437 Craven 
was quick to point out that any rugby body which was found not to be implementing mixed 
rugby to the fullest extent would suffer consequences.438 His statements drew a backlash in 
the media as his comments were labelled as ‘laughable’, particularly by Treurnicht’s 
Conservative Party, which by 1987 had become the official opposition to the ruling party in 
South Africa.439  
Craven had barely delivered his new year’s message when two members of the SARB 
executive committee made it known that they would stand as candidates for the Conservative 
Party in the upcoming 1987 election. Boetie Malan and Dan Nolte would stand for election in 
Cradock and Delmas respectively. Craven had not been told by either Malan or Nolte of their 
intentions, but was swift in issuing a statement in which he quoted the constitution of the 
SARB: 
“The SARB was empowered to expel any member who failed to comply with its 
constitution or whose actions were in the Board’s sole opinion detrimental to the 
best interests of the Board and the game.”  
In essence, Craven was pointing out the fact that there were glaring philosophical differences 
between the constitutions of the SARB and the Conservative Party, who still advocated the 
most hidebound separate development policies. There were fundamentally irreconcilable 
differences between the two constitutions. Craven had interpreted the SARB statute to mean 
that if a member wished to represent a party in parliament whose policy conflicted with that 
of the SARB, they could no longer serve on the Board’s executive.440 Both Nolte and Malan, 
however, resigned from their positions on the Board, largely under pressure from Craven and 
despite CP leader Treurnicht ordering them to stay and fight the SARB over the matter.   
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However, for Craven and the SARB, the question over the matter went further, as 
membership to the SARB was thrown into review. The Board’s disciplinary committee had 
found that no legal statute within the SARB’s constitution existed which forbade members 
from being eligible to political office, but insisted that one be drafted immediately.441 It 
would be safe to assume that Malan and Nolte were not the only conservatives serving on the 
Board, and were likely not the only ones to be incensed by Craven’s new liberal warpath. The 
SARB requested that South Africa’s main political parties to send a copy of their sports 
policies to the Board. This was done so that the Board’s executive could gauge which of the 
parties had sports policies that could be reconciled with those of the SARB. Craven expected 
SARB members to resign from the positions in the Board if their political views and 
allegiances clashed with those of the SARB.442 In doing so, Craven had essentially politicised 
the Board as it had adopted a position that opposed the Nationalist government. It was no 
longer a case of politics that was entering sport, but instead sport that had entered politics.  
“Oom Danie” and the ANC  
Craven’s new political initiative was cemented in 1988. The state of the political logjam 
regarding reform would not be doing South African rugby any favours anytime soon. 
Condemning apartheid in the media meant little to international onlookers if there was not 
significant action behind these statements. In early 1988, an opportunity presented itself. 
Fresh from the so-called “Dakar Safari”443 Tommy Bedford, a former Springbok and 
renowned critic of the apartheid government informed Craven that during discussions with 
the ANC, it had been speculated that the liberalisation of sport could help break the political 
deadlock South Africa faced.444 Bedford believed rugby could well be the best avenue for 
such a venture, as Craven had done much to distance the sport from apartheid. Craven agreed, 
as he saw such an initiative as being a potential solution for South African rugby’s 
international impasse.  
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The ‘African Initiative’, as it came to be known in the SARB, was a set of three meetings 
between the Danie Craven, Louis Luyt and various members of the ANC executive, usually 
chaired by Thabo Mbeki and facilitated by Tommy Bedford and later, Chris Laidlaw. The 
first of these meetings was to be between several sports administrators and the ANC, 
scheduled to be held in London. The meeting was held without the government’s knowledge 
or consent. The first meeting, however, changed into a meeting between the SARB and the 
ANC, as the other sports representatives were unable to make the meeting for various 
reasons. Louis Luyt had been deputised to attend the meeting by Craven, who was recovering 
from bypass surgery. Luyt describes this first meeting as a ‘get-to-know-each-other’ 
gathering, as little discussion was undertaken on the South African situation.445 Both parties, 
however, showed interest in further discussions being held and barely two months later a 
second meeting was set up in Frankfurt, scheduled for 28 May 1988. This time though the 
meeting was purposefully only between the SARB representatives and the ANC.  
Craven was again not able to attend due to still being frail following his surgery and thus 
Luyt and Bedford attended again. From the outset, the meeting had a hard time remaining on 
rugby, as Mbeki demanded that the government implement true reforms and the release of 
their political leaders.446 Of course, Luyt was not in a position to make any comments with 
regard to what the government could or would do, but promised to pass on the request. To his 
credit, Luyt did his best to pass the message on as upon return he arranged a meeting with Pik 
Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, during which he had given him a memorandum on the 
meeting. Botha had insisted that it was a matter of urgency that he passes the memorandum 
on to his namesake, P.W. Botha. However, nothing came of this and it is not clear whether 
the memorandum even made it to the President’s office.  
The third and final meeting between the SARB and ANC took place on 15 October 1988. 
This was regarded as the true meeting between the ANC and the SARB, as this time Craven 
would be attending. Apart from Mbeki, the meeting was attended by Alfred Nzo, Steve 
Tshwete, Barbara Masekela, and numerous others from the ANC executive. Craven was 
warmly received by the executive, particularly by Mbeki who insisted on calling him “Oom 
[Uncle] Danie”. In attendance too was SARU President, Ebrahim Patel, as the meeting was 
partly aimed at merging the interests of black and white rugby bodies under a single banner. 
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Under Patel, SARU had been one of the most strident critics of the South African rugby 
establishment. The Union was aligned with SACOS and had repeatedly called for 
intensifying the sporting boycott and isolating the SARB. The Union was as much a political 
organisation as it was a sporting body, with clear ties to the ANC.  
An amalgamation between the two rugby bodies could potentially reopen the doors to 
international competition for South African rugby. Despite having relatively few numbers, 
SARU was internationally accepted as representing true non-racial rugby in South Africa. 
However, SARU had also suffered under the boycott. For all that the Union had a political 
agenda, it still had to function primarily as a sporting body and thus found that the boycott 
also diminished the quality of their play. The few international tours that came to South 
Africa did not play SARU teams (touring teams played SARA and SARFF teams, which 
caused extensive defections of SARU players who were looking to broaden their own 
horizons). As early as 1984 SACOS had, on behalf of its sporting unions, pleaded with the 
UN to adjust its blanket ban on international coaches working in South Africa, as their sports 
unions were in dire need of quality coaching.447  
Perhaps from a sporting perspective then, an amalgamation between the SARB and SARU 
was as much needed by the Union as it was by the Board to ensure that rugby survived. By 
the end of the two-day meeting between the SARB, SARU, and ANC, the rugby bodies 
released a joint statement: 
“The meeting came about because of the common desire on the part of all the 
participating organisations to ensure to ensure that rugby in South Africa is 
organised according to non-racial principles. The meeting confirmed this position 
and agreed that South African rugby should come under one non-racial 
controlling body. They agree to work together to achieve these goals…”448 
The statement caused outrage in South Africa. The photos of Craven walking into the arms of 
the ‘terrorists’ and the joint statements by the SARB and an ANC affiliate incensed many 
whites. Within the Board, Craven’s actions were strongly condemned by Fritz Eloff (SARB 
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deputy president), Steve Strydom, and Ronnie Bauser who argued that the SARB should not 
be seen to be negotiating with terrorist organisations committed to violence.449  
The meeting also drew strong criticism from the government, which felt somewhat 
humiliated by the fact that one of the major institutions of Afrikaner pride had bypassed them 
to speak with terrorists. Both Luyt and Craven were threatened with having their passports 
seized and that the government would be re-evaluating its relationship with and support for 
the SARB.450 The Afrikaans press had a field day in condemning the Craven and Luyt for 
their actions, while the English press was overwhelmingly in favour of the meeting and 
praised Craven for this new initiative. Coming on the back of the Noltes and Malan issue, 
Craven was criticized for choosing terrorists over his own people.451   
The ANC meeting was also strongly condemned by the South African Police rugby club, who 
felt that their members put their life at risk to protect South Africans from the ANC 
‘terrorists’ only for the head of rugby to engage with the enemy, which the police believed 
legitimised the ANC and its actions.452 Such meetings made the ANC believe that they held 
the key to South Africa’s readmission to international rugby, which was in fact true. When 
the Board celebrated its centenary in 1989 and was able to invite a World XV side to play an 
exhibition match, it was largely due to the somewhat more positive mood internationally 
toward the SARB following the talks with the ANC.453   
Although the SARB/ANC meeting drew the most criticism, it was not the first meeting of its 
kind. Apart from the afore mentioned ‘Dakar Safari’ and the government’s attempts to 
establish underground networks of communication with the ANC, a business delegation of 
some of South Africa’s most influential business leaders had met with the ANC in 1986 after 
Botha’s initial reforms had been shown up. Perhaps, though, it was the historical significance 
of rugby to the Afrikaner nation which drew such a strong reaction when it came to rugby’s 
turn to meet with the ANC. Craven was labelled a traitor by P.W. Botha, something which 
hurt Craven to the end of his days, but seemed to spur him on to see the initiative through.  
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Craven presented an ultimatum to the Board that those who were not willing to abandon 
racism in rugby should leave. Under Craven’s insistence, the SARB declared itself fully 
against racism, amending its constitution accordingly. Releasing a statement on the ‘ANC 
incident’ Craven reaffirmed that he was doing what he believed to be best for South African 
rugby.454 Following the meeting with the ANC, the SARB executive released a statement that 
unification of the existing rugby bodies in South Africa was to be vigorously pursued.455   
Craven stipulated that the SARB needed to make a choice on whether it followed the old 
path, which had been unsuccessful over the past eight years, or chose a new road that led 
away from the abyss South Africa was heading towards.456 Craven pointed out that rugby 
autonomy meant nothing if the fortunes of the game were still dictated by government 
actions, and as long as apartheid survived, rugby would never be free to determine its own 
fate. The ANC meeting had been the first step to rugby regaining control over its own future. 
In the joint statement released by the SARB, SARU, and ANC, they had called on “all people 
of goodwill inside and outside the South Africa to support this process.”457 While the 
initiative did receive substantial support from around the world, it would not be enough to say 
that attempts were being made to unify in order to see rugby return to normal. There would 
need to be a unified rugby body leading the way to integration in South Africa before any 
prospect of return to rugby could be contemplated. Craven found that unification would not 
be easy, as there were certain fundamental disagreements on key points between the two 
rugby bodies. The process temporarily entered into a stalemate, as neither body was willing 
to bend on certain unsurpassable matters.   
It was only in 1990, after new state President F.W. De Klerk (the same man who had 
reprimanded Craven and Luyt for their irresponsible meeting with the ANC) dramatically 
lifted the ban on the ANC and Pan African Congress that there was some renewed vigour for 
the Harare declaration by the SARB and SARU. Although by 1989 rugby official were far 
ahead of the politicians in negotiating a new non-racial order, negotiations themselves were 
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not enough to see South African return to the rugby world, as the Springboks were still 
excluded from the 1991 Rugby World Cup. There would need to be some concrete 
foundations laid before readmission would be acceptable. Discussions between the two 
bodies resumed in earnest, with Luyt being the chief negotiator from the SARB and Ebrahim 
Patel from SARU with Steve Tshwete chairing the discussions. Discussion progressed 
surprisingly rapidly, and after barely a day of negotiating enough had been achieved to let the 
outside world know that the SARB and the SARU would be merging on a 50/50 basis under a 
new name, the South African Rugby Football Union.458  
The SARFU started functioning in 1991, with Danie Craven as its first President until he 
stepped down in 1993, being replaced by Ebrahim Patel. Perhaps to be expected, the new 
body had teething problems, both at executive and playing levels. John Nauright, 
commenting on post-integration South Africa sport, writes that black sports administrators 
became ceremonial figureheads alongside a core of old established officials who called on 
their supposed expertise to maintain key administrative positions.459 In addition, sending 
white clubs into townships and vice-a-versa for newly merged league matches proved to have 
their own problems, as racial tensions often threatened to boil over on the field or amongst 
spectators.  
However, despite the early difficulties in the new body, there was an upside, as South African 
rugby was welcomed back into international rugby. The changes implemented in South 
African rugby as well as the clear steps taken by the government to dismantle apartheid 
proved acceptable enough to have rugby readmitted internationally without concerns that it 
would slow the integration process taking place. By 1992, the familiar black jersey of the old 
foe graced South Africa’s fields, as the All Blacks were the first team to welcome the 
Springboks back. Shortly afterwards, this was followed by the Springboks’ first test match 
against the Wallabies in 21 years. 
The African Initiative had been born out of South African rugby’s isolation, an isolation that 
had steadily grown since 1981 until it threatened to irreparably damage the country’s rugby. 
Craven had worked hard to eradicate apartheid in the sport and had, to a significant extent, 
been able to do so, yet he had received little reward for his efforts. However, he did not have 
a genuine grasp of what scrapping apartheid entailed. He did not see it as entailing universal 
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franchise, majority rule, and a new political dispensation, but instead as the removal of social 
and economic discriminatory practices (as he had done in rugby and which was why he could 
not understand why South Africa could not return to international competition in the 
1980s).460 As late as 1990, Craven remained adamant that the government should never give 
everyone equal vote.461  
Craven’s opposition to apartheid was rooted in the fact that, above all else, it was crippling 
South African rugby. Had rugby not been in the tough spot it was and had Craven not 
exhausted the rest of his options, a meeting between the SARB and ANC may well not have 
happened. However, the events during and following the 1981 tour had so isolated South 
African rugby that by 1987 Craven was forced to abandon what he later termed the 
‘ineffectual old road’ (involving propagandist organisations, media congresses, rebel tours, 
and rugby marketers) and explored a new venture which led him and the SARB to the 
African Initiative. In his capacity as a rugby man, Craven was doing what he claimed to be 
best for rugby. Although his comments in the press where of a political nature and it was the 
politicians who attacked him, Craven and Luyt had not gone to Harare to negotiate and new 
settlement for the country, but to negotiate a way through which South African rugby stood a 
chance of returning to the international domain. Without international rugby, the sport in 
South Africa could not grow and was rapidly diminishing in quality as top players left the 
country.  
The recommendation by the ANC that the SARB and SARU amalgamate was hoped to be a 
case of leading by example by which other South African institutions would follow suit and 
hopefully apply enough pressure to the Nationalist government to enter some form of 
negotiations for a new political dispensation in South Africa. However, it would be safe to 
assume that thinking that far ahead was not on Craven’s agenda, as his primary objective was 
to see South African rugby return to its former glory. 
Conclusion  
For much of the 1980s, South African rugby found itself with few friends. The 1981 tour had 
been meant to herald the return of Springbok rugby to the world, but what happened in New 
Zealand and the USA only further shut the door on South Africa’s international rugby hopes. 
While the SARB still attempted to preach its non-racial stance to the world, the sporting 
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boycott had moved on with its objectives and now demanded that South Africa be a non-
racial society before sport could return to normal. In the face of these new demands, sporting 
bodies were helpless. They could only exert influence over their own sphere and until the 
government came to their aid by dismantling apartheid, South African sport would remain 
isolated. 
However, the SARB was late to realise this and utilised a number of initiatives which were 
hoped would return rugby to normal. Whereas these initiatives may have been effective in the 
1970s, they were ineffectual in the 1980s. The SARB’s involvement with Freedom in Sport, 
Stop Politics in Rugby, and Free Nation New Zealand yielded little fruit and, due to the 
conservative reputation of these bodies, likely only did further harm to the image of the 
SARB. With the hosting of the International Rugby Media Congress in 1983, the SARB had 
been able to show foreign journalist how integrated South African rugby had become. While 
many of the journalists left South Africa with a more favourable outlook on South African 
rugby, the world remained opposed to apartheid South Africa, particularly after it was 
revealed that the trumpeted Botha reforms were only a further way on maintaining white 
power. 
With the cancelation of the 1985 All Black tour the Board became increasingly desperate 
and, perhaps in a moment of rashness, agreed to a rebel tour by the Cavaliers in 1986, 
something which did irreparable damage to the image of the SARB as it came to be seen as 
willing to ‘buy’ tours and use underhand techniques to facilitate touring. The 1987 South Sea 
Barbarians rebel tour only furthered the anger of the rugby world towards the SARB, 
particularly as Craven had given his word to the IRB that there be no further rebel tours after 
the Cavaliers tour in 1986. 
It can only be seen as out of desperation that Craven entered talks with the ANC. Craven was 
doing what he believed to be right for rugby, something which had him labelled as a traitor 
by the South African government. However, by entering into talks with the ANC Craven had 
given South African ruby the semblance of a chance to return to international rugby in the not 
too distant future. With the amalgamation of the SARB and the SARU in 1991 South African 
rugby was readmitted to international competition, something that was aided by the 
Nationalist government finally starting the process of dismantling apartheid.   
While this chapter primarily outlines how the ripples of the 1981 tour can be linked to all 
these events, it also discusses in depth how these events themselves contributed significantly 
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to the complete isolation of South African rugby in the 1980s. The 1981 tour was a catalyst 
for the creation of FIS, SPIR, and FRENZ, all of which saw the tour as evidence that political 
interference in sport was inhibiting the rights of sportsmen to compete against whom they 
wished. However, the conservative line of argumentation these bodies used to justify why 
South Africa should return to international rugby only served to further turn attitudes against 
the Board as it came to be seen as willing to engage with conservative organisations which 
were insensitive to the political struggle of black South Africans.  
In the case of the 1985 All Black tour cancelation, the ripples of the 1981 tour are clear. New 
Zealand society had not yet fully recovered from the disastrous 1981 tour by the time the 
1985 tour was proposed. New Zealanders feared that if the 1985 tour took place the violent 
demonstrations the country experienced in 1981 would pick up where they left off. There was 
also concern over the damage the 1981 tour had done to rugby in New Zealand as there was a 
substantial drop-off in support for the game, which was attributed to the 1981 tour. 
Ultimately this would be used as evidence against the 1985 tour as the New Zealand High 
Court ruled that the 1985 tour would not promote, foster, or benefit the game in New Zealand 
and that therefore it contravened the constitutional duties of the NZRFU.  
The fact that the 1981 tour had in essence forced the cancelation of the 1985 tour meant that 
the SARB had to find an alternative way to attract tours to South Africa. This ultimately 
culminated in the birth of the rebel tours. The rebel tours illustrated just how isolated the 
SARB had become after 1981 as the Board was forced into using underhand tactics to secure 
tours. These rebel tours, however, only further isolated the Board as it drew the ire of the IRB 
and the unions whose players had been lured to South Africa, possibly for monetary gains. 
The rebel tours also reflected the dilemma the SARB was facing domestically as various 
marketing agencies had identified the lack of international competition as the primary reason 
for a lack of quality and spectator interest in rugby from the mid-1980s onward. The 
Springbok jersey no longer had the allure it once had when South Africa were regarded as the 
best in the world and regularly played against top flight international competition. South 
Africa’s top rugby talents were leaving the country to broadening their horizons elsewhere as 
Craven could no longer ensure tours. It was from a desperate position that Craven approached 
the ANC for talks on how South Africa could return to international rugby. While the ripples 
of the 1981 tour can be traced through all these events, the amalgamation process between the 
SARB and the SARU were set in motion by something else. Thus, when tracing the effects of 
the 1981 tour it can be seen to have brought Craven to the point where he entered talks with 
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the ANC, but from there on it was these talks which dictated the direction the SARB 
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Concluding Remarks     
The 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand and the United States of America has received very 
little academic attention. Those who have written on the tour have tended to lump it together 
with general discussions on the sporting boycott era. However, this thesis has demonstrated 
that the 1981 tour has its own set of complex causes and long-term effects and therefore 
needed a study of its own in order to comprehend the significance of the tour to South 
African rugby. While numerous authors have mentioned the tour in their work, none of them 
have gone further than outlining some of the bizarre events which took place during the tour 
as evidence for the peculiar conditions the sporting boycott forced South African sport into. 
However, this thesis has proven the 1981 tour to be a watershed moment in South African 
rugby history, particularly in the way it contributed to isolating South African rugby in the 
1980s.  
Instead of merely discussing the 1981 tour as part of the sporting boycott, this thesis has 
illustrated that the tour had its own unique dynamics, which led to the violent demonstrations 
taking place during the tour. Many New Zealanders had been growing increasingly impatient 
with their government’s willingness to compete against a racist regime. This boiled over for 
the first time in 1967, when an All Black tour of South Africa was cancelled due to the South 
African governments continued request that the All Blacks leave their Maoris at home when 
touring South Africa. The subsequent concession granted by the South African government 
that Maoris could tour with the All Blacks in future was the first concession of its kind and 
revealed a potential chink in the armour of apartheid: that pressure on sport could bring a 
measure of change. Following the concession, New Zealand demonstration did not dissipate 
as South Africa and New Zealand continued to compete against one-another, despite the 
apartheid policies of the NP government.  
By the time the Springboks arrived in New Zealand in 1981, attitudes toward South Africa 
had hardened considerably, particularly following the events during the Soweto uprising. 
Thus, the 1981 tour cannot be regarded as an isolated event, but instead as the final stage in a 
process starting in the 1960s whereby New Zealanders had grown increasingly 
uncomfortably with the NZRFU’s continued support for the rugby team of a racist regime. In 
1981, this frustration had boiled over and led to violent demonstrations in New Zealand.   
Furthermore, this thesis has also demonstrated that the protests in New Zealand had gradually 
taken on a different dimension as the tour wore on. For many New Zealanders the 1981 tour 
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became a proxy through which they expressed their frustrations with their own country’s 
racial disparities. This added extra potency to the demonstrations. With increasingly violent 
protests and hard-handed policing, the tour descended into a matter of demonstrators’ 
freedom to protest versus the maintenance of law and order. The tour essentially became a 
vehicle through which New Zealanders battled their fellow New Zealanders for what they 
believed to be right. New Zealand society had found itself completely divided over the tour 
matter, divisions which would remain in the society long after the tour concluded.  
With the Springboks traveling to the USA for a brief three-match tour following the New 
Zealand tour, much of the media attention they had received in New Zealand dissipated as the 
USA tour was simply not as appealing to rugby supporters. However, the Springboks 
encountered equally fierce demonstrations in the USA, which only reinforced the notion that 
following the 1981 tour South African athletes would not be able to travel abroad without 
encountering severe demonstrations. The USA tour, however, may have taken place for 
ulterior motives. Politically, South Africa was facing what it regarded as a ‘total onslaught’ 
against it, including a significant Communist presence in its southern African neighbours. 
The 1981 tour of the USA had been undertaken only months after the Republican, Ronald 
Reagan, had been elected President of the USA. Traditionally the Republican Presidents had 
taken a softer line toward South Africa and it is plausible that the tour was a way of extending 
a hand of friendship to the USA after the previous incumbent, Jimmy Carter, had left South 
Africa out in the cold. Due to time and spatial constraints, this thesis does not elaborate 
further on this question, other than the note the plausibility of such reasoning behind the tour. 
However, it would be necessary to undertake a self-standing study on this matter in order to 
either confirm or disconfirm this notion.       
Following the disastrous 1981 tour, South African rugby found itself to be isolated from 
world rugby for the first time. The SARB was forced into new ventures to try to curb this 
isolation. Very few studies have illustrated the connection between the events which unfolded 
in New Zealand and the USA in 1981 and the growing isolation South African rugby entered 
into in the 1980s. The 1981 tour had further compounded the fact that South African teams 
were unwelcome on sporting fields around the world. However, apart from the political 
objections to touring Springbok sides, the 1981 tour had revealed that tours involving the 
Springboks posed substantial security threats due to the large protest action they would 
inevitably attract. The international castigation of New Zealand (and to a lesser extent the 
US) for inviting the Springboks to tour in 1981 and breaking the sporting boycott and 
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contravening the Gleneagles Agreement was enough deter rugby unions around the world 
from extending an invitation to the South Africans. As it happened, 1981 was the last time 
that the Springboks would tour overseas while apartheid was in place.  
The SARB would have to find a way of enticing teams to come to South Africa, as it seemed 
certain that international tours by the Springboks were off for the future. Over the course of 
the early 1980s, the SARB built up a relationship with three organisations that it had hoped 
would help the Board’s cause to secure international tours. Freedom in Sport, Stop Politics in 
Rugby, and Free Nation New Zealand had all been products of the 1981 tour as they saw the 
events on tour as evidence that political interference was impeding the rights of sportsmen. 
They launched campaigns to remove political interference in sport, but proved generally 
ineffective. Amongst other things, the International Rugby Media Congress (1983) was 
arranged as an FIS initiative to show world media how integrated South African rugby had 
become, hoping that the attending media would then disseminate this picture of the ‘real’ 
South African rugby scene. However, the costly congress yielded little benefit to the plight of 
South African rugby.  
These organisations came to see South Africa and the SARB as the greatest victim of 
political interference in sport and thus attempted to aid the Board by spreading its non-racial 
and apartheid-free agenda. However, their lack of funding and support seriously inhibited 
what these organisations could achieve. They also came to be regarded as somewhat 
conservative organisations swimming against the current of opposing apartheid through all 
means possible, which also reflected badly on the SARB. Eventually their unsuccessful 
relationship with the SARB petered out towards the mid-1980s, particularly following the 
1985 All Black tour cancelation.  
The prospects of an All Black tour had kept South African rugby hopes alive, as rugby fans 
were desperate to see the old foe back on South African fields. With a brief tour by England 
in 1984, it seemed that an All Black tour stood a good chance of taking place. However, in 
New Zealand tempers flared and the possibility of a 1981 repeat (even though the tour would 
be in South Africa) seemed on the cards, as New Zealand police reports identified the 
possibility of never before seen violence should the All Blacks tour. Despite the newly 
elected Labour government imploring the NZRFU not to tour, plans were put in place for the 
tour to go ahead.  
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However, in the days leading up to the tour departure two Auckland lawyers took the matter 
to the New Zealand High Court and contended that the NZRFU would be in contravention of 
its own constitution to promote the game should the All Blacks tour South Africa. They likely 
sighted evidence from the 1981 tour of a substantial drop-off in rugby popularity amongst 
New Zealanders, and particularly among the youth, and contended that should the 1985 tour 
go ahead New Zealand might find rugby was no longer its preeminent sport. Consequently, 
the New Zealand court ruled against the 1985 tour, effectively grounding it only two days 
before it was set to depart. White South Africans were devastated at the loss of the tour and 
for the first time it seemed that South African rugby might have become truly isolated as 
France, Australia, Wales, and the British and Irish Lions cancelled their tours of the Republic.  
In a last gasp attempt to salvage South African rugby from the grips of isolation a New 
Zealand rebel tour was arranged by the SARB for 1986, without informing either the IRB or 
the NZRFU. The Cavaliers, as the rebel team was known, featured 28 of the 30 All Blacks 
who were set to tour in 1985 and were thus essentially a full All Black side. The tour briefly 
quenched the thirst of South African rugby fans, but ultimately proved counterproductive. 
The tour had violated IRB laws, as the Cavaliers did not have permission from their union to 
tour. On top of this, there was an investigation into transgressions of amateurism as it was 
speculated that players had been paid to tour South Africa. In the process, the SARB lost two 
of its closest friends, the IRB and NZRFU, who had both helped the Board to stave off South 
African rugby’s isolation for much of the boycott era.  
Despite promising the IRB that it would not engage in these rebel tours, another one was 
hosted the following year when the South Sea Barbarians toured South Africa in 1987, 
although they did not play any test matches. Again, the question of amateurism was thrown 
into dispute, as there was evidence of players being paid to come to South Africa. The SARB 
now found itself truly isolated as even some of the more conservative rugby unions around 
the world were questioning the ‘tour at all costs’ mentality of the SARB. After subsequently 
being excluded from the historic first Rugby World Cup, it seemed that the rugby world was 
leaving South Africa behind. The Rugby World Cup had changed the dynamic of future 
rugby as tours were now no longer the preeminent form of testing rugby strength. The rugby 
world was progressing while South Africa was being left behind.  
Having been deprived of regular and rigorous international competition, South Africa’s rugby 
quality was declining. Craven had relied for many years on the Currie Cup to keep South 
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Africa’s rugby standard high but with the country’s rugby ceiling becoming ever lower there 
was less chance for growth. Top players were leaving the country to apply their trade 
elsewhere as the Springbok jersey no longer represented the symbol of pride it once had. The 
drop in quality of rugby and the meagre prospects of playing the sport at an international 
level meant a drop in numbers playing the sport in South Africa, particularly among the youth 
who found that rugby was no longer their obvious choice at school level. South African rugby 
found itself in a position where it needed to be marketed – a comment in itself – if it wished 
to remain the foremost sport amongst white South Africans.  
Craven had found himself in a corner as none of the Board’s initiatives over the past several 
years had worked to facilitate the return of South African rugby to the international fold. As a 
result, he turned on the thing that had ultimately caused the 1981 tour events to transpire: 
apartheid. At the beginning of 1987, Craven released a new year’s message in which he 
condemned apartheid and the government’s non-commitment to major reform. Craven had 
not come to a sudden epiphany that apartheid was wrong, but had finally realised that while 
apartheid survived rugby could not.  
When in 1988 an opportunity presented itself to enter into talks with the ANC Craven 
grabbed it, essentially acknowledging that South Africa’s rugby future was very much at the 
mercy of the ANC. He and Louis Luyt entered into a series of discussions with the ANC 
executive regarding how rugby could ease the impact of the sporting boycott on the game. By 
talking with the ANC Craven believed that he was doing what was best for South African 
rugby, and in many respects, he was. The ANC recommended as a start the amalgamation of 
the two rugby bodies in South Africa, the SARB and SARU. Craven had already tried in 
1977 to amalgamate the SARU into the SARB, but then SARU president Abdul Abass had 
refused. Now in 1988 the time for an amalgamation seemed right as it was hoped that it 
would lead the way in bringing South Africans to a point where the government would enter 
into negotiations with the ANC. Although the discussions between the SARB and ANC were 
not political in nature, they took on a political significance, as it seemed that one of the major 
bastions of white power had defected and placed its faith in the ANC, much to the 
humiliation of the Nationalist government.  
The ANC incident marks the furthest reaches of the ripples caused by the 1981 tour. It was 
the moment that the SARB abandoned the old road it had followed since the tour and now 
implemented a new initiative that saw it amalgamate with the SARU to form the SARFU in 
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1991. The Board had tried numerous initiative which it believed could restore rugby pride in 
South Africa but each was as flawed as the next and ultimately left the game in a worse place 
than it had been before. It has to be acknowledged, though, that while the 1981 tour caused 
ripples in both South African and international rugby, these ripples were almost always 
aggravated by political events taking place in South Africa at the same time. Thus, while the 
1981 tour isolated South African rugby because rugby nations were opposed to inviting the 
Springboks or to tour to South Africa, that isolation was usually further compounded by, for 
instance, the failure of Botha to implement meaningful reforms or his infamous ‘Rubicon’ 
speech or the occupation of the townships by the SADF in the mid-1980s. While the 1981 
tour events forced the SARB into finding strategies to curb rugby isolation, the depth or 
severity of this isolation was usually dictated by what was happening in South Africa at the 
time, making it virtually impossible for the SARB to find a successful route past isolation.  
This was something Danie Craven and his Board were late to come to. The African initiative 
was thus an attempt to get to the root of the problem (apartheid) instead of trying to subvert it 
through convoluted and counterproductive strategies. However, even once the SARB entered 
into negotiations with the ANC and SARU, international rugby did not rush back and it took 
a further four years before touring resumed. The negotiations certainly pricked up the ears of 
the international audience who had been lulled to sleep by the ‘no-apartheid-in-rugby’ jingle, 
but it was only when real negotiations started for a new political dispensation in South 
African and the formal amalgamation of the SARU and SARB took place that it was deemed 
acceptable to return to international rugby. The African Initiative - in relative terms, the most 
successful of all of the SARB’s initiatives - would most likely have failed if the Board had 
gone to the ANC directly after the 1981 tour, as the political climate in greater South Africa 
was not right yet. The SARB was, however, perhaps a little fortuitous that so soon after 
holding talks with the ANC the new Nationalist government under F.W de Klerk decided to 
pursue negotiations with the ANC.  
Therefore, this thesis concludes that the 1981 tour of New Zealand and the USA is a much 
more complex entity that it is often made out to be. The events on tour were the ultimate 
expression of the frustrations New Zealanders had towards not only apartheid South Africa, 
but towards their own social environment. With the tour serving to isolate South African 
rugby, it certainly did add to the growing anxieties of white South Africans about the future 
of their country and likely weakened their resolve to resist major political changes in the 
1990s. While the tour cannot be considered has having played a part in breaking down 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
181 
 
apartheid, it certainly did contribute, along with the economic sanctions, civil disobedience in 
the townships, and the raging war on the country’s borders, to the increasing psychological 
pressure being placed on white South Africans during the 1980s. This likely contributed to 
overall inclination that South Africa was in need of major change.     
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